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Abi      irrigated land farming 
Afghani (or Af)    the official Afghan currency (one dollar= 48 Afs) 
Aigal      customary practice of conservation on hillsides 
Ailoq or sargol    upland pasture 
Amir     king 
Amlak     property  (land) 
Arbab      appointed local leader 
Asha     communal  work 
Beg     leader,  clan  head 
Chalma     dung cakes, for winter fuel 
Char kot  literally “four piles,” sharecropping where farmer gets one-quarter 
of crop 
Daftar  a highly erratic measure used mainly in Panjab District, averaging 
60 jeribs 
Dara     valley 
Dehqan     farmer, farm worker 
Ejara     lease,  lease  arrangement 
Ejara Khat    lease agreement 
Eslah Khat    mediation finding 
Firman     state order 
Feudales    landlords, as referred to during communist period 
Graw, bai jaez    pawning or mortgage 
Graw-dar    the person to whom land is pawned 
Habba     donation 
Hasre Werasat    legal heir 
Hizb     party 
Hoquq      law office, Ministry of Justice (right) 
Ijaradar    tenant 
I’tilaf     alliance,  coalition 
Jerib      one-fifth of a hectare 
Kargar     labourer/worker 
Kaghaz e safed  white paper settlements (customary or non Shari’a or legal 
document) 
Keraya     rent 
Khan      notable, landowner, landlord 
Khas bur    semi-useless land (literally, “tiny wild herb land”) 
Khar or Hezum  literally thorns or spikes, thorn bushes collected from mountains for 
fuel 
Koknar     poppy  plant 
Kulbar one-quarter  of  a daftar, around 15 jeribs 
Lalmi      rain-fed agriculture, dry land farming 
Loya Jirga    grand council 
Loy Saranwal    public prosecutor 
Mahkema Marafaa  provincial appeals court 
Mahr      marriage gift made to wife, can be property 
Malik     landlord,  owner 
Mana or Chapari  summer season shelter on pastures 
Maraa     public  land 
Mawaat     barren land 
Mir      leader, commander, tribal chief 
Mustofiyat    Finance House (provincial) 
Mustakber    landlord or oppressor (as referred to during time of faction) 
Mustazaf  the oppressed (as referred to during communist period), also a 
group of the Hizb-e Wahdat 
Nisfa kari    50-50 arrangement of sharecropping 
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Northern Alliance  coalition of anti-Taliban forces 
Numanyanda   representative 
Palavi      leader, literally “wrestler” 
Panj kot  literally “five piles,” sharecropping where farmer gets one-fifth of 
crop 
Qabala-ye-orfi    customary title deed 
Qabala-ye-shar’ia  official title deed 
Qabalae Jayezi   warranty deeds 
Qabalae Qatae    land ownership deeds 
Qarya     village 
Qasi     judge 
Qurut     dried  curds 
Rahn  temporary purchase, a form of mortgage but where lender takes 
over use of property until repayment 
Sahib zamin    landowner 
Sardar      leader, head of clan 
Sarad  literally “cold land,” meaning land fed by springs or highland 
ponds, neither by rain nor irrigation from rivers 
Sarqofli     tax or payment made by tenant 
Seer      seven kilos of grain 
Shari’a     Islamic law 
Sherini      tip, bribe, share 
Shura     community  committee 
Shura-i-Nizar    supervisory Council of the North 
Sai kot  literally “three piles,” sharecropping farmer received one-third of 
crop 
Taraka Khat    distribution of inherited property among heirs  
Takiya khana    meeting place, may also be used as mosque (in Shi’a sect of Islam) 
Tamlik Khat    letter of conveyance  
Taqsim Khat    division of property document during lifetime of owner 
Taryak     opium 
Tayefa     clan 
Tol      extended family or small group of families 
Tuyana     bride price, payment to wife’s father 
Ushr     alms  or  tithing 
Wahdat     the dominant Hazara political party 
Wakil     governor 
Wasayeq Sharia   legal documents 
Wasayat Khat    last will and testament 
Wuluswali   district 
Zamindar or mulkdar  landlord, landowner 
 
Note: the term household is used in this report to refer to what are generally extended 
households living in a single compound. Several nuclear families and several generations 
may be members of this household. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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Access to land is at the heartland of agrarian relations, as important to Afghans as 
to peasant farmers elsewhere around the world.
2 It has also been a public concern; 
attempts to reform inequitable access to land progressively marked late-royal, 
republican and especially communist agendas between 1966 and 1986. These 
efforts contributed significantly to rebellion and the ensuing decades of conflict 
and misery. Competition for scarce, usable land and deeper issues of inter-ethnic 
territoriality, aggravated by partisan government policy, have deeply characterised 
the making and unmaking of the Afghan state this last century.
3  
 
Despite the above, exploration and analysis of land relations in Afghanistan have 
been remarkably slight, both historically and in the present “post-conflict” period. 
To help remedy this, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) has 
begun to look into the issue. Examination of land tenure issues began in October 
2002 with a short scoping exercise by this author. Its objective was simple: to 
identify the land ownership problems facing Afghans, particularly those in the rural 
majority.  
 
AREU published this report in March 2003.
4 Although the study had been cursory, an 
overriding conclusion was inescapable: the land relations of Afghans are in serious 
disarray. This is both disarray born of two decades of conflict and disarray arising 
out of chronic and still unresolved inequities and tribal-based dissatisfactions. 
According to the report, the immediate concern is that real and lasting peace 
cannot be achieved without the resolution of land conflicts and the ordering of 
land relations in general.  
 
AREU engaged in a follow-up study in July 2003, 
5 which looked to the constitution-
making process as a unique opportunity for the national community to be alerted 
to the very basic tenure decisions that needed to be made and concluded that the 
exigencies of the situation required the intervention of supreme, constitutional 
law. A number of other countries had similarly found this to be necessary in recent 
years; chapters of land rights are increasingly common in modern national 
constitutions. 
 
Meanwhile, AREU has itself committed to learning more about the realities of land 
relations on the ground. This paper on Bamyan Province is the first of an 
immediate series of rapid reconnaissance studies that will be carried out in 
central, north-western, and north-eastern areas. These studies aim to provide 
quick, but grounded snapshots of land relations in different parts of the country.  
                                                 
2 Although in the past “Afghan” has referred to Pashtun only, it is used in its modern sense here to denote all 
citizens of Afghanistan. 
3 Refer to Alden Wily, L. Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan. Afghanistan Research and 
Evaluation Unit: Kabul. March 2003 for details of the 20
th century context of land relations in Afghanistan. The 
report is available on the internet: www.areu.org.pk  and may be acquired in hard copy from the AREU office in 
Kabul. 
4Ibid.  
5 Alden Wily, L. Land and the Constitution. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit: Kabul. September 2003. The 
report is available on the internet: www.areu.org.pk  and may be acquired in hard copy from the AREU office in 
Kabul. 
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Box 1: Bamyan Province:  Village Survey Areas   
 
1.  Bamyan District, Folady Valley:  Siya Khar Bolaq, Alibeg and Borghaso  
 
2.  Bamyan District, Peri-Urban Desert Area:  Dasht-e-Borsianas 
 
3.  Shibar District, Kalo Valley:  Upper Kalo 
 
4.  Shibar District, Eraq Valley:  Kafshandaz, Ashoor and Khoshkak 
 
5.  Panjab District, Gudar and Nargas Valleys:  Nargas and Doni Nayab 
 
6.  Panjab District, Khdak Takhta Valley:  Deh Pioetab and Kachari 
 
7.  Panjab District, Ghor Ghori Valley:  Bazaar, Joi Hawdz and Rashak 
 
Methodology 
Bamyan Province lies in the heart of the country (see map). It is also physically and 
historically central to the area referred to as Hazarajat, populated mainly (but now 
far from exclusively) by the Hazara people. Bamyan was selected as potentially 
representative of the central zone mainly on the basis that it is accessible and 
“secure.” The visit to the area was short, lasting 13 days in June 2003. It focused 
on eight groupings of villages in three of the seven districts. Around 200 farmers, 
both landed and landless, participated, talking about the land relations of some 
2,000 households in 15 communities (villages or hamlets) (Table 1). Women 
attended about half of these meetings.  The selection of communities was 
opportunistic and selection of informants was casual; nothing in the village 
accounts should be construed as founded on rigorous research. Time limitations, 
which were exacerbated by long distances travelled within this expansive province, 
meant that the author opted for breadth of coverage at the expense of depth of 
study. In all areas selected, valleys form the natural socio-spatial framework. 
Sometimes these represent a single interlinked social formation or social ward 
(manteqa). In the case of larger valleys, villages and hamlets may form a number 
of such social clusters. 
 
Though the author visited a number of farms, there was no way of knowing 
whether the information received on farm size and other matters was accurately 
presented by informants. It became clear, however, that Bamyan Province farmers 
are considerably less shy than their brothers in many other parts of the world to 
say how much land they own (or don’t own). “What is the point of lying about my 
land?” responded one farmer, “My tenants know exactly how much land I have and 
how much land everyone else has.” Such candidness was not found when discussing 
livestock, and vague or obviously inaccurate responses were common. Accordingly, 
the livestock data collected are not provided here. This is a great pity, for 
livestock ownership, as this study found, is much more widely spread among 
households than land ownership; indeed, the ownership of sheep in particular 
represents the single capital asset of many poorer households. 
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Table 1: Number of Districts, Valleys/Manteqa and Communities Surveyed, Number of 
Households Surveyed and Number of Direct Interviewees  
  

















Kahmard  0  --  --  0  0 
Saighan  0  --  --  0  0 
Warras  0  --  --  0  0 
Yakawlang  5  --  --  0  0 
Bamyan  20
6  Folady   Siya Khar Bolaq  78  12 
      Alibeg  126  10 
      Borghaso  100  11 
    Bamyan  Dasht-e-Borsianas  100  15 
Shibar  5  Kalo  -  (1,200)
7  35 
    Eraq  Kafshandaz  42  6 
      Ashoor  22  4 
      Khoshkak  20  11 
Panjab   4  Nargas  Sara-e-Nargas   16  5 
      Akbar  55  6 
    Gudar  Doni Nayab  30  16 
    Khdak Takhta  Deh Pioetab  83  13 
      Kachari  16  15 
    Ghor Ghori  Bazaar  12  12 
      Joi Hawdz  11  16 













Generically, land relations do not exist in isolation from other social and economic 
relations. Nor are they isolated in time. Hazara land relations — for the Hazara 
people are the overwhelming ethnic majority in Bamyan — and the problems 
Hazaras face today have been very directly shaped by state policy over the last 
century, including in the very recent Taliban past. Additionally, this is set against a 
long history in which Hazarajat operated as a largely (but frequently infringed and 
embattled) series of related autonomous areas, if not a discrete kingdom per se. 
Writing on the modern history of Hazarajat is limited and mainly indirectly 
ascertained by commentators. S.A. Mousavi (1998) stands as Afghanistan’s only 
contemporary scholar on the subject and is a source frequently used here. For the 
most part, however, it befits the nature of this exercise that the farmers 
interviewed should speak for themselves, and it is their report on their land 
relations that dominate this paper.  
 
Sadly, the story they tell is far from happy.  They represent a population that has 
been on the receiving end of vicious depopulation policies, of classical tensions 
between customary and state-granted rights and legal systems, those between the 
land uses of settled and nomadic peoples and those between the state and people 
as to their respective powers over property. As if the external drivers of chaos in 
land relations were not sufficient, the internal ordering of land relations is 
inequitable, resulting in landlessness, exploitation and increasing poverty.  
                                                 
6 Mainly provincial level officials. 
7 This refers to the estimated total households of the valley, the subject of discussion with 35 representatives. 
However, the information ascertained was very general, and not backed up with on-site visits to any villages in the 
valley, and the number is therefore placed in parentheses. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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Bamyan Province lies in central Afghanistan within the Hindu Kush range between 
2,000 and 4,000 metres above sea level (and with the dominant Koh-i-Baba 
mountain ridge rising to 5,000 metres). Administratively, Bamyan officially 
comprises seven districts with around half a million people in around 2,000 hamlets 
or villages (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Population Estimates of Bamyan Province 
  District  Est. Villages  Est. Households  Est. Population 
 
1  Bamyan Central  271  14,457  77,473 
2  Yakawlang  481  13,948  141,877 
3  Shibar  190  4,905  19,002 
4  Saighan  83  4,633  27,758 
5  Kahmard  41  7,126  42,107 
6  Panjab  390  11,580  113,896 











Sources: Various: FAO 2003 (using AIMS data of June 2002), Solidarités 2003 and AKDN, pers. comm. 
 
Accurate demography is hard to come by, both because the population has been in 
flux over the last decade and because operational agencies tend to use different 
socio-spatial units to define “villages.” 
8 Villagers themselves use diverse bases to 
define local areas or manteqa. In one valley, this may be defined by a socio-
physical hamlet, while among persons in another valley, by membership of the 
local takiya khana and in another valley, by clan membership, which may cross-cut 
rather than coincide with settlement patterns. Religion may also define 
“community.” 
9 Valleys are generally too large to define community or serve as a 
useful operational basis for social or development management. These variously 
comprise ten to 60 hamlets. Villages or hamlets may comprise six to 160 or more 
households. Households tend to vary from nuclear units to large extended families 
and to households which include client families (see Box 2). In sum, figures for 
settlements and people need to be viewed with caution, particularly as the 
population is still in flux as people return from exile. 
 
The vast majority of residents are farmers
10 and towns are few.  Artisan skills of 
spinning and weaving woollen goods and trading of these and qurut (dried milk 
curds) and leather are widely practised supplementary activities.
11 The area is 
                                                 
8 For example, population estimates for August 2002 given by UNHCR are markedly different from those provided 
by AIMS for the same period and different again for those provided by operational agencies in the area. 
9 A fascinating insight into the way religion may reconstruct what on the surface looks like a village community is 
provided by Canfield, R.L. Faction and Conversion in a Plural Society: Religious Alignments in the Hindu Kush. 
Anthropological Press: The University of Michigan – Ann Arbor. 1973, 8-9. In looking at religion in some valleys in 
Shibar District, he found that while Ismaili and other Shi’a may live together in the same hamlet, they do not 
intermarry, identify different forefathers, do not graze sheep and goats in the same flock, patronise different 
mills and use different artisans. They feel no obligation to greet each other on the path, and borrowing, lending, 
buying and selling seldom crosses sectarian lines. 
10 The FAO estimates 95 percent. FAO. Project Document. The Development of Sustainable Agricultural 
Livelihoods in the Eastern Hazarajat, 2003-2007. 2003. 
11 See Shurmann, H.F. The Mongols of Afghanistan: An Ethnography of the Moghols and Related Peoples of 
Afghanistan. Mouton and Co.: S-Gravenhage. 1962 and Mousavi, S. The Hazaras of Afghanistan. An Historical, 
Cultural, Economic and Political History. Curzon Press: Surrey. 1998 for details of what the latter calls “industry 
and commerce” among the Hazaras. There is no doubt that Bamyan City itself represented an important trading Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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famously high and cold and the people poor, eking out a living in long, narrow 
valleys with limited scope for irrigated agriculture and unusually long winters of six 
months in the higher zones.  
 
Box 2:  Social Organisation among Bamyan Hazaras 
 
Khanawadah   Household 
 
Tol (or Tolwar)   Extended family, headed by malik 
 
Tayefa  Clan, headed by khan (and later often an arbab) 
 
Qaum Tribe,  headed  by  beg or higher mir (commander) 
 
Source: Mousavi 1998 and field. 
 
Traditionally, Bamyan has always had the least hectares of irrigated farmland in 
Afghanistan.
12 Wheat is the dominant crop, with 41,711 hectares (ha) planted in 
2002 in the five districts of Bamyan, Shibar, Yakawlang, Saighan and Kahmard.
13 
Potatoes in Bamyan District in particular, and barley, beans and sometimes poplar 
and willow trees, are other common crops. Fodder crops are also routinely 
produced.
14 Cultivation is by river-fed irrigation (abi) or partial irrigation by high 
ponds or springs (sarad) and on rain-fed fields (lalmi). Rotation and fallowing are 
practised, the latter especially on the rain-fed fields. Some of these lie at more 
than 3,000 metres and may be very remote from settlements. Figures for farmland 
vary widely, and again figures are given with reservation in Table 3. Certain trends 
are fairly stable, such as the limited amount of rain-fed land in Bamyan District 
compared to its abundance in Panjab District.
15 The mountainous nature of Bamyan 




Historically and today, raising livestock is common. Those who have tracked 
livestock data observe the sensitivity of numbers to local and external factors and 
not just drought.
17 Comparing figures for three villages between 1994 and 1998, 
Semple, for example, concluded that not-flood-related fodder losses, as well as the 
Taliban economic blockade of Hazarajat during 1997-1999, had reduced mean 
cattle holding from six to two animals per household, and sheep and goats from 21 
to seven animals per household within that short period.
18 Farmers in this 
                                                                                                                                            
post throughout several millennia and also that the passes were important trading routes to and from the north 
and south. 
12 During the 1960s, Bamyan Province had the lowest hectarage of irrigated land at 23,160 ha. CSO (Central 
Statistics Office). Afghanistan Agriculture in Figures. Kabul. 1978. 
13  Solidarités. Social and Economic Survey on 5 Districts of Central Afghanistan: Bamyan, Saighan, Kahmard, 
Shibar, Yakawlang. Paris. 2003.   In 1991, at which time some 41 percent of farms were abandoned, a Swedish-
funded survey of agriculture found that 98 percent of farmers were growing wheat; the mean area was 4.4 jeribs 
(0.9 ha) of irrigated land per farmer under wheat, producing a mean of 57 seers  (399 kg) per jerib. Among the 23 
percent who also grew rain-fed wheat, the mean area cultivated was 6.9 jeribs (1.38 ha), but with each jerib 
producing only 13 seers of wheat (91 kg), one quarter the production of irrigated land. (SCA [Swedish Committee 
for Agriculture]. Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan. Fourteenth Report. 1993, Table 14.)   
14 In 1991, 36 percent of farmers grew alfalfa and 14 percent grew clover (Ibid, Table 21). 
15 For example, FAO-UNDP indicated 8,963 ha and 6,723 ha respectively for irrigated farmland in Bamyan and 
Panjab Districts, but only 596 ha of rain-fed land compared to Panjab’s 7,082 ha (FAO-UNDP. Provincial Landcover 
Atlas of Islamic State of Afghanistan, 1999. Kabul. 1999.) 
16 For example, in 1967-78, a formal survey showed that only 6,760 ha of rain-fed agriculture was practised; the 
seventh lowest area among 28 provinces (CSO 1978, op cit.; Table 32). 
17 See information on livestock numbers in Shurmann, op cit., Solidarités, op cit., and Semple, M. Strategies for 
support of sustainable rural livelihoods for the central highlands of Afghanistan: A study to identify opportunities 
for effective assistance to reinforce people’s livelihood strategies. Pattan Development Organization: Islamabad. 
Draft. 1998. 
18 Semple, ibid. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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reconnaissance indicated that disease represented the largest constraint to 
increasing numbers of livestock, against a background of losses during the drought 
and the Taliban years.  
 
Table 3: Estimated Arable Land in Bamyan Province 














Land (% of 
total) 
1  Bamyan 
Central 
49,154   5,783   54,937   89.5  10.5 
2  Yakawlang  55,560   62,680   118,240   47  53 
3  Shibar  10,298   10,789   21,087   49  51 
4  Saighan  19,454   18,991   38,445   50.6  49.4 
5  Kahmard  19,238   16,388   35,626   54  46 
6  Panjab  15,252   73,160   88,412   17.3  82.7 
7  Warras  No data  No data       
Sources: Solidarités 2003, Oxfam Panjab Office for Panjab and Warras Districts 
 
 
There is ample evidence that Hazara ownership of stock may have been in steady 
decline over the last century. Competition for rangeland, loss of rangeland through 
expanded rain-fed cultivation, climate change due to deforestation of the juniper 
forests, and degradation of the rangeland that remains are commonly mentioned 
causes. Many travellers and researchers of the past noted the large numbers of 
animals owned by Hazaras.
19 Hazaras have historically been agro-pastoral rather 
than solely farmers (and, Shurmann notes, some were nomadic). Mousavi cites an 
1857 finding that the feudal chiefs of Dai Zangi (modern day Panjab and Warras) 
possessed more than 69,000 horses in their cavalry, though he acknowledges that 
others recorded much lower numbers.
20 The movement of flocks to the high 
pastures (ailoq or sarqol) remains an annual summer routine (not to be confused 
with nomadism). Every community hires a shepherd or two for this purpose, usually 
the sons of landless workers.  
 
Keeping livestock in this region is by no means confined to the landed; even among 
the poorest, there are those that take their small herds of sheep and goats with 
them as they move from landlord to landlord. In 1991, the Swedish Committee of 
Afghanistan (SCA) reported that 98 percent of households owned a donkey and 
more surprising, 75 percent owned a cow. Two-thirds of households owned small 
stock (goats or sheep).
21 There is little evidence today of such widespread 
ownership, especially of cattle. All communities visited complained of shortage of 
ploughing power. No landless farmer owned a cow. Many landless farmers own a 
sheep or two. 
  
Land ownership typically defines and divides community members broadly into 
those who own land and houses and those who do not. Mousavi divides pre-modern 
society among feudal landlords (mirs), richer peasants (often religious leaders), 
middle peasants (soldiers and relatives of the mirs), small peasants, and landless 
peasants and landless, bonded labourers.
22 It is generally agreed that a prominent 
                                                 
19 Shurmann, op cit., Canfield, op cit., Mousavi, op cit. and Hamilton, L. A Vizier’s Daughter. A Tale of the Hazara 
War. John Murray: London. 1900. 
20  Mousavi, op cit., 101; See also Ferdinand, K. Preliminary Notes on Hazara Culture. Historisk-filosofiske 
Meddeleser bind 37, No. 5: Copenhagen. 1959, 22 and Lee, J. The ‘Ancient Supremacy’: Bukhara, Afghanistan and 
the Battle for Balkh, 1731-1901. Brill, Leiden: New York. 1996, pers. comm. 
21 SCA 1993, op cit. 
22 Mousavi, op cit. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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Hazara urban working class grew out of the forced and voluntary migrations from 
Hazarajat that resulted from Abdur Rahman’s policies and those of his successors.
23 
These same policies did much to reconstruct feudal land relations at home and the 
mirs in effect disappeared. Landlessness and exploitative land relations did not 
contribute to the reconstruction of feudal land relations, as this paper will amply 
illustrate. 
 
Bamyan as the Centre of Hazarajat 
Bamyan Province is part of Hazarajat, and arguably its geographical, historical and 
socio-cultural centre. Hazarajat has no official political or administrative 
designation and different administrations over the last century have determinedly 
constructed provincial boundaries to limit its cohesion — the most recent effort of 
which has seen the Tajik-dominated districts of Saighan and Kahmard attached to 
Bamyan in 2003. Excluding these districts, Hazarajat as popularly construed by 
Hazaras comprises Bamyan Province and ten districts in six adjacent provinces.
24 
 
The fact that many (but not all) Hazaras appear Mongoloid in their features 
generated much interest in their origins among travellers and scholars between the 
18
th to 20
th centuries. An emergent view for a while was that they are the 
descendants of the soldiers of the Mongol warrior, Genghis Khan, who reached and 
laid waste to the area around 1221.
25 Mousavi extensively reviews this and other 
theories and concludes that the Hazaras have much older origins, extending back 
to the migration of different Turkic peoples into the area some 2,300 years ago. 
Modern Hazaras are, Mousavi argues, a thorough mixture of many different races 
and ethnic groups, of which the soldiers of Genghis Khan and his descendant, Amir 
Timur, are but one element.
26 
 
Hazarajat is regarded as one of the most mono-ethnic areas in Afghanistan. By far 
the majority of residents are Hazaras. The exceptions are the two newly added 
districts of Saighan and Kahmard, where respectively 63 percent and 82 percent of 
the population call themselves Tajik.
27 Authors in the past have divided the 
Hazaras into seven or eight tribes, among whom the Sheikh Ali Hazaras around 
Bamyan are perhaps most well known.
28 The Hazaras are Imami Shi’a, and this 
distinction from majority Sunni adherence has been a frequent source of conflict 
with non-Hazaras. Hazarajat is also the home of most of Afghanistan’s Ismaili Shi’a, 
found predominantly in Bamyan, Shibar and Yakawlang districts.
29 Sadats or 
Sayeeds also represent a significant minority. They constitute an upper class of 
                                                 
23 Abdur Rahman reigned from 1880–1901.  This migration pattern grew dramatically during the 1970s, providing a 
significant proportion of the unskilled labour in Afghanistan and neighbouring Iran (Mousavi, op cit., 107-109). 
24 Balkhab in Jouwzjan Province, Dar-e-Suf in Samangan Province, Lal o Sari Jangal in Ghor Province, Dai Kundi and 
Sharistan in Uruzgan Province, Malistan, Jaghori and Nawor in Ghazni Province and Behsud I and II in Wardak 
Province. 
25 Lee, op cit., 14. The Mongol hordes swept through the area on the way to Herat, besieged and destroyed by the 
end of 1221. 
26 Mousavi, op cit., 43. 
27 Solidarités, op cit. 
28 Hazara comes from the Persian word for “a thousand,” a military division used by the Uzbeks and Mongols.  As 
such, it originated as a military, not an ethnic designation.  Other groups include the Koh-i-Baba, Badakshan, 
Berberis (in Iran), Aimaq and Taimanni clans (Sunni Hazaras) as well as those referred to by Shurmann, for 
example, as simply the Harazajat Hazaras, meaning areas around Wardak (op cit., 112). Canfield observes after 
Kakar 1968 that the Sheikh Ali Hazaras in fact included the Shibar and Kalo Hazaras who in the 1970s referred to 
themselves as Darghu Hazaras (op cit., 99). 
29 The Shi’a or Shi’ites broke from the “orthodox” (Sunni) Muslim community after the death of the 4
th Khalif, Ali. 
They recognize Ali and his descendants, whom they call “Imams,” as the only legitimate descendants of the 
Prophet. The Imami Shi’a are referred to as “twelvers” because they recognise 12 Imams. In contrast, the Ismaili 
branch of the Shi’a, are called “seveners” because they recognize only the first seven Imams. They follow a 
different line of Imam descendants after that up until the present day. The Agha Khan is their current Imam. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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Shi’a who claim direct descent from the Prophet’s son-in-law, Ali, and have origins 
in Saudi Arabia. An important group of Sayeeds are known as Qizelbash or Afshar, 
said to be of Turkish heritage and descendants of the Persian king, Nadir Shah, who 
invaded Afghanistan in 1738. Sayeeds tend to be urban dwellers and many live 
today in Herat, Kabul and Kandahar, but are also present in Yakawlang and Bamyan 
City. 
Historical Overview 
Prior to the rule of Abdur Rahman (1880-1901), Hazarajat was governed internally 
by tribal chieftains, “some of whom it would be right to call local kings.”
30 The 
area was never unified under a single leader, nor does it appear that this was an 
aspiration of the different local amirs. Nonetheless, there is much to suggest a 
sense of ethnic and socio-spatial cohesion that reaches back many centuries. 




31 The area was a link in the silk route and 
related trading byways from many centuries past and domination at this time was 
at least partly designed to limit the chronic plundering of trading caravans by the 
local Sheikh Ali Hazaras around Bamyan.
32 Few dared to go to Hazarajat, writes 
Ferdinand, but Afghan nomads (Kuchis) did begin to venture into the area during 
the reign of Sher Ali Khan (1863-1879), “just at the time when they told me they 
had begun to get good, modern rifles.”
33  
1880-1901: The Dispossession of the Hazaras 
Everything changed, of course, with the reign of Abdur Rahman (1880-1901). Much 
has been written on this period, usually with emphasis by some 18
th century 
historians on the role of this amir in creating the modern geo-political state of 
Afghanistan.
34 Rahman’s extraordinary ruthlessness in bringing the occupants of 
northern and western Afghanistan to heel (and his particular cruelty to the 
Hazaras) have been noted by historians but explained as a necessary evil of 
establishing the nation-state.
35 Lee’s more recent and in-depth examination of 
India Office documents provides a much clearer picture of the atrocities and the 
mental instability of Abdur Rahman that lay behind it.
36 
 
There may be little doubt that the Hazaras were a prominent focus of the “Iron 
Amir’s” terror. First, their subordination was to cost him most of his budget and 
military force. Second, as Shi’ites, they were considered heretics by the Sunni 
amir.
37 Canfield suggests that Hazara raids on caravans passing along the Kabul-
Turkistan road were early irritants to Abdur Rahman to act, particularly as his wife 
was caught at one point in such a caravan.
38 
                                                 
30 Ferdinand, op cit., 22. 
31 And most notably by Shah Zaman (1793-99). Ferdinand cites Elphinstone’s account of 1812 in which the Hazaras 
of Panjab and Warras were in particular referred to as “independent” (op cit., 18). Also refer to Canfield, op cit., 
96-99, who records regular slave-raiding into Bamyan from the north and the steadily increasing effort to control 
Bamyan as a way of controlling trade routes. 
32 Canfield, op cit., 96-99. 
33 Ferdinand, op cit., 19. 
34 For example, see Dupree, L. Afghanistan. Princeton University Press: Princeton. 1980; Olesen, A. Islam and 
Politics in Afghanistan. Curzon Press: Surrey. 1995; and Magnus, R., Naby, E. Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and 
Mujahid. Westview Press: New York. 2002. 
35 Ferdinand, op cit., Canfield, op cit. and Shurmann, op cit. also tend to this position. 
36 Rahman judicially executed upwards of 10,000 persons; many of the Hazaras and hundreds of thousands more 
perished from hunger, forced migrations or campaigns. Lee shows how the British knew the condition and terror of 
Rahman well, but chose to keep this secret for political reasons (Lee, op cit., passim). Also see Hamilton, op cit. 
for a first-hand description of this period. 
37 Mousavi, op cit., 114. 
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From their point of view, the Iron Amir’s rule was intolerable to the Hazaras, and 
not least in the continuing stream of taxes levied, some 16 of which were 
introduced as early as 1880-1881.
39 While their leaders initially welcomed Abdur 
Rahman, his reign proved quickly to not be as they had expected. Discontent was 
expressed as early as 1882 when the king exiled and replaced the leader of the 
Bamyan Hazaras (the Sheikh Ali Hazaras) with a Pashtun ruler.
40 When later (1888) 
one of Abdur Rahman’s own cousins rebelled in Mazar-i-Sharif (the famous Ishaq 
Khan), the remaining Sheikh Ali leaders took the opportunity to support him.
41 Lee 
records that on his way to crush this rebellion in Afghan Turkistan in 1888, Abdur 
Rahman vented his wrath on the Sheikh Ali Hazaras. Fines were imposed and a 
large number of cattle were taken. By December 1889, an official British 
newsletter on the region produced in Peshawar reported that there were between 
6,000 and 7,000 Sheikh Ali Hazaras imprisoned in Kabul. Hundreds, possibly 
thousands, had died during the forced march to Kabul: 
 
“… for the old, women and children who collapsed from exhaustion or fell 
sick on the road were massacred where they fell, by their guards. Others 
died from a variety of diseases contracted in the fetid Kabul prisons, from 
the rigours of working in slave gangs or as a result of the appalling conditions 
in which they were housed. Many young women were sold to Muhammadzai 
sardars (commanders). By the end of 1890 the Kabul wakil reported that not 
a vestige of the Sheikh Ali Hazaras are left.”
42 
 
By 1890 parts of Hazarajat were so depopulated that it was easy for Abdur Rahman 
to further colonise the area with Pashtuns, and especially members of Ghilzai 
clans, by no means ardent supporters of the Durrani Abdur Rahman. Large numbers 
of Ghilzai from Jalalabad, Laghman and Kandahar were forced to move there and 
to areas further north, where the vacant and vacated land was divided among 
them.
43 Not all Pashtuns were willing emigrants. Sometimes whole villages were 
levelled in order to force the Ghilzai Pashtuns to emigrate.
44 By 1892 most of 
Hazarajat was subordinated and taxes were being paid. This was not enough for 
Abdur Khan, says Mousavi. He summoned, and then imprisoned, exiled or killed as 
many Hazara mirs and religious leaders as he could find. More and more atrocities 
were committed in what was indisputably an open rule of terror.
45 New taxes were 
constantly added, including a land tax.  
 
Finally, in 1891, the amir sent 10,000 men to Bamyan to collect revenues and they 
were so heavy-handed that they precipitated the first uprising.
46 Land tax would be 
collected one day, then the next day oil would be added on, then 100 sheep, then 
straw, followed by barley and so on, records Mousavi, citing an eyewitness account 
written in 1913 that those who refused or who could not pay were massacred, 
including women and children.
47 
                                                 
39 These continued; Canfield after Kakar 1968 records that by 1886 all Hazara tribes paid land tax on cattle and 
even marriage fees. “But the revenue was not paid in a uniform manner …whereas some tribes paid a fixed 
percentage on the produce of their land …others paid a fixed amount on the land or by family...”. Kakar also 
records that only Uruzgan Hazaras had escaped and this was due to their strength and resistance (Canfield, op cit., 
100). 
40  Mousavi, op cit., 121. 
41 Refer to Lee, op cit., 495-529 for a detailed account of Ishaq Khan’s rebellion and the effects upon both the 
north and Hazarajat. 
42 Ibid, 532. 
43 Ibid, 560. 
44 Ibid, 597. 
45 Lee, op cit. and Mousavi, op cit. 
46 Lee, op cit., 581. 
47 Mousavi, op cit., 124. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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The uprising began as a popular movement by ordinary Hazaras, joined by leaders, 
one of whom was Mohammad Azim Beg, the Dai Zangi Amir — a character who will 
appear in the history of one of the villages discussed later. This mir had in fact 
pledged loyalty to Abdur Rahman, but joined his people in their outrage and 
organised the council that brought Hazara leaders together from all over the 
domain.
48 Unlike the earlier uprising of Sheikh Ali Hazaras, this sought to do more 
than limit taxes; it sought to overthrow the amir in Kabul. Abdur Rahman 
responded with the dispatch of some 30,000 troops and called on Sunni leaders to 
conduct a crusade against the kafir (infidel) Shi’a Hazaras. Those who took part 




By the end of 1892 the Hazaras were defeated. Thousands of Hazara men, women 
and children were sold as slaves in the markets of Kabul and Kandahar and towers 
of human heads were made from the defeated rebels as warning.
50  Exorbitant 
taxes and oppression were again the rule and Hazarajat became a centre of slave 
trading, with a special tax on slave trading introduced.
51 Bribery and looting of 
Hazara property was rife.  
 
Mousavi records that in April 1894 orders were given to confiscate all grazing land 
in Hazarajat, with the stipulation that under no circumstances should Hazaras be 
allowed any longer to use these lands.
52 These lands were handed over to the 
leaders of the Afghan nomads: 
 
“Efforts to protect their land ended in the death of several Hazara each 
time, and the looting of their property and families, with the local rulers 
always siding with the Afghan intruders …far from any fines being levied … 
for trespass and damage to Hazara crops, they were able to force their 




Taxes continued to multiply, including a head tax, a household or poll tax, an 
animal tax and a blood tax to pay for Abdur Rahman’s army, a slave tax and a 
land tax. By 1901 the last was based on land size, and the payable rate rose 
annually. Non-arable land was also taxed. By then, the socio-economic 
landscape of Hazarajat had changed. The feudal and ruling class was wiped out, 
the traditional method of dividing land on a tribal, clan and khan  basis was 
abandoned, and large scale emigration saw the dispersal of Hazaras to Russia, 
Iran (the Barbari) and to Quetta in what was then British India, as well as to the 
cities of Afghanistan.  
1901-1978: Barely Making Amends 
When he succeeded the throne in 1901, Amir Habibullah Khan (1901-1919) restored 
at least some of the arable land to the Hazaras, making grants to many who had 
been imprisoned for the duration of his father’s reign. His son, the reputable King 
Amanullah (1919-1929), famed for his reforms, attempted to restore more land to 
                                                 
48  This was to become in local history as the famous Jirga-e Au Qoal. 
49  Mousavi, op cit., 126. 
50  Shurmann, op cit. 
51  Mousavi, op cit., 126. Enslavement was not new to the Hazaras, as recorded by Shurmann, op cit. and 
Ferdinand, op cit. Also see Canfield, op cit., 98. 
52  Mousavi, op cit., 133. 
53  Ibid. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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the Hazaras (but contradicted this in his policy of selling large tracts of so-called 
public lands, but often pasture, at low prices, and increasingly to Pashtuns). The 
land-fate of the Hazaras was sealed by the post-war wave of Pashtun nationalism, 
which was to gather pace under Nadir Shah (1929-1933) and his son, Zahir Shah 
(1933-1973). Throughout Hazarajat, the interests of Pashtuns were favoured in 
terms of land grants and grants of grazing lands to Pashtun nomads. Particularly 
from the 1950s, the Pashtun nomads felt free to roam wherever they liked and to 
secure whatever pastures or related lands they wished for.
54 Peace was, however, 
restored during the 1900-1930 period and the formal abolition of slavery (1895) 
began to become more of a reality under Amanullah, who put the matter into the 
first constitution
55 (although, as noted later, this did not limit discrimination or 
exploitation against Hazaras, wherever they lived). As important for Hazaras was 
the sharp — but temporary — diminishment by Amanullah of multiple taxation on 




Despite peace and changes under Amanullah, Mousavi and others argue that little 
really changed in practice for the Hazaras during the first 80 years of the 20
th 
century. They remained the poorest farmers in the country and served as the 
underpaid porters and house staff of Kabul. Their exploitation, subordination and 
intimidation were “normal.”
57 Indeed, up until the 1970s, the killing of Hazara 
Shi’a was allegedly accepted by Sunni clerics as a sanctified means of gaining God’s 
favour. Taxes remained unusually harsh in Hazarajat and at least once in this 
period (1946) there was rebellion against a tax designed to squeeze more land and 
livestock out of the Hazaras.
58 As the studies in this paper record, many Hazaras 
consider the period of President Daoud (1973-1978) to have been the most harsh in 
this respect. Officials turned a blind eye or publicly supported Kuchi land grabbing 
and their exploitation of poor farming communities in their trading relations.
59 
Much of the loss of land under bitter dispute today in fact stems from the 1960-
1970s. Hazara migration to cities continued throughout this period.  
1979-1995: The Resurgence of Hazarajat 
After the invasion of Russian troops in 1979, Bamyan and other Hazarajat provinces 
regained their status as de facto semi-autonomous areas. Resistance against the 
communists was quick to take off in 1979, and up until 1983 a genuinely local and 
popular movement (Shura-e Ittifaq) emerged, largely based in Yakawlang. This was 
overtaken by a multiplicity of resistance groups formed in Iran. With the 
encouragement of Iranian authorities, at least four attempts at alliance among 
these factions was made from 1979 and finally succeeded in 1987.
60 This paved the 
way for the formation of the Hizb-e Wahdat in Bamyan itself in 1989.  
 
Mousavi perceives the post-1979 period as one of liberation not just from Kabul, 
but against oppressive landlords. He claims that many took a stand in their own 
localities. To some extent, this is reflected in the surveys recounted later. The 
landlord-based Shura-e Ittifaq movement of 1979-1983 was criticised for its feudal 
ideology and Hizb-e Wahdat was perceived by most as a more popular evolution.  
                                                 
54 Ferdinand, op cit. 
55 1923 Constitution, 20 Hamal 1302, Article 9. 
56 Poullada, L. Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929. King Amanullah’s Failure to Modernize a Tribal 
Society. Ithaca University Press: Ithaca, NY. 1973, 134. 
57 Mousavi, op cit., 160. 
58  Ferdinand, op cit. 
59  Canfield, op cit., Ferdinand, op cit., and Pedersen, G. Afghan Nomads in Transition: A Century of Change 
Among the Zala Khan Khel. The Carlsberg Foundation’s Nomad Research Project: Thames on Hudson. 1994.  
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A more obvious gain was in the retrieval of lands which had, to Hazara thinking, 
been wrongfully taken from them by Pashtuns over the preceding decades. 
Pedersen, Canfield and others have all commented on this trend. “I was told in 
Bamyan,” Mousavi wrote, “that not a single Pashtun is left in the whole of 
Hazarajat. Deprived of central government backing, and given the bitter past 
relations between the two peoples, the Pashtuns have themselves withdrawn.”
61  
 
For some years, the Hizb-e Wahdat coalition held and steadily gained support, 
including from urban areas. It was led by the charismatic Abdul Ali Mazari from 
Mazar-i-Sharif, who succeeded in bringing together ethnic, religious and political 
factions. He was a Hazara whose great grandfather, Ajir Mohaqiq, had fled Amir 
Abdur Rahman’s torments and had been given land in Mazar by Amanullah in 
compensation. “By 1992 the Hazaras had emerged as a national force to be 
reckoned with.”
62 With the fall of Najibullah’s government in 1992, Hizb-e Wahdat, 
now with a base in Kabul, began to defend Shi’a and Hazara interests against what 
it perceived as a Tajik and Sunni dominated interim government. In 1993, anti-
Tajik feelings reached new heights among the Hazaras following the Afshar 
massacre in West Kabul in which several hundred Hazaras were murdered by the 
forces of President Rabbani and his chief commander, Ahmed Massoud. Hazaras 
sacked the Kabul museum and were partly to blame for the destruction of some 
Kabul neighbourhoods. Back in Bamyan, Hizb-e  Wahdat and the Tajik forces of 
Massoud fought each other for control throughout most of 1995. The Tajik 
commanders were eventually defeated and retreated to Kahmard district, on the 
way destroying many villages in Bamyan and parts of Shibar. This was to be 
remembered in 1999.
63  
1995-2001: The Taliban Arrive 
After the death of Abdul Ali Mazari in 1995, Hizb-e Wahdat, already fragmented, 
formally split. One faction, led by Abdul Karim Khalili, joined forces in 1996 with 
the Dostum-led Northern Alliance against the Taliban. Moderate and generally 
wealthier Hazaras (including many Sayeeds) supported Mohammed Akbari, who 
pledged allegiance to the Taliban “in a bid to prevent more bloodshed.” Fighting 
between the two Hazara factions continued up until 1998.
64  It became so 
destructive that Oxfam, for example, closed its office in Panjab in 1996, not to 
reopen until 1998. In Yakawlang, commanders of different sub-groups supporting 
one or other faction took over some local properties, some of which are still under 
dispute today. Local interviewees said that this has soured local relations between 
the Hazaras and Sayeeds.  
 
Failing to break through Hazara resistance under Khalili, the Taliban instituted an 
economic blockade of Hazarajat in 1997, preventing goods from moving in and out 
of the region. Following their conquest of Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1998, the 
Taliban proceeded south to Bamyan, easily took Kahmard and Saighan, and then 
Bamyan City in September 1998, and Yakawlang and Panjab in December 1998.
65 
Many had fled before them, having heard the news of the Mazar massacres.  
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After securing the area, the Taliban withdrew, leaving administration to the Akbari 
supporters. This worked best in Panjab and Warras, where field studies suggest 
people suffered less. The situation was less settled to the north and west. Periodic 
attacks were launched by Hizb-e Wahdat forces during 1999 in both Bamyan and 
Yakawlang; the latter changed hands several times. Solidarités records that the 
fighting in May 1999 in Bamyan between Hizb-e Wahdat and the Taliban was 
especially fierce. The bazaar was looted, 17 percent of houses were destroyed, 
people were summarily executed and nearly 90 percent of the population fled 
(some 13,000 families).
66 Production plummeted that summer; wheat crops yielded 
one-fifth the production of the previous year.
67 
 
By late 2000 the situation had returned to normal, save for a crippling drought.  
Agencies like Solidarités assisted people to rebuild their homes. The bazaar was 
reoccupied, but by Tajiks, not Hazaras. Khalili, together with Northern Alliance 
Forces, tried to capture Bamyan one more time but failed. An uneasy “peace” 
reigned.  
 
This calm was shattered with the Hizb-e Wahdat attack on Yakawlang on 
January 5, 2001. In late 2001, Oxfam evacuated its staff, believing war again to 
be near; the office in Yakawlang gained information that Khalili was distributing 
cash dollars to supporting commanders.
68 The Taliban retook the town, wreaking 
a most terrible vengeance on those they had thought supported the Khalili 
forces. Again, thousands fled from Yakawlang. Three hundred families arrived 
and remained in Panjab town, while another 1,500 or so proceeded from there 
to other areas.
69 For its part, Bamyan City returned to being a military town 
under the Taliban. 
 
Hizb-e Wahdat attacks continued throughout 2001. The Taliban conscripted 
local people forcibly and levied repeated taxes to pay for the war. Even widows 
and orphans had to pay a contribution or go to the front line.
70 Tithes were 
added. Drought by this time was doubling the burdens of people throughout the 
country. Such a drought had not been experienced in Hazarajat since 1970, 
when an equivalent degree of misery had ensued.
71 As this paper will show, 
through the combination of drought and conflict, thousands lost not only their 
crops and livestock at this time, but their land. 
 
Following the events of September 11
th 2001, fighting intensified. With the help of 
US bombing, Khalili forced the Taliban to withdraw in early November 2001. This 
withdrawal was preceded by destruction and looting.
72 The Tajik allies of the 
Taliban returned to their homes in Shibar, Saighan and Kahmard.
73 The current 
deputy governor of the province commented, “Tajik Taliban leaders remain there 
and greatly fear Guantanamo Bay. That is why they will not give up their arms.”
74 
 
Bamyan Province now cautiously boasts stability and peace, encouraged by the 
presence of Coalition forces. While land mines plague some areas of the province, 
                                                 
66  Soldarités, op cit. 
67  Ibid. 
68  Pers. comm., Shah Wali, Oxfam Panjab. 
69  Ibid. 
70 Johnson, C. Hazarajat Baseline Study – Interim Report. UN Coordinator’s Office. 2000. 
71  Deaths from starvation between January and June 1972, following two years of drought, have been estimated 
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73 Ibid. 
74 Pers. comm., Abdul Zol Halek, Bamyan. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 
   
 
 14
movement is otherwise considered safe. Khalili, the leader of Hizb-e Wahdat, is 
currently vice president in an otherwise Tajik-dominated cabinet. The governor of 
Bamyan is an acknowledged Khalili supporter, but the deputy governor is a 
supporter of the National Movement, a party established by Massoud’s brother. 
Party allegiance is diverse within the province. Hazaras are uniform, however, in 
their wish to keep the new peace among themselves and with other peoples of 
A f g h a n i s t a n .  T h e y  a l s o  s e e k  t o  l o s e  t h e i r  h i s t o r i c a l  s t a t u s  a s  t h e  u n d e r d o g s  o f  
society and to be respected as equal players in the new Afghanistan. While no 
parties openly seek autonomy for Hazarajat, the territorial sense of “our land” is 
strong and repeatedly expressed in fears and determination that the Kuchi should 
not return. “If they do so,” said the deputy governor, “our people will not only lose 
their lands again, they will be dominated as they were before.”  
Land Issues  
That people list “Kuchis,” or nomads, as one of their biggest land problems will not 
be surprising and will arise in the following chapters. Another issue that will 
feature prominently concerns the fact that a large number of households own no 
land of their own in a society that is nonetheless agriculturally based. Related, 
indebtedness is rife.  One impoverished group that will not be covered in this 
report is the estimated 1,000 households that live in the caves above Bamyan City 
and who are, at this point, targeted for assistance by UNESCO for new housing. 
Some controversy has arisen as to this plan, as many argue that these households 
are cave-dwellers by choice. Each time a group of cave-dwellers are re-housed, 
another lot occupies the caves in the hope of getting re-located and of receiving 
aid. Most of these people are now from Bamyan, and are not internally displaced 
persons from Kabul, as they were in the 1990s.  
 
Additional problems that were not intended as the primary focus of this study are 
commented on briefly below. 
Occupation of Government Properties 
Although officials were unable (or reluctant) to provide a list of government offices 
which have been wrongfully occupied by non-government agents, these may 
number up to 20. Premises such as the offices of the Afghan Tourism Board and the 
Ministries of Agriculture, Education and Civil Aviation are currently occupied by 
factional leaders, each of whom sustains support from one or other minister. 
District offices in Panjab and Warras are also occupied. The problem is being partly 
and indirectly dealt with through construction of new offices with foreign aid 
funds. In May 2003, the governor and other officials met together along with 
representatives from the Coalition and the new national army and resolved to 
ensure that offices were returned to the government. This has not yet occurred, 
the deputy governor claims, because the Coalition was convinced by the Minister of 
Defence and the minister in charge of intelligence that their representatives should 
be permitted to keep the offices.  
 
Other types of government property have been occupied; these include the vast 
Ajar Estate in Kahmard District, part of which belongs to King Mohammad Zahir 
Shah (1933-1973) and part to the state. Two Tajik commanders, who have the 
support of the Minister of Defence, have taken this and other fertile land and 
distributed it.
75 Another commander has appropriated state land in Toopchi in 
                                                 
75 These were named as Arbab Sakhi Dad and Mawlawi Sarwar in the Ghandak area of Shibar. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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Bamyan District and handed it over to his own relations to farm. Officials expressed 
less concern about this case as, “Daoud had wrongly given that land to Kuchi 
anyway.” In the past, the Ministry of Agriculture took over lands for which owners 
were unable to pay tax, and many of these lands reverted to their previous owners 
after 1979.
76 The Ministry of Agriculture is particularly aggrieved at the loss of an 
area of farmland in Bamyan City, now used for brick-making, and the loss of its 
horticulture plot to provide land for the Coalition camp.  
 
One important success has been recorded, however. The Shibar District 
government proudly claims to be the first in the country to recover government 
land; this comprises 391 jeribs (78 ha) of forested lands, which local people have 
felled and farmed since the 1980s.
77 These farmers are now formally the tenants of 
the ministry, paying rent for the current season, at the end of which a decision will 
be made as to what to do with the land. “The secret of our success,” said the 
agricultural officer, “is that we followed the law and did not get involved in 
corruption.” 
Failure of the State to Pay Compensation 
Officials in Bamyan did raise the fact that Daoud’s administration never 
compensated the farmers who lost their land through the construction of the air 
strip in Bamyan City. Nor has the current administration compensated those who 
lost land through its expansion in 2003.  
Occupation of Private Properties 
Thousands of households left Bamyan Province during 1979-1989, exiling 
themselves to Pakistan and Iran or to cities in Afghanistan. The Taliban era induced 
another exodus that was possibly even greater. Returns since December 2001 have 
been steady. The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) estimates 
around 3,000 refugee families and 17,000 internally displaced persons (IDP) 
families had returned by May 2003.
78 It estimates that another 7,000 IDP families 
are yet to return. Over 17,000 families are still residing in Pakistan, Iran, Russia 
and elsewhere.   
 
Most of UNHCR’s activities have focused on the provision of food and tents to these 
households and provision of safe water (largely implemented by Solidarités and 
other non-governmental organisations [NGOs] operating in the province). Given the 
many houses destroyed during the Taliban fighting of 1998-2001 in Bamyan and 
Yakawlang Districts, assistance with housing rehabilitation has also been prominent 
in these areas, with over 7,000 households assisted with tents and now 2,000 
families given materials to reconstruct their houses.
79  
 
Wrongful occupation of private farms and houses by others does not appear to be 
as severe a problem in the province as it has proven in many other areas.
80 In 
UNHCR’s experience this is predominantly linked with inter-ethnic strife and where 
a population is prominently of one tribe, most returnees are able to retrieve their 
                                                 
76 The Taliban had begun to retrieve such properties in 2001, including an eight jerib plot at Zartoghai near the 
entrance of Eraq Valley, one of the areas reviewed later. 
77 The forests of Shaspoul and Dahani Iroq, Dahani Ghandaq, Dahani Jalmish and Shikuri. 
78  UNHCR. Briefing Notes on Refugees and IDPs in Bamyan Province. UNHCR Field Office: Bamyan. 30 April 2003. 
79 Ibid.  By comparison only 150 units were provided to families in Panjab and Warras, indicative of the limited 
destruction in those areas. No such assistance has been needed in either Saighan or Kahmard, predominantly Tajik 
areas. 
80  See Al-Saleem, R. for UNHCR. Land Issues within the Repatriation Process of Afghan Refugees (draft). 2003. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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81 Fleeing farmers tend to leave their homes and farms in the care of 
relatives who are fairly readily persuaded to return the property on the owners’ 
return. Particularly in Bamyan City and its surrounds, the inter-ethnic strife 
generated in the Taliban period did result in some Tajik losing their homes. Some 
27 cases (out of 780 Tajik families who fled and have returned) are recorded by 
UNHCR. Most have now retrieved their homes. The remaining six cases are 
properties now occupied by the Ministry of Defence’s 34
th Division, which refuses to 
vacate. The governor is looking for alternative accommodation.  As shown below, 
there are also cases of wrongful occupation in Yakawlang. Elsewhere in the 
province, this problem does not appear acute. 
Weak and Corrupted Land Administration and Dispute Resolution 
Systems 
Land administration is theoretically in the hands of the Amlak Department of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Few districts have this office at this time and the provincial 
office is inordinately weak in its staffing and competence. Its building was burned 
in 1978 (allegedly, deliberately in order to remove records which might show large 
landholdings) and records have been lost. Some, however, have been recently 
recovered, and this author saw nine volumes recording ownership and taxation. 
The type of information in these records is summarised in Appendix B. The Amlak 
officer in Shibar District confirmed that he personally removed all records for 
safekeeping and will return these “when an office building has been provided.” 
Records are also allegedly available in the Mustofiyat (Accounts and Finance 
Department). Some records may exist in the Ministry of Justice’s Hoquq (Law 
Department).
82 No one questioned on the handling of land administration matters 
gave a positive impression of the competence of any of these offices.  
 
Much greater wrath is reserved, however, for the judiciary. From the governor’s 
office to villages in all three districts visited, judges are considered corrupt and 
the courts “useless.” The primary courts of two districts were visited.
83 Staffing is 
visibly a problem. Only three of the seven districts have an approved judge in place 
and those that are not approved may therefore make only informal rulings, 
providing in effect a peace-making service. Land cases constitute over one-third of 
cases handled.
84 The newly-appointed judge of Bamyan District found 17 land cases 
pending and had received ten more cases since his arrival two weeks past. Most of 
the cases were appeals, for assistance, by returnees to recover their houses in 
Bamyan City, and included some households in Toopchi where, as noted above, a 
commander had reallocated lands previously owned by Kuchis. Around seven cases 
were lodged by widows seeking the return of property owned by their husbands and 
taken over by relatives. The judge commented that these cases were new to courts 
and were arising directly out of NGO encouragement to women in the area to 




                                                 
81  Ibid. 
82 To be fair, at least the Ministry of Agriculture staff were in the office. Despite four attempts no one was found 
in the provincial finance or justice departments. 
83 Despite three attempts no judge in the provincial court was present. 
84 The largest groups of cases involve persons seeking to establish that they are the legal kin of persons killed in 
the war, in order to collect their pensions. 
85 Formal rules of inheritance are laid out only in the Civil Law drawing upon Koranic principles, as interpreted by 
Hanafi Sunni jurisprudence. Articles 1993-2102 of the Civil Law outline in great detail the procedures. This 
includes precise provision of shares for all parties (‘farz’) including for widows and daughters (Article 2004). 
Widows receive one-eighth of the property or more (one-quarter) if they are childless. Where there is more than 
one wife, this proportion is shared.  Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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A number of cases where commanders have wrongfully taken private houses and 
farms exist in Yakawlang District. Several people commented that recourse to the 
courts was not fruitful, as the judges had colluded with these commanders to issue 
fake title deeds. The current governor of Yakawlang and the court both responded 
that these cases were few and the only one involving farmland had its origin in a 
domestic dispute.
86 The governor acknowledged that “around five other disputes” 
exist which concerned claims of wrongful occupation of lands of those fleeing 
either after the revolution in 1978/79 or during the Taliban wars in the area. 
Counterfeit documents were proving “problematic.”  
 
The Yakawlang court indicated that most of the cases it receives for mediation 
were land-related, and could number up to two new cases daily. At least 150 land 
cases had been heard in the last 18 months (i.e., since January 2002). Prior to that 
time the Taliban had dismissed this court and brought in two of their own clerics, 
paying high salaries to pre-empt corruption. Nonetheless “no one referred to them 
because they were not local or trusted.” The current mullah, assisting judge and 
recorder had all been previously appointed by Mazari of Hizb-e Wahdat in the 
1980s and now brought back to work. Neither of the two judges had been approved 
by the current administration and the court is thus unable to rule and only offers a 
recommendation to disputants. Around half reject the mediation decision and take 
their cases on to the provincial court. Although unable to give statistics, the main 
judge indicated that “most” of the land cases are of a domestic nature. Common 
cases are where an heir claims against the sale of land he expected to inherit or a 
neighbour claims he should have been given the first right of purchase to land sold 
by his neighbour (as instructed in Shari’a). Returnee problems relate more to 
claims over the share of crop produced in the owner’s absence than to ownership 
of the land itself. The judge believes that the poor are able to access the court 
given that the application costs only ten new Afs and the court form 50 new Afs 
(just over US$1). Several of the current cases being heard by the court are 
illustrated in Box 3. Table 5 records the type of land disputes volunteered in the 15 
villages visited. 
                                                 
86 The main claimant is said to be the cousin of the commander and their dispute centres on land granted their 
grandfather 90 years ago. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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Box 3: Examples of Recent Land Cases in Yakawlang Court 
 
Battle Over the Ailoq 
This battle began with the claim of one village community that its neighbour had entirely 
co-opted their common land. This area was traditionally used as both pasture and for 
periodic rain-fed cultivation. The accused village responded that it had bought the area and 
could turn it entirely into rain-fed farms if it wished. The original village claimed that the 
payment only referred to a fee for using the area for one year. Three other villages entered 
the dispute, claiming that they too had traditional rights to use that ailoq, these were 
pasturage rights, but as the other villages were now farming the land, they too should be 
given space to farm there. 
 
Re-constructing a Legacy 
A man had lodged a claim for a large area of land which his grandfather had sold. His own 
father had been a tenant on the land. In the view of the court, the claimant had only 
brought the case knowing that the current owner had lost the bill of sale when his house 
was destroyed by the Taliban. He was claiming that his grandfather had never sold the 
land, just put it under pawn and that he could redeem the outstanding debt. As he was 
unable to explain why his father had never claimed the land or attempted to redeem the 
debt if that had been the case, the court rejected his claim. The grandson was now taking 
his case to the provincial court.  
 
A Family Affair 
Two sisters had gifted their land to one brother and the brother has been cultivating and 
harvesting the land. The sisters have died and their sons are trying to reclaim the land, on 
the grounds that their mothers were forced to gift the land to their brother. The brother 
produced a customary document, witnessed by the local mullah. The sons claim the mullah 
remains a close friend of their uncle and his witnessing cannot be trusted. The court could 
not agree that the mullah was not neutral and found that the mothers had signed the 
document, and ruled that the land must remain with the brother.  
 
The Landlord   
A landlord had substantial land, both irrigated and rain-fed, and used this as collateral to 
take out a loan to participate in a Ministry of Agriculture project. He failed to repay the 
loan and the Ministry of Agriculture took over the land and put tenants on it. Four villagers 
in the area have come to court claiming that the land in question was never the landlord’s 
to give and the ministry has no right to take the land now. They claim that the landlord 
sold the land to them and have produced documents of sale for both irrigated and rain-fed 
farms. The court has inspected the documents and ruled in their favour. 
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III.  Findings from the Villages 
Bamyan District:  The Folady Valley 
The Folady Valley comprises a large and fertile main valley and four branch valleys, 
with villages located both in the valley bottom and high on the plateaus of the 
surrounding mountains. There are around 30 hamlets or villages overall. The valley 
is close to Bamyan City. Three villages were visited along a main ridge area. These 
were Siya Khar Bolaq, Alibeg and Borghaso.  
Siya Khar Bolaq 
Siya Khar Bolaq, nearest to Bamyan City (around 13 km), has been occupied the 
longest. Elders claim that the valley has a very long history of settlement, only 
briefly interrupted when Abdur Rahman chased people from the area a century 
ago. Current landowners trace their occupation to land allocations made by King 
Amanullah, though some claim these allocations were of land being returned to 
their grandfathers, where they have resided for several centuries.  Farmers 
produced receipts for taxes levied on landowners dating back to 1926.
87 
 
There are currently 78 households resident in Siya Khar Bolaq. All households are 
Hazara. Most families have some land (64 percent), although most of these (28 of 
50 households) are considered as having insufficient land to be self-sufficient in 
basic foods. There are 11 large landowners with up to 60 jeribs each (12 ha) who 
represent 14 percent of households. Seventeen households (22 percent) are 
landless farmers, most of who earn food through sharecropping and receive one-
quarter of the crop (see Box 3). In all cases, these farmers, and those who have 
small plots of land, must purchase food to survive until the following harvest.  
 
Those who have not yet returned to the village are said to be largely landless 
farmers who are trying to find work in Kabul or other cities. There are also some 
sons of richer landowners who have moved to Iran or elsewhere and are not 
expected to return. The land of absentee landowners rarely lies idle; relatives or 
other residents cultivate the land. For the latter, this costs them 50 percent of the 
crop as rent, which is not always collected, the due value being carried over to the 
next season. Such arrangements are obviously only able to be made by better off 
farmers, those who are able to provide seed and other inputs to use the land. 
Poorer farmers or workers, who provide only labour, receive only one-quarter or 
one fifth of the crop-share when they use land, and of necessity, the land of 
residents who can provide the rest of the inputs.  
 
The Upper Folady Valley — or rather the high ridges on either side of the valley — 
w a s  t h e  o n l y  a r e a  i n  B a m y a n  P r o v i n c e  w h e r e  l a n d  w a s  d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  l a n d l e s s  
farmers as part of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) land reform 
of 1978-79.
88 Though there were a number of large landowners in the valley whose 
holdings exceeded the permitted hectarage, their property was not redistributed. 
Instead, the government handed out a total of 420 jeribs (84 ha) of what they 
declared to be un-owned land above Siya Khar Bolaq to around 140 landless 
families. Another 2,000 jeribs (400 ha) of similar un-irrigated pasture was allocated 
                                                 
87 As noted in the previous chapter, Amanullah introduced a new and more orderly land tax regime. The tax itself 
was increased by one Afghani only per jerib (Male, op cit., 134). 
88 Laid out in the Land Reform Decree, No. 8, 1978; refer to Alden Wily, Land Rights in Crisis, 106ff. for translation 
of the decree, and see pages 44-47 for analysis. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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higher up the valley in the Borghaso area.
89 Around half of the beneficiaries came 
from the Folady Valley; the other half came from other parts of the district. The 
distributed land above Siya Khar Bolaq had belonged to the village but had been 
only erratically cultivated because it was dry and infertile. Because villagers paid 
no tax for this area, the government appropriated the land itself during the 1960s, 
under the guidance of Prime Minister Daoud’s active Ministry of Agriculture. It was 
this “government” land that was redistributed in 1979. At that time, none of the 
landless beneficiaries had the means to develop this land beyond the periodic rain-
fed cultivation of wheat. They could not employ the labour needed or afford the 
time to bring irrigation to the ridge. Most of those who were allocated the plots are 
still absent, having fled the area.  
 
Box 4:  Traditional Local Sharecropping Arrangements 
 
Nisfa Kari:   
A 50-50 arrangement whereby one party ploughs and the other provides the seed and both 
share the costs of fertiliser. When the owner is absent, as is currently often the case, a 
different 50-50 arrangement occurs, in which the farmer is effectively paying 50 percent of 
the crop for the use of the absentee’s land, providing all inputs. 
 
Si Kot: 
Literally, “three piles,” in which the farmer receives one-third of the crops produced. The 
landowner provides the draught power, seeds and fertiliser. The farmer provides all labour, 
including ploughing, and uses his own tools. 
 
Char Kot: 
Literally, “four piles,” in which the farmer receives only one-quarter of the crops 
produced. Poorer families are generally subject to this arrangement. 
 
Panj Kot: 
Literally, “five piles,” by which the farmer receives only one-fifth of the crops produced. 
This generally applies to the very poorest labourers, usually migrant workers. They are 
provided shelter in addition.  
 
 
Indebtedness is high in the village. Most buy goods on credit, despite the 
consequent higher prices, and are indebted to shopkeepers as a result.  Most have 
sold their animals or have lost part of their farms to cover such debt. One elder 
admitted that desperation during the last five years had been so great in his village 
that “some of us sold our daughters just to allow the rest of the family to eat.”  
Among the 50 households that have at least a tiny plot of arable land, five 
currently have their land under mortgage (ten percent). Interviewees attested that 
large landowners and shopkeepers deliberately encourage indebtedness as a route 
to acquire more land in any area where land shortage is chronic. One man of 35 
years described how four years ago he was encouraged to take out a loan of two 
million old Afs from a friendly local landlord (US $42),
90 pledging his farm as 
collateral. Although he was told he would have some time to pay, after one year 
and failure to pay the 100 percent interest, the landlord forcibly took over his 
farm. Farmers in the meeting agreed that his farm had been worth around six 
million old Afs at the time ($128). The borrower spoke bitterly about not having 
been given the time to find a buyer who would have paid the full price, enabled 
                                                 
89 Conflicting information was given by Ministry of Agriculture staff and villages in this area as to exactly how much 
government land was distributed; 2,500 jeribs (500 ha) is the most commonly cited amount, although some 
villages say that this rose to 600 ha. 
90 The “old” Afghani refers to the official currency in place until October 2002.  At the time of its conversion, one 
US dollar equalled approximately 47,000 “old” Afghanis. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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him to repay the debt and interest and still retain some funds — “He is a powerful 
landlord. He threatened me with the militia if I did not give him the land at once.”  
Alibeg 
Further up the valley and at several hundred feet higher altitude is the village of 
Alibeg, named for a past khan known as Ali Beg in the early 1900s, following 
permission from Abdur Rahman’s son to resettle in the area. Ali Beg was a lesser 
mir who had lived further down the valley towards Bamyan and had his land 
confiscated along with thousands of others in the 1890s. Today there are 126 
households in the village, all inter-related and variously descended from this great 
grandfather. Their shares in the land are highly uneven. More than one-third of the 
households have no land at all, eight percent are near-landless, another third have 
small farms of around five to ten jeribs (one to two ha) and the remaining 20 
percent have larger farms (up to 50 jeribs). Those with the most land are the most 
direct descendants of Ali Beg.  
 
Like many communities in the valley near Bamyan, up to one-quarter of the houses 
were burnt by the Taliban. Villagers evacuated the area at least twice between 
1998 and 2001 and more than half of the households have not yet returned to the 
village. One middle-aged man reported that he has three brothers in Iran with their 
families: “They had to pay huge amounts to escape to Iran three years ago and as 
soon as they arrived they were kept like slaves working for Iranians. I have just 
heard that they have discharged their debts and will come home soon.” These 
brothers and their families will have to survive on a meagre family holding of five 
jeribs (1 ha).  Another man, now the elected village representative on the newly-
formed valley shura, recalled his imprisonment by the Taliban, from which he has 
never recovered: 
 
“I was working in Mazar-i-Sharif as a driver when it fell to the Taliban. I was 
arrested by them and kept in prison for three years and seven months. I was 
released just before September 11, 2001 when Khalili made a deal with the 
Taliban to release 295 Hazaras in return for the release of 50 Taliban.  But I 
got ill in prison and have never recovered. I have had to sell my land to feed 
my family.” 
 
Group work on farms is the norm in this community, partly because of the close 
inter-family relationships. The landless and smaller farmers sharecrop on the larger 
farms, generally on a one-fourth basis (char kot). No outsiders were recorded and 
no one was working for one-fifth share. There is a lot of borrowing within the 
community, usually at only 40 percent annual interest, again because of inter-
relatedness. An unspecified number of households have pawned their land, several 
for more than two years, though the norm is to give out land in temporary 
ownership only for one season or, in exceptional circumstances, for two seasons. 
 
Alibeg Village illustrates what was to become a familiar scenario of dwindling 
pasture with the conversion of hillside and upper lands to rain-fed agriculture. The 
village area used to have at its disposal a large area of pasture. This was used by 
landed and landless families who owned oxen and sheep; prior to the drought and 
Taliban, livestock ownership was said to have been very common among the poorer 
relatives. “Most of us owned one ox.” Now only one-tenth of households possess an 
ox and all are landowners. These animals are rented in by those without oxen on a 
jerib basis, or sometimes on a less-favoured daily basis (the animal tends to get 
overworked). As population and livestock numbers grew since the 1950s, pressure Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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upon the pasture has also grown among the valley communities. This was 
exacerbated in the 1970s with the increasing arrival of Kuchi nomads, 
appropriating the upper pastures for themselves, allegedly with the support of 
local officials, and their own claims that they had bought the land and/or paid tax 
on their stock to the local officials. Today, aside from a minor patch of grazing in 
the middle of the village (est. 3 ha) and which is frequently waterlogged, Alibeg’s 
substantial grazing land is now divided among only the large stock-owning families, 
all of them Hazaras from the community.  It was unclear how these richer families 
had managed to secure the pasture for themselves. Now with no stock to their 
name anyway, the poorer families which had used the pasture also believe they 
will have no claim to do so in the future, except on the basis of goodwill on the 
part of their rich relatives. More important, however, is the evident conversion of 
much of this pasture to farmland. The areas where this was pointed out are indeed 
visibly fertile, gently sloping and even possess potential for irrigation, pending 
resources to develop this — a benefit limited to the better off. There were no signs 
of soil erosion in the farming areas identified by villagers as originally “our common 
pastures.”  
Borghaso  
Borghaso Village lies at the very top of the valley, at yet higher altitude (around 
3,000 metres). The village is surrounded by expansive, dry pasture and villagers 
own significantly more stock than people living further down the valley. The 
community comprised 100 households before the arrival of the Taliban. Many 
houses were burned during the first Taliban foray up the valley (1998) and almost 
all animals and crops were stolen. The entire village was evacuated as people fled 
mainly to Bersud in Wardak Province, where the local Taliban commander was in 
fact a Hazara and known to be less vicious in his rule. There, according to villagers, 
they shared the houses of local Hazaras throughout the winters and lived in UN-
supplied tents in the summer.  In 1999 the community sent a handful of farmers 
back to serve as their representatives. These men began farming again and 
collected tax from those in Bersud to pay the Taliban.  
 
“People were very honest about the size of the land they owned because if 
the Taliban found a farmer was lying, he would lose his land. This was the 
same as in the past. When you are afraid, you have to be honest about how 
much land you own, otherwise the government takes the extra that you tried 
to hide and makes it government land. It is better to pay their taxes on the 
land than lose it.”
91   
 
Although Borghaso is an old settlement of possibly several hundred years, it 
received a batch of new residents in 1978-79 when, as noted above, Taraki 
redistributed about 2,000 jeribs of land to landless farmers.  The current village 
representative recalls how he was one of the 24 landless farmers from Borghaso 
itself who benefited: 
 
“I was only 12 years old at the time, although I was tall. We all had ID cards 
by the time we were 10 or 11 years old. On each ID it said if you were a 
landowner, a sharecropper or a farmer (dehqan, worker). My brother, who 
was two years older than me, had “owner” on his card because my father 
had given him some land to farm. I had just “farmer” on my card. I was 
already labouring for other farmers by then. So I went to Amlak in Bamyan 
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and put my name down for land. Altogether 360 people got land. I was given 
eight jeribs in this area. Those who got given land at lower altitudes, like at 
Siya Khar Bolaq, only got three to four jeribs each but here we got eight 
jeribs because the land is not productive and the growing season is so short 
because of the cold. When I got the land it was useless, but I have made it 
good farmland by bringing irrigation from the higher hills. We have plenty of 
water in this area.”
92 
 
The land allocated to landless farmers had been the common property of the 
Borghaso community, some of it pasture and some of it used for periodic rain-fed 
cultivation. However, again this land had been appropriated by the government 
(sometime after 1965) on the grounds that the villagers had not paid tax for this 
common property: 
 
“Distinguishing between government land and our own land was always a 
problem. Every year the line moved. The government always wanted more 
land. During the king’s time and mostly Daoud’s time, officials came every 
year and tried to take more. We were all afraid of losing our land in Daoud’s 
time. The officials used to warn us that if we didn’t give them ghee, curds 
and rugs and kill sheep for them to eat, they would include our land under 
government land. Of course we fed them well. Widows always lost their 
land. And if a person died without making a will for his land to go to his 
sons, then the government would always take the land.”
93 
 
“There was a lot of corruption on both sides at that time. The government 
wanted land so that it could make money. It would take the land and then 
lease it back to the farmer. Some people made an arrangement with an 
official to say that the land was unusable or had been encroached in order 
not to pay the fee. Someone from the government would come and agree, 
yes, the land had been encroached by someone else, and no fee that year 
would be paid. In return, he got a bribe, such as a beautiful felt rug. We 
were very happy with Taraki because then we believed this business of the 
government taking our land was over.”
94 
 
The Borghaso elders recalled how the land distribution proceeded: 
 
“In the first year, all the 24 households were very happy. We went to the 
rich and asked their help with fertiliser, seed and we rented their oxen. Most 
of them helped us. In the second year, the Ministry of Agriculture set up 
cooperatives to lend us fertiliser. We were given cash to buy a cow. No one 
was allowed to sell that animal. The idea was that you got a second animal 
from the cow and then returned the cow and the money that it had cost. It 
was a good plan. Many people benefited.” 
 
However, the enthusiasm for Taraki and his reforms did not last. Villagers 
remember how they became nervous of Taraki: 
 
“It was the time of Soviet influence and we were worried that he was 
turning us into a communist state and that we would lose Islam and all 
become slaves. The mullahs encouraged us to believe lies about the 
communists. We were very young and stupid. So we revolted against him. I 
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93 Borghaso villager. 
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got this scar in that revolt. We were illiterates and we were used like 
shepherds by some clever people who hated the reforms.” 
 
Because Borghaso is at the top of the ridge, the community borders expansive 
pasture. Aside from the barren, snow-covered peaks, these grassy pastures are 
considered the common property of the village, and cover at least 1,000 hectares. 
This area is divided into two main pastures, named Iriqi and Baraki. Up until 1978, 
these pastures were only used by Borghaso villagers, not people from further down 
the valley who had less stock and small pastures of their own on the upper ridges. 
Kuchis also used the area but only by agreement with the Borghaso elders, and 
generally kept to the even higher and less fertile pastures. After 1978, the 
expansion of population and livestock in the Folady Valley meant that more and 
more people established summer camps in Iriqi and Baraki. This is a source of 
contention:  
 
“Most villages in the valley are supported by powerful factions, so we keep 
our silence now, but when there is a strong government again we hope to 
get our land back. We have most need of this land because we are the ones 
who most need the ground bushes for winter fuel, as we live under snow for 
six months of the year.”
95 
 
Around one-quarter of the Borghaso community is still absent from the village. 
These people live in Pakistan and Iran, or have gone to Kabul and other cities. 
Some are not expected to return quickly, because cultivation at this high altitude 
is difficult and they have lost their livestock. Ultimately they will return, the 
farmers say, because “in the end people want to be near their relatives and the 
graves of their parents.”  
 
Prior to the evacuation in 1978, around 20 households (20 percent) were landless 
and homeless. They worked and those that returned still work as shepherds, 
domestic help and farmers for the larger owners. In return, they receive shelter 
and food. Irrigated landholdings are not large; most have five to ten jeribs. Some 
do not have the means to farm the land and there is the unusual site in Bamyan of 
uncultivated higher fields.  Instead, these owners work for other farmers who have 
m e a n s ,  o r  h a v e  g o n e  o r  r e m a i n e d  i n  B a myan or other cities to look for work, 
sending money back to their families. There has been some selling of land in the 
last year or two as people struggle to find food. Fields now sell for up to 10,000 Afs 
($200) per jerib although not many lower valley farmers are interested in the cold 
farming fields (lalmi). Many families in Borghaso have borrowed money against 
such lands, usually at 70 to 100 percent annual interest. Most of those who 
borrowed more than three years ago have now lost their land, as they have been 
unable to earn money to repay their debts:  
 
“The Taliban made most of us poor. And we had the drought. It is impossible 
for a person who has lost his land can get land back today.”
96  
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Bamyan District:  The Peri-Urban Desert 
Dasht-e-Borsianas 
This is a village only three miles from Bamyan centre and now a peri-urban village. 
This was one of three villages in the province where the cadastral survey was 
carried out (1974) and selected because of this. In fact, these were the last sites 
where the formal cadastral survey was undertaken, as the survey gave way to a 
non-mapped system of land ownership recordation. The other two villages where 
the survey was carried out in Bamyan are close by, and were already peri-urban 
and are now fully part of Bamyan City.
97 Farmers recall how two surveyors came for 
two days with considerable equipment and maps. Every farm was measured and 
beacons were installed on certain farms. The surveyors promised that a map of 
each farm would be sent along with new title needs. The surveyors told the 
farmers, however, that their measurements and the records on their deeds were 
very similar. “We were pleased that our titles were accurate.”
98 Neither maps nor 
deeds ever arrived. In fact, it had already been decided by 1974 that no title deeds 
would be issued out of the cadastral survey. The survey itself was coming to an end 
by then, having cost millions of dollars and involved many hundreds of vehicles and 
technicians.
99 In most areas, no survey had been undertaken at all. Ownership was 
already beginning to be recorded simply on the evidence of farmers confirmed by 
local leaders in a non-cadastral record system. Box 5 gives an example from 
another village of the information that would have been recorded about Dashti-e-
Borsianas in the land register of the cadastre. 
 
At the time of the cadastral survey there were 60 households in the village. Today 
there are 100 households. Most now own small farms of five or fewer jeribs. Fifty 
years ago, they had larger farms but these have been subdivided. One villager 
presented a title deed, which showed that his grandfather had owned 82 jeribs (16 
ha) in 1926. Now he has only 16 jeribs (three ha) of that land; the rest is owned by 
his cousins. He is considered a large owner. Several other farmers hold title 
documents from the 1920s, suggesting that Amanullah’s effort to begin land 
recordation did take off in some parts of the country.  Around half the households 
have no land or too little land to live on. These people either work for landowners 
or sharecrop others’ land in addition to farming their own patches. Some have jobs 
in Bamyan. Around one-third of villagers have not yet returned from exile and their 
relatives are farming their land this year. Many of those who never owned land 
have not returned either. 
                                                 
97 Dashti-e-Sa Khan and Sur-e Asiab. 
98 Villager in mosque meeting at Dasht-e-Borsianas Village. 
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Box 5: Example of Information About Village Land Ownership in Land Register of the 
National Cadastre 
 
Land class  No. of plots  Size (in jeribs) 
Private Land     
Cultivation     756  1,112.17 
Gardens/orchards  166  146.62 
Government Land       
Cultivation  17  70.89 
Gardens/orchards  1   1.17 
Public institutions  10  13.74 
Housing area    13  60.51 
Pasture/forests   0  0 
TOTAL  963  1,405.10  
 
Total landowners:      250 
Range of parcel size:      0.2 jeribs – 30.25 jeribs 
Average size of holdings:    1.42 jeribs 
Mean size of land owned:    0.525 jeribs 
 
Source: Review of Cadastre for Village of Qala-I-Sahra, Jabulsiraj District, Parwan Province as per 
survey conducted in November 1961. 
 
Being so close to Bamyan City, the village suffered a great deal during the Taliban 
period, where much of the fighting between the Hazaras and the Taliban and their 
supporters was conducted. Virtually the whole village was destroyed and is still 
being rebuilt. One person was killed, although most residents managed to escape 
the fighting. There remains today evident hatred for Tajiks, who, the villagers 
claim, carried out the burnings: 
 
“Everyone is defaming the Pashtuns and the Taliban but it was the local 
Tajik Taliban supporters who wrecked us. They came together from all parts 
of Bamyan and formed a force to evict us from our homes. These Tajiks 
supported the Taliban who supported their claims against us. They 
complained to Kabul that we had their land and houses, which was not true. 
They intentionally destroyed our homes and took the wooden roof poles to 
sell in Kabul. Some of these people still live across the valley. In the old days 
when we were friends we could call to each other. They burned 70 sheep 
and took the cows and left nothing for us. Yet they walk around free. Even 
now we can’t speak about it because they are in power, supported by Vice 
President Khalili and Defence Minister Fahim. We escaped to the mountains, 
and from there we scattered. Some of us went village to village, sleeping in 
mosques, until we reached Panjab. The elders have told us not to revenge 
our losses. Fahim even came and told us ‘forget the past!’ Khalili has said 
the same. But how can we forget the past? One man was murdered here and 
everyone lost all that they had. The Holy Koran teaches us that a life for a 
life, an eye for eye, a tooth for tooth and we cannot rest until that son is 
revenged.”
100 
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Shibar District:  The Kalo Valley 
Shibar District is a relatively small district in population and area under cultivation. 
The 1971 census recorded 101 villages with a population of 18,440 persons in 3,112 
households. The Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) has collected data that 
showed Shibar to comprise 15 main inhabited valley areas, with 125 villages and a 
total of 22,050 persons in 3,675 households. That was at the end of 2001. Already 
the population has increased as more households return. 
 
The main survey task in this valley was to obtain a picture of social organisation 
among the different villages and to assess whether a community-based land 
administration system could work. Through discussion in a full meeting of the 
valley shura, some indicative landholding data were shared, but their accuracy was 
not validated in follow-up interviews. The members reported that most households 
are landless or have only their house and kitchen garden (around 50 percent). The 
road through the valley is one of the main roads to Kabul, and for many decades 
such households have sent male members to Kabul or other cities in the winter to 
work as porters or in other unskilled jobs. Around ten percent of households are 
categorised as large landowners. This means they have around five jeribs (one ha). 
Only a handful of farmers have enough land to employ workers, lease out land or 
enter sharecropping agreements. One or two farms appear to exceed 10 jeribs. 
These are located in the less land-scarce upper half of the valley and include 
mainly rain-fed and spring-irrigated land (sarad). Another estimated 40 percent are 
small to medium landowners (from three to five jeribs). In the upper half of Kalo 
Valley, hillside and mountain grazing land is expansive and “most” households are 
said to own sheep (a valley average of five sheep was given).  
 
There is a trading centre in the middle of the valley and around 15 households own 
vehicles. The shopkeepers are the main source of loans. “Many” people have their 
land under mortgage, and not all will recover their land.  The dominant mortgaging 
arrangement is as found almost everywhere in the province (see Box 6). 
 
The valley comprises four main villages and 37 sub-villages, with more than 1,200 
households overall. The valley breaks down into around four discrete manteqa. 
Nonetheless, a valley-wide single shura has been created with the assistance of 
AKDN on the grounds that projects benefit all valley residents. This comprises 30 
representatives, each appointed by and representing at least 30 families. The ten-
month-old shura has appointed an administrator who maintains impressive files in a 
lockable trunk in the takiya khana (meeting place-cum-mosque). The members 
meet every 15 days during the winter and every three to four weeks in the summer 
and are currently organising labour for a micro-hydroelectricity project and the 
construction of a clinic. The head of the shura is available daily in the 
office/meeting place and visibly dominates the body, not allowing some of the 
members to speak freely. Few of the 30 representatives were khans of the past. All 
but three were elderly and all but one owned land. Up until the revolution in 1978, 
the valley was governed by a handful of arbabs whom the current shura concurred 
had been “reasonable” leaders. All left the area in 1978, some have since died and 
some remain in cities, where their children work. The head of the shura observed 
that, “If these palavi
101 returned, we would welcome them because every society 
needs a leader. If there are too many leaders, we experience problems.”  
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Box 6: Land Pawning (Graw or Bai Jaez) 
 
Although referred to as a mortgage, the dominant arrangement is more like pawning. The 
land does not serve as collateral to be collected in the event of failure to repay the loan, 
but is passed over to the lender in temporary ownership and who thereafter behaves as the 
owner. Any documents held by the farmer relating to the land are given to the lender.  A 
contract is agreed. In most cases today this is written down and witnessed by two other 
persons. The contract specifies the amount of money lent and the term on which it is lent. 
This is usually for one season or two seasons only.  The contract does not always specify the 
share of land the lender will retain in the event of default on the loan and it is common for 
farmers to lose all their land. The value of the land is in practice usually higher than the 
value of the loan. 
 
Interest is not mentioned in the agreement. This is paid, however, through the right of the 
lender to use the farmer’s land (or that part of it agreed) for as long as the debt is 
outstanding. Many lenders rehire the farmer as a sharecropper, who thereafter retains only 
one-quarter or one-fifth of the crops produced. Other lenders may hire another 
sharecropper to work the land, rent out the land or hire workers. Sometimes the lender will 
work the land himself. These arrangements are most common where the original owner 
leaves the village for some reason or is unable to work the land himself.   
 
In every village visited it was apparent that many and possibly most of those who pawn 
their land never retrieve it. Only lack of alternative means to raise cash and poverty and 
desperation can be reasons why graw continues right up until the present. From the outset 
the arrangement is stacked against repayment of the loan and retrieval of the land. With 
only one-quarter or one-fifth of the crop to hand, the farmer is forced to buy in food for 
the year and this leaves no funds to repay the loan. The reasons given for land pawning 
were in order of importance: to buy food, to pay a dowry (bride-price), to cover costs of a 
family member’s illness, and least commonly, to travel in search of work. 
 
 
Like many valleys in Bamyan, Yakawlang and Shibar districts, the Kalo people 
consider the Taliban period unparalleled in recent history for its violence in the 
area: 
  
“For many years prior to the Taliban we lived in fear but we never saw 
fighting. After the revolution (1979-79) we were forced to take donkey loads 
of bread every day to the soldiers manning the posts near Shibar. It was a 
seven-hour walk from here. Every household had to provide one loaf. The 
Russians never came up this valley, but our people formed a militia and 
especially during Karmal and Najibullah’s time (1979-1992) you couldn’t 
travel outside the village. Nothing could be bought. But for us the worse 
time was Taliban. Our villages are on the main road from Kabul. They came 
in tanks, trucks and four-wheel drives. They fired on everyone they saw. 
They stopped and sprayed our houses with petrol and then the soldiers that 
followed picked out the wood from the burned houses and carried the poles 
away. This happened in September 1999. They also took all our animals. 
Around 200 men from this valley were captured and taken to prison. Later, 
some of the relatives were able to collect money and bribe the Taliban to 
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“When it was reported that the Taliban were coming up the valley, most of 
us fled to the mountains. We hid there for a full week. There were few 
caves and it was difficult to live in the mountains. Food was scarce. We 
came back to find our animals gone and the houses destroyed. The second 




Up until the 1970s, most landowners in the Kalo Valley had some form of 
documentation testifying to their land ownership. This was mainly in the form of 
customary written agreements, with the thumbprints of witnesses. Shura members 
agreed that recording of verbal agreements was common in even earlier decades. 
Today most villagers write down land-related agreements or write wills. Wills have 
become very important as testimony of ownership and for determining which child 
should receive which share of the land.  
 
Despite many houses having been burned in the valley, “most” farmers hold a 
written record of the land they own. This may be in the form of tax receipts, 
records of subdivision or inheritance or mortgage/pawn agreements (see Appendix 
B). Although the cadastral survey never reached Shibar, books of ownership were 
compiled in the early 1970s and the Provincial Agricultural Office holds a copy of 
this record, which was recently “returned” by a commander. The governor of 
Shibar District also is satisfied that all copies of the nine Shibar Valley books exist. 
As noted earlier, the district Amlak officer acknowledges that he has documents 
and files in his house, which he removed for safety and will not return until 
instructed to do so by the Ministry of Agriculture, and until office accommodation 
has been provided. These files include the forms (or copies) used to compile 
ownership books. Shura members recalled well the arrival of an official in around 
1973, who accompanied the arbab to every household, distributing forms and 
requiring these be filled out. The books that were compiled from these records are 
referred to as “books of ownership,” but are more precisely titled Books of 
Integrated Land Size and Progressive Taxation (see Box 7). 
 




Recorders of information 
Name of village 
Name of district  
Name of province 
Serial number  
Name of landowner 
Number of evidence 
 
Number of plots 
Total land area (in jeribs) 
Details: 
Land type: grades I-VII 
Progressive tax to be paid 
Exemption from tax  
Total amount due 
Type of ownership documents held by owner 
Amount of tax paid under previous system 
 
Source: Examination of nine books held by Provincial Agricultural Office; “The Book of Integrated 
Land Size and Progressive Taxation,” Land Reform Administration, Ministry of Finance, Republic 
of Afghanistan (undated). 
 
For farmers in this and other villages, land ownership and taxation have always 
gone together. A host of different taxes have been charged, but a founding tax 
for most of this century has been the land tax, directed to landowners and fixed 
in accordance with the size of holding. Officially sanctioned community leaders, 
arbabs, played a main role as tax collectors from the 1900s. Even from Abdur 
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Rahman’s time, the size of land determined the amount payable. This is clearly 
evident in the property tax records from 1930-1959 examined by this author in 
the archives of the Ministry of Finance. Even before this time, large landowners 
forcibly or otherwise organised the collection and payment of taxes for kings 
and charged their people mainly in accordance with their farm size. Tenants 
could also be charged. The shura leader in Kalo reported: 
 
“The arbab always knew exactly how many people had to pay tax and what 
they should pay. The poor did not have to pay. But the big got a share from 
their workers and sharecroppers, so that way everyone paid. Under Daoud, 
the tax got bigger. If you couldn’t pay, the police were sent to collect you. 
We paid tax every August or September. Some of the arbabs extracted 
money for themselves. A good thing about Taraki was that he ended the 
arbab system. All his reforms were good; people were happy especially 
about the cancelling of unfair debts. However, I can’t support Taraki 
because it was his reforms which brought the troubles. Since then our houses 
have been destroyed, our fields plundered, our animals stolen and our 
children lost to us.”  
 
The members of the Kalo shura distinguish between taxation, which they regard as 
a national activity, and taxes randomly extracted by local commanders, leaders or 
parties. In addition, the Taliban extracted tithes. They welcome the return of “real 
taxation” as a sign that order has been restored and local commanders controlled 
in their valley. They consider it appropriate for rural taxation to be based upon 
property and that those without homes or farms should not pay tax. They favour 
progressive taxation, with larger landowners paying at higher rates than smaller 
farmers. 
 
However, it was also the view of the Kalo shura that it would be necessary to draw 
up a new list of exactly who is living in the valley and the land they own. Although 
it is usually the landless who leave and do not return, some of the departed were 
landowners who sold on their land or lost it by mortgaging. Some still have their 
land under uncertain pawn arrangements, and it is not clear if they or their 
creditors should pay the tax. Even in the 1970s, names of forefathers were often 
given to indicate the family farm and were thus not accurate for current holders. 
Some shura members said that it did not matter even today under whose name the 
land was registered, because that person, or the descendant of the person named, 
would then collect the tax from all the other parties involved. Most said that this 
did matter and it was important for a new register to reflect the current owners 
and their share in the land. Most farms had been subdivided since 1973 and many 
family disputes surrounded the shares; they said it would help if the register 
reflected each owner’s land exactly, and did not lump the land of brothers and 
cousins together under one family name. 
 
This would mean, however, that change of ownership in the future would have to 
be recorded in the register to keep it accurate. The shura liked the idea of each 
valley establishing and maintaining its own register. Copies of customary 
documents of subdivision, gifting or sale of land could be filed with the book. 
There would be no need to involve the court. The book itself could have one page 
to each owner recorded and space for changes in ownership or pawning, to be 
noted. Shura members became quite enthusiastic just thinking about the how the 
book would work. The shura, they said, could be in charge of the book. They 
volunteered that the record would be accurate, as everyone in the community 
knows who owns what land, and nothing could be concealed. People would also Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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know when land had been given away to sons or sold. They agreed the book would 
have to be open to villagers to inspect, to make sure the information had not been 
tampered with. “If the book were here we could protect it from being corrupted by 
officials.”  
 
An idea of special appeal to the Kalo shura was the registration of even the highest 
pastures, recording these in the name of particular villages in the valley. Inter-
village or inter-manteqa dispute over pasture use is rife at this time. Shibar District 
as a whole has limited pasture, one of which is in the upper reaches of the Kalo 
Valley.
 104 The main conflict exists between those villages and villagers who wish to 
convert even the higher pastures into farmland and those without the means to do 
so, or with large numbers of stock. Kuchis visit these pastures, especially during 
the 1960-1970s, as encouraged by King Zahir Shah and President Daoud, but the 
Kalo shura reported that there were only a few Kuchis and that relations between 
the Kuchis and Shibar farmers were fairly amicable. The Governor of Shibar 
suggested this was because the Kuchis who came to Shibar were only poor Kuchis, 
not the traders, and they did not try to exploit the Hazaras. The Kalo shura 
reported that some of these Kuchis returned in 1999 but came via the mountains, 
not the roads, as had been usual prior to 1979. Nonetheless, no shura members 
considered it a good idea that Kuchis be allowed to return. “The pastures are not 
enough for strangers,” they said. 
Shibar District:  The Eraq Valley 
The valley of Eraq is narrow and possesses very limited land. In 1978 there were 
nearly 1,000 households farming in the valley.
105 Although out-migration for jobs 
had grown steadily since the 1960s, this accelerated with the collapse of the PDPA 
government in 1979 and the arrival of the Russians. Departure of young men 
gathered pace in the 1990s as mujahiddin groups formed. Mass departure of young 
and old did not occur, however, until the arrival of the Taliban in the region after 
1997. By the time of their fall (late 2001) there were only 300 households (1,800 
people) resident in Eraq Valley.
106 AKDN calculated the land under cultivation at 
that time as 589 jeribs of irrigated land and 200 jeribs of rain-fed land. By June 
2003 the population had risen again to more than 400 households, as fear has 
receded and people return. Leaders say many of those still away are unlikely to 
return; most were landless before they left and had no homes of their own, and 
have little to return to.
107 There are also some who do own land but it is too small 
to live on and the returns of work in the towns are more attractive:  
 
“These are people who own one or two jeribs and sometimes more. They 
like to keep contact with their relatives and to be able to come and see the 
graveyards of their parents. They periodically return, like tourists. They will 
never live here again but nor will they ever sell their land.” 
108 
 
No resident in this valley considers himself to have “enough” land. Farm sizes are 
certainly much smaller than encountered in Bamyan District. A farm of three jeribs 
of irrigated land (0.6 ha) in Eraq is considered a large farm. There is no scope for 
rain-fed farming on the steep, rocky hillsides. No cultivatable, common land exists. 
Even 40 years ago, the site of the school had to be donated by a private farmer and 
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the new clinic has been built on another patch of private property. The only 
common lands are the very high pastures above the two mountain sub-villages 
reached only by several hours of walking through barren dessert.
109 Villagers from 
the valley bottom hamlets consistently claimed that “everyone” has the right to 
graze there, a right obviously exercised only by those with stock. As was the case 
in neighbouring Kalo Valley, Kuchis also used the upper pastures, especially during 
the 1970s, and by 1979 they numbered from 300 to 500 households. Fifteen Kuchi 
families returned in 1999 under the support of the Taliban. Eraq people differ in 
their views about the Kuchis. A leader insisted that the Kuchis had exploited poorer 
people and begun to buy up their lands when they defaulted on credit:  
 
“They were clever. They would lend money and get the repayment in seers 
of wheat which increased in value every year. Then they would add interest. 
Even if you could pay them back the next summer, you paid several times 
more than you had borrowed. They would only accept payment in wheat, not 
cash. Those who didn’t have enough wheat could lose their land very 
easily.” 
 
Others, however, were more sanguine, such as had been most interviewees in the 
Folady Valley in neighbouring Bamyan District. The Eraq Valley representative 
selected to attend the meeting with the Constitutional Commission representatives 
said he had written on his form that most Hazara people do not dislike the Kuchis, 
but that they should not be permitted to return because the grazing was 
insufficient even for the Hazaras:  
 
“We had a friendly relationship with them. They were not helping us but 
they were not harming us. That was a peaceful time. There was no problem 
with the pasture. There was enough for all of us. We used to go to their 
tents and drink tea and chat. They used to give us loans on a usury basis. But 
times have changed. We cannot let them use our pasture again. We do not 
have enough farmland and we must invest in animals, like our forefathers 
did.” 
 
The nine hamlets or villages of Eraq Valley fall traditionally into four manteqa and 
much of the social organisation of the valley is around these clan-based 
associations. Rain-fed land is limited (est. 200 jeribs or 40 ha) and located mainly 
at very high altitudes. Expansion of irrigated land within the valley is now 
impossible. Seven of the villages are located in the valley floor and two are several 
hours walk in high mountains above the valley (Khoshkak and Upper Gundaraghi). 
People in these areas are considered to be poor in Eraq, mainly because land and 
water for irrigation is scarce. Wheat yields in Shibar average between 40-60 seers 
per jerib for irrigated land and half this amount for the rain-fed fields high on the 
mountains.  
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Table 6: The Hamlets of Eraq Valley 














Ashoor  Ashoor  10  11  25  0 
  Kafshandaz  8  15  25  0 
Della  Della  45    40  0 
  Tangi Bokya  8    12  0 
Qalha  Qalha Ghulla  21    25  0 
  Shenna  7    12  0 
Eraq  Eraq Bala  60  78  125  50 




Gundargahi   110    250  0 
TOTAL   
 





* Aga Khan Development Network, Bamyan. 
** This survey. 
 
Modern settlement within the valley began 11 generations ago under a Hazara 
notable. Settlement first began in the very remote Khoshkak area, which was 
difficult for brigands to raid. Eraq people claim that the valley has an ancient 
settlement history with oral and material evidence of occupation long before the 
arrival of Islam in the 7
th century. The valley has remnants of iron workings and is 
considered to have been a site for blade and sword production during the Suhak 
Empire.
110 Pottery considered to be ancient by villagers is still periodically found in 
cultivated fields and a recent excavation for a house revealed three levels of 
graves, the deepest with pottery fire dishes buried alongside the bones, suggesting 
that the followers of the Balkh fire-worshippers of Zardasht may have lived in the 
valley.
111 Another legend has it that the population derives from Herat and 
Kandahar, the descendants of the dynasty of Khwaja Abdullah Ansari.  
 
More than half the people of Eraq are Ismaili Shi’a, with all residents of the villages 
of Khoshkak and especially Eraq Bala being Ismaili. They claim recurrent 
persecution. “Whenever there are wars we are victims. Even during the Russian 
occupation  mujahiddin  singled out Ismaili leaders to murder them. Only a few 
years ago, the owner of this house was pulled from his bed and shot before his five 
daughters, only because he was a devout Ismaili.”
112 
 
Until Amin’s rule in 1979, the valley was governed by two government-paid arbab. 
Both were chosen by the people. One was well-off (he had around five jeribs of 
land) but the other had three jeribs, more than most villagers. One was well 
respected and the other not; the latter is still alive and greeted as “arbab” to 
mock him. As one villager commented, “He took too many chances to make money. 
He would exaggerate even the smallest dispute among people so that he could 
extract a fee for resolving the argument.” Several villagers commented upon the 
dominance of bribery and corruption during President Daoud’s rule from 1973 to 
1978, and the way in which the arbab would collude with district and provincial 
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(Lee, op cit., 9-11). 
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officials. However, they denied that this involved land (“there was not enough land 
to make trouble over”).  
 
During the mujahiddin and Taliban period, each hamlet was required to appoint a 
representative (numayanda). The last time the eight hamlet numayanda met 
together was to help the Taliban organise the collection of tithes and taxes. Some 
are now members of the valley shura (17 members) established with guidance from 
the NGOs, Solidarités and AKDN, to help manage village projects. One of these 
representatives acknowledged that he and his colleagues are “slightly better off” 
than most villagers but that that was incidental. He had been a representative 
during the mujahiddin time (1979-1998) but no longer received the customary gift 
of a few seers of wheat from each household at harvest time. He believed there 
was less scope for corruption among leaders today than had been the case in the 
valley during the 1960s.  
 
Land has always been scarce in Eraq Valley and residents have been quick to take 
whatever opportunities were availed to settle elsewhere. Virtually every household 
has a male member working or living outside the village. Many other male family 
members migrate to cities seasonally (for the winter), earning money as unskilled 
labour. Villagers recall the first formal opportunity to resettle in 1979: 
 
“It was announced on the radio that landless people could apply for land in 
Helmand. People gathered and sent one representative to Kabul to plead our 
case, with many names. He took the ID cards of all those wanting land. Each 
person also had a letter from the arbab confirming that the person was 
landless. Only some got accepted; it was a lottery numbers process and 
there was also a lot of bribery and corruption. Around 12 from Kafshandaz 
hamlet got a place and around eight from other villages in this valley. These 
people got letters to take to the governor of Helmand.  They rushed to 
Helmand. What they found pleased them; large farms with lots of irrigation. 
No one came back from Helmand in disgust. They grew cotton, maize and 
wheat and had two harvests every year! Winters only lasted for 40 days! 
Several families still live there but most felt insecure under the Taliban and 
returned here or went to Kabul.” 
 
A second resettlement opportunity arose in 1992 under Najibullah’s administration:  
 
“People were encouraged to settle in the northern deserts of Kuwaja Alwan 
and Killagai in Puli Khumri District of Baghlan. Around 700-800 people went 
there from Shibar District. At least 200 came from this valley. The land was 
distributed evenly and free of charge. Each person got 10 jeribs of rain-fed 
land. We grew wheat there. But people got afraid when the Taliban came 
into power. The wise ones left in 1996. Some returned here. Others went to 
Kabul or Pakistan. Later we heard that those who had stayed were 
massacred by the Taliban. They were murdered and put into deep wells. No 
one has returned there. I do not know if the desert is still being cultivated. 
The same thing happened in other parts of the north.”
113 
 
Russian soldiers came only once into the valley.  “They inspected each house and 
collected arms from people. For two days and nights we hid in our houses. But no 
one was hurt.” This was not the case later. During the 1980s, the valley got 
embroiled in the factional fighting among emergent mujahiddin factions. Although 
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the Ismaili members of the community claim that they tried to avoid taking sides as 
ordered by the Aga Khan, they too were involved.
114 Attacks and battles reached 
their height in 1993-1995 with fighting between the Massoud-backed Harakat-e-
Ingilabi Islami party and Khalili’s Hizb-e Wahdat. A disabled tank of the former 
faction lies at the entrance of the village today. Eraq constantly changed hands 
between 1990 and 1995: 
 
“Even though we are remote, we were easy prey for the militias as we are so 




With hindsight, villagers think favourably of the Khalili forces: 
 
“Of all the militias, they treated us the best. But all factions made us bring 
water and bread to their outposts. Sometimes we had to work for them 
dawn to dusk. Even old people had to crawl up mountains with water for 
their men. When they saw we were Ismaili, they would beat us. Neither 
Sunni nor Shi’a respected us.”
116 
 
When the Taliban first came to the area in 1998, the villagers assured them of their 
allegiance and the Taliban went away satisfied. A second visit occurred several 
months later with the arrival of a contingent of soldiers, tanks and four-wheel 
drives following them. People fled to the mountains as those in neighbouring Kalo 
Valley were to do after them. Some houses were burned, arms and vehicles 
collected and the Taliban took whatever money people had: 
 
“They went house to house, entered and demanded ‘Where are your sons?’  
Most of the Taliban were from Kandahar and Parwan, but there were Tajiks 
among them. The destruction was done by the Tajiks. They were the guides 
to the Taliban into the valleys. Even near the entrance to our valley, around 
30 people were massacred when they were found on the road travelling from 
Shibar town. That time with the Taliban was terrible; they stopped 
differentiating among us; all Hazaras were enemies.”  
 
For a while the village was left in peace. Then a third visit was made to the valley 
(1999). A message was sent to the village that every man should gather at Eraq 
Bala Village to hear a statement. Men came from everywhere, including from the 
two mountain villages. Immediately after all had arrived, they were rounded up. 
Many escaped in the melee and fled to the mountains, but nearly 100 men were 
taken, including a large number of elderly men who had been unable to escape. 
They were trucked to Toopchi in Parwan for the first night, then to the Ghorband 
Valley, where they spent seven or eight months living in a fort and building a road 
during the day. They were then moved to Kabul prison. Those who could not 
arrange for bribes to be paid were not released until after the fall of the Taliban in 
November 2001, spending a full two years in Kabul gaol: 
 
“At the beginning, relatives began to cultivate the land which people had 
left behind. Later the Taliban came and forced our youths to the front line, 
so again many escaped. The Taliban took over any farm which did not have 
                                                 
114 This was mainly due to Captain Turan Noor Mohammed Khan, a local Ismaili commander, who was associated 
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groups between 1978-1985, the dissolution of many and the emergent coalitions from 1987 (Mousavi, op cit., 
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the owner living in the village and took the harvests and sent the grain to 
their fighters. Only now are relatives again beginning to harvest these lands. 
The owners never demand a share; they just come to make sure their land is 
still there and recognised as their own. Several families managed to get to 
Canada. One of those came back after Karzai was appointed to check on his 
farm. He never asked the relative for a share of grain.” 
 
Most interviewees considered the current period peaceful. One villager boasted 
that “nowhere in Afghanistan has peace like we now have in Bamyan Province.” 
Another commented upon the district governor. He had been a warlord through the 
1989-2001 era and had followers. However, he had given up his weapons and tanks. 
His father had been a well-known arbab and malik. The son, however, this man 
opined: 
 
 “… is just a nice warlord. He is like a shepherd. He can’t do anything for the 
people but neither can he harm them. He only has the job because he 
supported Khalili. Not everyone was happy about this. Several valleys 
refused to participate in the shura to appoint him. But most people have 
accepted him. At the moment we are not frightened that there will be war 
again.” 
 
A leader concluded: 
 
“Looking back since the king’s time, the most peaceful moment in this valley 
is now, this moment. People can move freely. But under the Taliban and the 
factions, we suffered. It was also bad under the king and Daoud, but the 
main problem in those days was bribery and corruption. We could deal with 
that. What we could not deal with was the guns and the killing that followed 
the revolution and lasted until 2001.” 
 
Below, the landholding of three sample villages within Eraq Valley is presented. 
Kafshandaz  
Kafshandaz is the newest settlement in the valley, having been first settled around 
1920 through a land grant to the grandfather of the current landowners (this may 
coincide with the period in which Amanullah tried to make amends with the 
Hazaras). Most of the 42 households are no longer in the village; in December 2001, 
only eight were living in the village, increased since to 15 households. Only two of 
the absent 27 households are expected to return to farm. Most of the rest are in 
Kabul (21). Three families are in Moscow, two in Pakistan and one is in Canada. A 
review of 23 people who left the village shows that half left within the last five 
years because of the Taliban, seven left to fight with mujahiddin (1985-1994), two 
left in 1979 after the revolution and one has left within the last year to work in 
Kabul. Three left to take up settlement scheme opportunities in Helmand and the 
north but have returned.
117 
 
Ten of the 42 households of Kafshandaz are entirely landless (24 percent). Nor did 
these ten households ever own houses of their own. They were poor relatives or 
workers attached to one or other owner household.
118 Homelessness extends well 
beyond these households; in fact, only 15 of the 42 families have houses of their 
own, living with parents or relatives (36 percent). Among those 15 families resident 
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in the village today, five do not have their own house and doubt they will ever 
have the means to build houses.
119 Two expect to eventually inherit their fathers’ 
houses along with their brothers. 
 
Farms are extremely small and average only one jerib of irrigated land, with a 
range of 0.3–2.5 jeribs (under half a hectare). Among the 15 residential 
households, seven have one jerib or less. Nine of the 15 households also farm 
additional land belonging to relatives. Although the arrangement is that they will 
retain only one-third, only half the owners have collected their two-thirds share in 
the years they have been absent. The farmers say they keep an exact record of 
production in the event that they will be asked eventually for the share in cash or 
kind.  
 
Among the 15 resident households, the maximum land any one is cultivating (both 
their own land and relatives’ land) is four jeribs, less than one hectare. Although 
no more land is available, they say the constraining factor is not just land, but 
money to buy seeds and fertiliser. They have only been able to cultivate this year 
due to advance provision of seed and fertiliser by AKDN and Solidarités. It was 
noted, however, that each landowning household in Kafshandaz owns one ox. 
Brothers normally team up their animals to plough. Collective work is undertaken 




All extended families in Kafshandaz have at least one adult male member who is 
working outside of the village. Remittances have kept some families alive over the 
last three or four years. Only one among the 15 households has borrowed outside 
the inter-related family system during the last few years. People borrow from non-
relatives as a last resort. Interest in the valley begins at ten percent per month or 
120 percent per year. There are virtually no persons living in the valley today who 
are rich enough to lend money. The one farmer in Kafshandaz who has borrowed 
said he had to go to a faraway village to borrow 7,000 Afs (US$145). He hopes to 
repay this through selling his livestock, but fears the interest will have risen so high 
that he will have to pawn his meagre land as well to pay off the loan.  
Ashoor  
Ashoor Village is the sister village of Kafshandaz.
121  The elders listed 22 
households, only 11 of which are currently resident in the village. The remainder 
reside in Bamyan, Kabul, Iran or other places with available jobs. Where this is the 
case, they generally send money to their families or relatives. Although it seems 
difficult to imagine, land is yet scarcer in Ashoor than Kafshandaz. Only seven of 
the 11 residential households own land and they share a meagre seven jeribs 
among them. The four households that are landless work as labourers for these and 
other owners. Their wage is US$25 per person per season — not enough to buy 
wheat for a year. The landowners also sharecrop whatever other land they can find 
in the area. However, the poorer owners did not risk sharecropping this year, 
because they feared investing seeds and fertiliser in what looked like it could be 
another drought year.  
 
Only three of the 11 absentee households own land. Their asset adds up to only 
five more jeribs. Land shortage is so acute in the village that arguments frequently 
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break out. A typical dispute recorded concerns a family of four married sons whose 
father sold the little land he had in order to remarry after his wife died: 
 
“He had to marry, as he had four sons to bring up. The dowry cost him the 
equivalent of 15,000 Afs (US$300). He sold his land to his own cousin. Now 
there is a dispute between the sons of that cousin and the sons of the 
father. They claim that their father only pawned the land and they say they 
have a document in Iran with the eldest son to prove it. One other son is 
baking bread for the military and only sometimes comes home. The other 
two brothers sharecrop for Tajiks in Shaspoul and often come home. They 
want to stay here and want to get their father’s land back. The dispute has 
become heated. We elders are waiting to see the document, but it may not 
solve the problem. We need to know if the father paid back any of the loan 
as his sons claim. Disputes like this can last for generations.” 
Khoshkak  
Khoshkak
122 is located at 3,000 metres in a small valley high in the mountains. It is 
a two-hour walk from the valley bottom hamlets of Eraq. Khoshkak is fed by a small 
river that has its source 12 km away. The source falls within Jola Village and 
relations between the two villages are tense largely because of water distribution 
problems. Khoshkak villagers freely express their jealousy that Jola is “such a rich 
village” and has so much water:  
 
“It is because they took all our water that they didn’t suffer in the drought 
or under the Taliban. They had enough food to feed themselves and to bribe 
the Taliban. We had none.” 
 
The flow of Khoshkak River is certainly limited. In addition, the river freezes in 
w i n t e r  s o  w a t e r  h a s  t o  b e  c o l l e c t e d  f r o m  a  s t r e a m  a t  l o w e r  a l t i t u d e ,  e a c h  
collection trip taking two hours. The village depends heavily upon rain-fed farming 
and no crop has been planted for five years, including this rain-short 2003. Life has 
always been hard in Khoshkak and the people are referred to as “very poor.” 
However, it has been only the Taliban period that has pushed the community into 
irreversible demise. Before the Taliban around 80 households lived in the village. 
“We were poor but we survived. Now we are only 20 households and we can’t 
survive.” 
 
How has this come about? This is the story that the Khoshkak people tell: 
 
“Before the Taliban we were protected up here. No one reached us. In the 
king’s time and under Daoud, soldiers came once or twice but they never 
disturbed us. Russians did not come up here although they kept lookouts on 
top of the mountains near here. Even when there was mujahiddin fighting in 
the valley, most of us from here kept out of it. Our troubles began with the 
Taliban. There was a notorious commander of the Taliban in Parwan 
Province, a real tyrant. He asked us all to attend a meeting and when we 
arrived we found eight trucks of Taliban soldiers. They rounded us up, 
including eight men from Khoshkak. We sat in the prison in Kabul until the 
Taliban were defeated. Most of the people in the prison were Hazaras. We 
received three small pieces of bread a day. Two from Khoshkak died. When 
we asked what our crime was, the guards said it was because we were 
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Hazaras and had we stayed in the valleys: we would have supported Khalili 
and fought against the Taliban.”  
 
Life continued in the village. Relatives of the prisoners collected as much money as 
they could to get them released. The standard bribe was around US$1,000. Several 
households from Khoshkak succeeded in collecting the funds and their 
husbands/fathers were released. Sheep were sold, houses were sold and farms 
pawned. Blankets and cooking pots were also sold. Money was borrowed. None of 
these households have been able to remain in the village. They work today in 
wealthier communities for landowners who can afford to hire labourers. Village 
elders doubt that these families will ever own land again. “They do not even have 
houses to return to.” 
 
Many other families left the village at this time, fearing further reprisals for the 
support Khalili was garnering. Although everyone was poor, the slightly better-off 
families left first, able to afford the transport. “Walking takes you nowhere. You 
can run to the mountains if you are young enough and you can stay there for one, 
two weeks, but in the end you have to come back.” Many were still trapped and 
subject to periodic visits from armed Taliban ordering them to the front line:  
 
“At first they tricked us and told us if some of the men volunteered, they 
would leave the village alone. Some young men volunteered, but then when 
they arrived at the command post, they found the commander only wanted 
money. The commander said to the young men, ‘Oh dear, the truck has just 
left. You will have to pay me to send other Hazaras to go in your place. The 
cost is 20 million old Afs (US$415) for each of you.’ We were given one 
month to find the money. We had to find the money otherwise they would 
have killed everyone in the village. Our families pawned the land and sold 
the stock and we paid them.”  
 
Other men escaped to the mountains and found their way to Pakistan or other 
places. Taliban soldiers continued to turn up in Khoshkak, ordering families to 
make bread, carry loads or to slaughter the few sheep that were left. Even during 
the drought they still attacked. Shots were fired in the air, old men beaten with 
cables. Villagers remain particularly bitter about the Tajik Taliban, some of whom 
they recognised as from Gandak Valley in the north:  
 
“Every other month armed Taliban came and ordered us to show them our 
tax receipts. They always took more tax away. We also had to pay tithes, 
one seer for every ten seers of grain we had. It was no good running to the 
mountain as they just exploited or beat the old and very young who had 
stayed and those of us who had run away felt ashamed.”
123  
 
Many more left the village altogether:  
 
“What have they got to come home to? Just debts. It is no use coming home 
unless you can buy your land back. And you can’t buy your land back living 
here. Even though the lenders let us farm the land we have to give almost 
all the crop to them.”
124  
 
Some rescue is arriving in the form of AKDN assistance with seeds and fertiliser 
noted above. Once crops are harvested, the beneficiaries will return the same 
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amount of seed they received and pay for the fertiliser through the same weight in 
seeds (or double the weight if the fertiliser was black fertiliser). The collected 
seed will be stored in the village to assist the very poor and to pay for food for 
work efforts.
125 Farmers who have pawned their land may make much more 
favourable arrangements with the money-lenders. Instead of receiving one-fifth or 
one-quarter of their production, they may bargain for a 50-50 split in the harvest 
given that they are providing the seed, fertiliser and usually oxen. This has been 
life saving for at least ten of the 20 households who remain in Khoshkak. It may in 
the future attract some of the absentees back home. 
 
Another current advantage to Khoshkak people is that with fewer families 
depending upon the scarce, irrigated land, those that are back in the village are 
able to cultivate more this year than has traditionally been possible. All but one 
family (and the head of household is blind and elderly) are cultivating both their 
own pawned land and/or land belonging to absentee farmers. Departing residents 
typically left clear instructions as to who was to farm their land and under what 
conditions. Because most handed these farms to their close relatives, the 
arrangement is generally on a 50-50 basis. In due course, the owners will collect 
their share in grain or cash. In the interim some of the remaining farmers hope 
they may be able to at least produce enough food for the coming year.  
 
Many farmers doubt, however, that they will ever recover their pawned land. One 
villager explained that his debt now amounts to 100,000 Afs ($2,000). He had 
borrowed to pay usha to the Taliban, to pay for one son not to be sent to the front 
line, and to buy food during the drought. He has now sent a son to Kabul to find 
work as a porter and the other son is sent daily to harvest ground brush from the 
mountains and to sell this to people in richer valleys. The farmer expects he will at 
most be able to repay around $25 each year to the money-lender. He doubts his 
sons will marry as no one will lend him money to pay dowry when he has no more 
land to pawn. He noted that he has no daughters to sell. 
 
The source of loans for the Khoshkak people has been richer farmers in Jola and 
Bolola Villages and later, the transport owners in Bolola, located on the main 
road to Bamyan. Khoshkak people are bitter that they had to borrow from the 
Jola people; as noted above, the two villages have been rivals for generations 
and battle annually over water shares. To add insult to injury, now most of 
Khoshkak is owned by Jola farmers, both land and houses. 
 
The fact that the rain-fed land has still not been able to be cultivated has not 
helped. These areas are not communal village lands. They were divided among 
landowners some generations past, and with inequities intact; those with most 
irrigated land were given most of the rain-fed land. Those without irrigated land 
were given no rain-fed areas. The explanation given included: 
 
“The poor cannot farm rain-fed lands easily because they do not own oxen. 
Before the Taliban, there were 80 oxen in this village. Now there are only 
ten oxen, so even if the rain comes next year we will have difficulty 
cultivating all the area.”  
  
How much land do the Khoshkak people own today? Together the 17 landowners in 
situ own 13.15 jeribs (2.6 ha) of irrigated land, or an average of 0.77 jeribs each 
(0.15 ha). The largest holding is 1.2 jeribs (0.2 ha). Three of the 20 households that 
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are in the village today are entirely landless and one of these does not own a house 
(many of the absentee households now own neither houses nor farms). Twelve 
others are near landless and most of them are now not home-owners either. Six of 
the 17 land-owning households have their land under pawn (as do many of those 
absent from the village). Two others would have pawned their land but their 
holdings are too small and rocky to be attractive to money-lenders. Both work as 
labourers for other farmers, as they have always done. Those who are not working 
for others are sharecropping the land of relatives.  
 
The largest area cultivated by any one household is four jeribs and includes both 
owned and relatives’ land; this is farmed by an 18-year-old son who remained in 
the village during the Taliban because his brother is mentally handicapped and his 
father is ill. He ran frequently to the mountains to avoid being conscripted, and 
once directly escaped capture by Taliban soldiers by inviting them into the house 
and offering to provide tea after their hard walk up the mountain and then running 
away. Infuriated, they put a bounty on his head which the community had to find 
and pay. He is still paying back the amount, with the help of three older brothers 
who escaped earlier and who work as road workers in Kabul. They also send tea 
and sugar. 
 
Two other families owe money, although their land is not pawned. One owes 
50,000 Afs (US$1,000) and this year plans to start repaying this and the interest 
(unspecified) with 50 seers of wheat (worth around US$52). Family members 
expect to be repaying this loan all their lives but would rather do this than lose 
the land. Like so many in the community, this family has no home of its own, 
living currently in the house of absent relatives.  
 
The second family owns a house and has land that is no more than a garden, 
around 0.3 jerib. The owner borrowed cash “to survive the Taliban taxes and 
the drought and to feed my family.” All household members work on the farms 
of other people and the eldest son is the shepherd for the village, taking the 
cows and sheep to the pasture one hour away. The household head does not 
expect to be able to repay even part of the loan. He believes they may soon lose 
their house and garden. “If I had money I would leave my family here and go and 
look for work in the cities,” he said.  
 
In summary, of the estimated 80 households that lived in Khoshkak prior to the 
Taliban, three-quarters have left. Around half have little to return to, having 
either been already landless or made landless due to the taxing, tithing and 
tyranny of the Taliban. Most of those who remained or who have returned to the 
village own some land (85 percent) but in most cases, too little to be useful for 
livelihood (70 percent). One-third of these have their small lands under 
mortgage. Another 11 percent have large loans outstanding. Every villager is in 
debt to shopkeepers for the purchase of small commodities. Taken together, the 
elders estimate that over a half of the families who owned land have now lost 
their land, others will lose their land, and only a handful have hope of hanging 
onto their farms.  
Panjab District:  The Nargas Valley 
T h e  N a r g a s  V a l l e y  r u n s  d i r e c t l y  w e s t  o u t  o f  P a n j a b  t o w n  u n t i l  i t  r e a c h e s  a  
mountain. Immediately over the mountain the Gudar Valley begins and 
continues in the same westward direction. Like many parts of Panjab District, 
these are areas that have a long history of Hazara feudal relations with begs or Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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mirs  (landlords)  possessing vast lands with many client households. 
Characteristically, each of the 15 major valleys in Panjab was owned by one 
large mir.  This was reinforced by the granting of land to select persons by more 
numerous Hazara notables during and after Abdur Rahman’s time, which did not 
necessarily coincide with previous land ownership patterns.  A crucial element 
of these land grants was that specific land areas were not allocated but rather 
select Hazara khans received written awards or orders (firman) stating that they 
had been granted a specific amount of land and were told to find that land 
themselves in a named valley or valleys. Not all were able to find enough land 
again in their original valleys. Landless workers, the majority, were never 
included in these grants.
126  
 
Intra-family subdivision and sale outside the family have left few of the very 
large estates intact. Each valley in Panjab is still characterised by highly 
polarised land ownership, but with very large holdings found today in only four 
valleys, one of which is the Nargas Valley.
127 Abdur Rahman also handed out 
pasture land grants to Pashtun nomads at the same time. A certain Yakoub Khan 
is reputed as having been Rahman’s officer-in-charge and issued documents to 
the Hazara khans and allegedly reserved only the tops of mountains for Kuchi 
use. In practice, distinctions between what was pasture or mountain top and 
what was existing or potential rain-fed land, were unclear or since manipulated. 
These vagaries facilitated the deep disputes between Hazaras and Kuchis that 
continue today.  
 
In addition, the Pashtun nomads began to buy non-pasture land, as early as the 
1900s.
128 Over the intervening century some of the khans sold off lower rain-fed 
and irrigated lands to these visitors for prices that were considered fair at the 
time. As elaborated later, many of the smaller landowners in later years did not 
so much sell their land to Kuchi as were forcibly persuaded to give it up.  
 
The use of the daftar, a highly erratic unit of measure of land, was unique to 
this part of Hazarajat, and enabled many of the grantees to help themselves to 
much larger areas than perhaps the grants had intended.  The jerib measure 
never took root in Panjab District (let alone acres or hectares).   Daftars and 
kulbars (approximately one-fourth of a daftar) were used instead. The problem 
was that these were not definitive units of measure.  Although officials 
recognised 60 jeribs as a daftar, it might represent 30 jeribs to one farmer and 
150 jeribs to another. The district agricultural officer reported that farmers’ 
manipulation of the measure to their own advantage was typical of Panjab: 
 
“I recall cases where farmers recorded in the 1960s and 1970s that they had 
one kulbar of land when in fact the seers of seed (approximately seven kilos 
of grain) they used to farm the land showed me that they had two kulbar. 
When Kuchi bought land they would do the opposite. They would get the 
Amlak officer to write down that they had bought land equal to 120 jeribs 
when in fact they had bought land only equal to 100 jeribs. Then they would 
let their animals graze the neighbour’s land and when the neighbour 
                                                 
126 This was also the case even in the years when King Amanullah attempted to help the poor by selling 
government lands very cheaply; this was directed to poor ex-landowners, not those who had never in the past 
owned land of their own. However, it is not known that this scheme actually reached Hazarajat (refer to 
Poullada, op cit., 135).  
127 The Arkorot, Akhzarai and Charjbarja Valleys are the other valleys in question. Many of the villages in these 
valleys are made up entirely of landless households; Safidak Village, for example, comprises 22 households, all 
tenants of one landlord. 
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protested, they would show him the document and insist that the land must 
be theirs because of its size. If the dispute went to court, the court would 
rule according to the document. The Kuchi would also offer to buy the 
neighbour’s land to resolve the dispute, and the farmer would concede, 
having already lost most of the crop to the Kuchi’s animals and knowing he 
would never be able to farm with the Kuchi as his neighbour. Because the 
Kuchi would still claim the land was his and that he had no need to sell what 
was already his, the price would be very low.” 
 
The preferred measure has therefore been to refer to the seers of seed needed 
to plant an area. This would be straightforward if it were not for the fact that 
farmers lump together the seeds needed for rain-fed and irrigated land, where 
in practice a jerib of rain-fed land requires around half the seed of an irrigated 
plot. Therefore, even the use of seers of seed to identify land owned has proved 
unreliable.
129 This affects the accuracy of figures given below. Following the 
advice of the Oxfam Agricultural Adviser in Panjab, an average of 60 jeribs (12 
ha) to one daftar of irrigated land and 200 jeribs (40 ha) of rain-fed land is used 
here.  
 
Table 7: Estimate of Cultivated Land in Panjab District  
Land type  Total daftars 
 
Jeribs   Percent  
Rain-fed  366  73,200*  59 
Spring or check dam 
irrigated 
161  9,672**  26 








Source: Oxfam Office, Panjab. * Using 200 jeribs per daftar of rain-fed land; ** using 60 
jeribs per daftar of irrigated land. 
 
Current land ownership in Panjab District follows local tradition, extending from 
the valley bottom to the top of hill from which run-off drains. A five-jerib 
irrigated farm could therefore yield the owner up to 500 jeribs of hillside, of 
which one-tenth might be suitable for scattered, rain-fed cultivation. Common 
land on the hillsides or ranges is accordingly scarce. Landless workers, tenants 
or sharecroppers who own sheep or oxen are generally able to use their 
landowner’s grazing area for their own animals as part of their agreement. Some 
farmers thought that in the distant past (i.e., before Abdur Rahman), the 
hillsides had been treated as common land, and that it was only during the 
hand-outs to Hazara nobles by Habibullah that the new landlords took the 
opportunity to claim the hillsides as their own land. Other farmers in the district 
have suggested that any land with potential for rain-fed agriculture has always 
been divided among landowners in the valley.  
 
The extent to which the steep hillsides of valleys and mountains beyond have 
been used for rain-fed farming is a matter of sharper dispute. Certainly hillside 
rain-fed farming has been practised for centuries, but probably not to the 
extent following the 1978 revolution and the departure of the Kuchis. Currently, 
Hazara farmers in all four valleys say that rain-fed cultivation has declined over 
the last decade, partly because of the drought (1999-2002), but mainly because 
of the decline in yields, weed infestation and soil erosion. The availability of 
                                                 
129 In general, one jerib of irrigated land requires five seers of seed and one jerib of rain-fed land requires two 
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ground cover used for winter fuel (khar – thorn bushes) has declined. There is 
little evidence of rain-fed cultivation on hillsides directly above settlements; 
local Hazaras claim this is because of the danger of landslides and avalanches to 
their homes. Customary soil conserving measures (aigal) were mentioned several 
times. The role of recent extension in limiting rain-fed cultivation cannot be 
discounted. Oxfam has operated in the district for more than a decade, and has 
increasingly emphasised soil conservation and provided food-for-work to 
conserve soil. 
 
Most of the Nargas Valley remains in the hands of the Akbar Khan family, given 
by King Habibullah when he took the throne in 1901. Today, the land is held by 
four descendant brothers and their nephew, two sisters and their husbands. 
Three brothers,
130 a cousin and the nephew recounted the history of the estate: 
 
“Our forefathers had always lived in this valley. In 1879 our great, great 
grandfather was the owner of all this land.  When Abdur Rahman’s forces 
wanted to capture Hazarajat, they sent messengers that we should hand 
over our leaders or otherwise prepare for war. The Hazara people came 
together and decided to fight. Hazarajat was divided into four commands. 
One force was in Maidan. Our great grandfather, Abraham Beg, was the 
commander of this front. He was a young man with a family and very 
determined to protect the land of the Hazaras. The second front was in 
Bamyan, led by Mir el Khani. The third was in Ghor Province, led by 
Mohammed Hussan Beg Lal. The further was towards Kandara and Urgystan 
and led by Sardar Azmim Beg.   
 
“Now, there is a pass on the way to Maidan called Mullah Yaqoub, where 
there is a bridge called Torghonak. Our great grandfather destroyed the 
bridge, thinking he would be safe if he cut off the pass. But he didn’t know 
that Abdur Rahman had long-range guns. The very first bullet fired killed 
him, and when his forces saw this, they tried to flee. Most were massacred. 
Abdur Rahman’s soldiers marched into this area and killed so many people. 
Everyone was massacred except for some women and children. Our great 
grandfather was only seven years old at the time. He, and many others, 
including women, were captured, sent to Kabul and imprisoned or were 
made slaves. They remained slaves in Kabul for 22 years. Then in 
Habibullah’s time, our great grandfather, Haji Mohammed Hussain Beg, was 
released. He was 29 years old and had spent nearly all his life in prison. 
Habibullah was sorry about his father’s treatment of the Hazaras and he 
gave Hazarajat back to the Hazaras.  My great grandfather was given 50 
daftars (approximately 3,000 jeribs or 600 ha). He was the only one left in 
the family; his father, his uncles and his cousins had all been killed or died, 
so he returned alone to reclaim his land. However, the valley only has 30 
daftars of land, and his grant from the king said 50 daftars. So our 
grandfather took all the land in this valley except for five daftars, which had 
been taken by other notables, and then he claimed more land in 
neighbouring valleys, including Ghor Ghori Valley. Most of the land we 
owned there was later sold by my father to Kuchis. 
 
“Of the 25 daftars, which our grandfather inherited, only 12 remain with us. 
The 13 other daftar have been sold to other people by our uncles. That was 
mainly in Taraki’s time. They were afraid the land would be taken from us. 
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There were plenty of rich people who wanted to buy the land, so we got 




Today the Akbar descendants are involved in transport and a range of other 
businesses and do not farm.  They do, however, spend time supervising their 
workers and tenants. The estate is farmed jointly by the brothers and their cousin. 
Other cousins and their eldest brother manage family businesses in Kabul. The 12 
daftars of the estate comprise at least 720 jeribs (144 ha) of “mainly” irrigated 
land. It is likely that double or even triple this amount exists as rain-fed fields. The 
land is farmed by workers and tenants in six settlements along the valley. They 
include 22 tenants in Naw Pak, Shinak, Char Borja, Qala-e-Kata and Qala-e-
Akhound. The remainder of the Akbar estate is being farmed by 18 workers directly 
hired by the family.  
 
None of the tenants, sharecroppers or workers own land of their own. Seven of the 
tenants have been farming Akbar land for a generation or more and are, in effect, 
long-term lessees. In contrast, the workers have come to the area in only the last 
three or four years. This body of farmers belong to a very large sector of modern 
Panjab agriculture, moving from farm to farm every one or two years, ever seeking 
the perfect landlord, productive land and a fair share of the crop. 
 
The workers (dehqan) are hired by the season and receive one-quarter of the crop 
(char kot), but those who were given a room and a stall for their animals are 
entitled to only one-fifth of the crop (panj kot). The “season” usually includes six 
winter months, during which they are responsible for caring for the large Akbar 
herd. The Akbars provide oxen, seed and fertiliser. The workers are given a 
specified area of irrigated and rain-fed land to cultivate and must provide a fixed 
number of seers of wheat at harvest, irrespective of the total. Even during the 
drought when there was no harvest, the quota was barely reduced, placing workers 
in serious debt. Long-term tenants were given larger exemptions. In addition, 
workers must also collect an agreed number of bundles of khar (thorn bushes) for 
fuel and prepare a fixed number of dung rounds for winter fuel.  
 
The Akbar brothers acknowledge that there is not a single tenant, sharecropper or 
worker who is not in debt to them to one degree or another. All have received cash 
and/or wheat loans. Most also have debts with the local shopkeepers. The Akbars 
keep good records of debts and subtract these at harvest time. Many workers leave 
with food for a month or two. Unpaid debts have to be worked off the next season. 
Agreements are always in writing and witnessed by other tenants or workers. The 
relationship between the Akbar landlords and their farmers cannot be described as 
feudal, in the sense that social bonds of reciprocity do not exist, except in respect 
of one or two faithful retainers, such as those working in the castle.  
 
Aside from the Akbar family, there are at least 13 other landowners in the long and 
wide Nargas Valley today. Five already had land when the Akbars’ great 
grandfather arrived back in the valley. Today, these farms also exist as villages of 
well extended and multiplied families. One middle-aged member of one of the 
families (at Sak-e-Joi hamlet) pointed out his farm, which measured only half an 
acre of irrigated land. His three brothers have similar-sized farms. They also own 
around one acre of rain-fed land but which is currently “too poor to cultivate.” All 
three have mortgaged their land — to the Akbars.  
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The lands which the Akbar family sold in 1979 are found in Deh Naw Pak and 
Taghak, hamlets at the western end of the valley. Respectively, these include five 
owners with one worker household and three landowners with one worker family.  
Together, they own an estimated 64 jeribs or an average of eight jeribs (1.6 ha) 
per family. One of the largest owners explained that his father arrived with money 
to buy land in 1978, having failed to find land in his original home area, Warras 
District. His father had been working for 30 years as a junior official in Kabul and 
Kandahar and this had made him “rich.”  He bought one kulbar (15 jeribs, 3 ha) 
from the Akbars. He had been to school and owned a minibus with his cousin. 
“Everyone in the valley knows I will buy their land if they want to sell it but no one 
wants to sell. No business can replace land.” 
Panjab District:  The Gudar Valley 
Like most of Panjab District, the Gudar Valley is characterised by landlordism and 
landlessness, but without a single dominant owner as in the Nargas Valley. Doni 
Nayab Village is a good example. 
 
Doni Nayab comprises 30 households. Only four households own land. Two each 
own around 12 jeribs (2.4 ha); two own about three jeribs (0.6 ha) of irrigated 
land.
132 Each also owns several times these amounts of rain-fed land, though one 
household has much less. In total, the four owners together own around 88 jeribs 
(17.6 ha), or 22 jeribs (4.4 ha) each. 
 
The remaining 26 households work for these farmers. All are homeless as well as 
landless and live in rooms attached to the landlords’ houses. Seven are lessees, 
having agreed on rent at the beginning of the season, paid in seers of wheat. This 
year these tenants (ijaradar) agreed to provide 20 seers of wheat at harvest for 
fields which are expected to produce 60-70 seers, or around one-third. This is 
considered an average to good arrangement; in the previous drought years farmers 
were only able to keep one-tenth of this amount after paying the fixed share to the 
owners.  With an exceptional harvest a tenant may be able to keep up to half the 
crop. Tenants provide all inputs to farming, including oxen to plough. 
 
The current period is considered excellent for tenants, and those who have the 
means to plough and procure seeds and fertiliser are doing so if they are at all 
able. This is because the drought is over and better crops are expected in the next 
few years, particularly on the rain-fed fields, which have been resting during the 
drought. It is also because no taxes are being levied. Traditionally, in this area 
lessees/tenants have been required by their landlords to share the cost of levies, 
tithes (during the Taliban) and taxes. They shared the annual property tax burden 
up until 1978, and were more erratically but onerously taxed by militia throughout 
the mujahiddin period. Factions would levy food and livestock to help feed their 
soldiers, sometimes demanding tributes every few months. Tenants who owned a 
few sheep were most affected. Landlords tired of sending their own sheep to feed 
fighters and would often “persuade” tenants to contribute.  
 
The impression gained from villagers was that under the Taliban, tax collection was 
more formalised and accepted in Panjab District than appears to have been the 
case in Shibar or Bamyan Districts, where taxes, tithes and tributes were levied 
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frequently and randomly. In 1999, the Taliban-supporting officials in Panjab levied 
tax only once and on the basis of records of land ownership. The charge was the 
equivalent of US$6 per daftar. Landlords required tenants to pay a share. 
 
The oldest staying ijaradar (tenant) in Doni Nayab has lived and worked land in this 
district for 14 years. The other six have been in the Gudar Valley five years or less. 
Each has a son or sons who works or is looking for work outside of the valley — in 
Iran and Pakistan, or in Balkh and in Ghazni Provinces. Five of these sons have left 
their wives (some with children) in the village with their fathers-in-law. These 
women assist their fathers-in-law with farm work. 
 
Nineteen households are dehqan (workers) for one of three landowners, providing 
labour in exchange for one-quarter of the product. Each is allocated a fixed area of 
irrigated and rain-fed land to cultivate, and is required to collect thorn bushes and 
dung for winter fuel. In winter they will clean out the stalls and care for the 
owners’ animals. Around half of these workers come from neighbouring Warras 
District, and half from other areas in Panjab. Most expect to move on at the end of 
the season. Some said they had worked for around 20 different landlords. The 
critical incentive after food is shelter for the bitter winter for themselves and the 
few sheep they own. Over half own sheep. None of the dehqan has ever owned 
land or expects to own land, nor have any of the 19 ever owned a house of their 
own. Most would like to acquire more sheep. Their fathers were landless workers. 
Their sons are also landless workers. Few of the mature sons have had funds to 
travel to Kabul or beyond to look for work. They contribute to the farm work. 
Younger sons are usually sent to mind the landlords’ stock, for which they are paid 
around US$20 each summer season.  
 
One dehqan remarked on land relations: 
 
“Our lives have got worse, not better. The golden time was the king’s time. 
Daoud’s time was not good for us because Kuchis interfered with our lives. They 
roamed freely in these valleys with their cattle and didn’t care if the crops we 
grew for our masters were destroyed. We were harassed a lot. If they found us 
cultivating in the rain-fed areas away from the village, they beat us. Daoud’s 
government supported them. They told us that we had to let the Kuchis 
persecute us because it was their land. They told us that all the land above the 
streams belonged to Kuchis and we should be hospitable to our guests as is the 





“When Taraki came to power we heard that we would get land, but his life was 
short. Had he lived, we would have been given land. That was the law of 
communism. Those who fear God could not accept communism because it has 




The workers in Doni Nayab are related, belonging to five extended households. 
They try to move and work together. Each worker is in debt to the local 
shopkeeper. He permits them to borrow up to a certain amount (see Box 8). After 
that, they must beg small amounts of food from each other and borrow from the 
landlord against their crop-share.  
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Box 8:  The Shopkeeper of Gudar Valley 
 
The shopkeeper is new to the valley, having left his home area in Warras due to a family 
land feud. He adds ten percent to all items which are sold on credit to cover what would 
otherwise be interest. He knows of no landless person in the valley who does not buy on 
credit. Some of those who are small landowners also get products on credit. He only lends 
to people he personally knows. He receives 15 or more requests to provide credit each 
week. If he did not provide credit, few would be able to use his shop and he would have no 
business. The average debt is 3,000 Afs (US$62). He does not allow a debt to exceed this 
amount and requires all debts paid after three months. If a person can’t bring cash, then he 
may bring dried curds, a goat or a sheep, which he then trades in Panjab. The shopkeeper 
provides no cash loans.  “If I had cash I would buy more items for the shop,” he said. The 
items he sells are wheat, wheat flour, sugar, rice, soap, oil, kerosene and sweets. The only 
customers who pay in cash are landlords and passers-by. 
 
 
The four zamindar (landowners) of Doni Nayab are related. Three brothers and one 
daughter acquired land from their father. The youngest landowner is a teacher and 
owns only one kulbar of land, which he rents out to tenants. The other two owners 
are part-time farmers and at the time of survey had gone to the mountains to take 
bread and water to workers collecting ground brushwood winter fuel.  
 
The fourth, Ishaq, is the widower of the daughter who inherited a small share of 
land from her father.
135 He explained how his Hazara father-in-law had bought the 
land in 1978, having escaped Bersud when his land was forcibly taken over by 
Pashtuns. Whilst his wife was alive, she was considered the landowner, but he had 
taken over the farm on her death. Ishaq cannot afford to hire workers or tenants. 
Four years ago, he pawned the land in order to provide dowry for his daughter-in-
law. The pawnbrokers are two brothers who currently live in Iran but who used to 
own shops further down the valley. They gave him a lump sum of what is now 
30,000 Afs ($620) in exchange for documents relating to the land (tax receipts and 
the purchase of the land by his father-in-law). Ishaq then leased the land back 
from the brothers at a rate of 120 seers of wheat per year (worth about US$125 at 
current values). Ishaq has only been able to pay this amount by selling his 
livestock, as his land pawning coincided with the drought. To recover his land he 
must find the 30,000 Afs he owes in cash. He is concerned the brothers will take his 
land this year when they return from Iran. At best, they may agree to increase the 
crop share to 200 seers which he cannot achieve. Three of his sons, including the 
son whose dowry he paid, are in Iran and Pakistan, but none have been able to 
remit funds. Ishaq is resigned to losing his land. 
Panjab District:  The Khdak Takhta Valley 
This area includes nine settlements and 100 households. More than 20 households 
are still absent, having fled during the unsettled times of the 1990s. Landowners in 
these communities are related, and the area is considered a discrete clan-based 
manteqa. Settlement dates back to the early Habibullah years (1900s), resulting 
from the same kind of land grants as occurred in the Nargas and Gudar Valleys. 
However, in this instance, the lead mir had no historical connection with this area; 
his father had been born in Warras. Unlike most Panjab valleys, the valley hills are 
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stony and so there is little rain-fed cultivation. The valley bottom is expansive and 
fertile. 
Deh Pioetab 
Landowners in the Khdak Takhta Valley
136 volunteered that their land has always 
been under threat.  “In the days of Taraki we were called feudales and our farmers 
were called kargar or mustazaf (the oppressed).  Government threatened to take 
our land like they did in Lal, Warras and Daikundi districts, but these threats never 
came to anything.” Even in the time of the factions during the 1980s and 1990s, 
they expected to lose their land. “Only the Taliban cooled things down and told us 
we would not lose our land.”
137 
 
Table 8: The Hamlets and Owners of Khdak Takhta Valley  






1  Deh Pioetab  1  6  6  13 
2  Sia Sang  6  0  1  7 
3  Qalai-i-Miana  8  0  4  12 
4  Qalai Qazi  8  0  4  12 
5  Sorkh Qabi  10  1  4  15 
6  Naw Bolai  15  0  0  15 
7  Dai Sorkhi  1  0  3  4 
8  Kachari  8  2  7  17 
9  Sari Goli  2  0  2  4 
  TOTAL  59  9  31  99 
 
Problems were experienced, however, with the Kuchis. Farmers in the area 
complained of the way the Kuchis came to graze, with sometimes thousands of 
cattle. It became worse during Daoud’s time (1973-1978): 
 
“During that time, the Kuchis were free to do what they liked. Before that, 
they used to behave themselves and kept their stock away from our fields. 
But during Daoud’s time they grew thorns. They were protected by Daoud’s 
government. Even the provincial head of police told the people of Panjab 
that if they did not let the Kuchis graze, he would turn into a cow and eat all 
our crops. Every child now knows this in Panjab.”
138 
 
The period of the control by mujahiddin factions was also difficult, but for 
different reasons. Khalili and Akbari forces clashed a number of times in battles 
with mortars and rockets, as they passed through the valley.  The landlords had to 
provide bread and mutton for the soldiers. Later, the blockade of Hazarajat by the 
Taliban, frustrated with the recalcitrance of the Bamyan people, caused food 
shortages during 1998-2000. Several people from this manteqa had been in Panjab 
town when the Taliban finally entered it, and were among those killed. 
Interviewees estimated that around half the population had left the area during 
the early Taliban years, for both economic and security reasons, but that once the 
Taliban settled in the town, relations were peaceful. 
 
Deh Pioetab comprises one estate, with one landowning family. The farm was said 
to extend to nine hectares (45 jeribs) of irrigated land and an unspecified area of 
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137 The landlord of Deh Pioetab. 
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hillside grazing estimated at many times that area. There is no rain-fed cultivation, 
but a substantial willow forest in the valley bottom, annually harvested by the 
owner (a truck was being loaded with wooden poles at the time of the visit). 
Among his 12 employees, half are workers and half are tenants. The workers 
(dehqan) are hired every year and said they had been given the standard access to 
shelter for themselves and their sheep and would be given one-quarter of the crop. 
They may also allow their sheep to graze the hills that belong to the landlord. The 
landlord provides oxen to plough, seeds and fertiliser. In return they cultivate, 
care for the animals and stock up on fodder and fuel for the six winter months. All 
the current dehqan  are new, having not worked for this landlord before. Their 
previous workplaces have all been in Warras District. They are all related and the 
six very large families share two rooms. They have placed some of their children in 
the local school, but were insistent that this would not keep them in the area 
should they fall out with the landlord. This they expect to do: 
 
“Landlords usually send us away after one or two years. They are never 
satisfied. If they stay for more than a year or two, landlords fear they will 
become lazy or dishonest or beg too much. You can’t find a landlord who 
will give you a good life. Why do we stay as farmers? Because that is the only 
work we know. We need a place for our few sheep. Many people go to the 
cities, but they come back without money.”  
 
The tenants as compared to the workers have slightly longer relations with the 
landlord. All six have leased land for two to three years. The current arrangement 
is that for every 30 seers of seed they plant, they must return 60 seers of grain. If 
the harvest is good, they could reap 200-250 seers. They could thus retain at least 
two-thirds of their harvest. This would be sufficient to almost feed the family for 
the coming year. However, the tenants have also borrowed the seeds they plant 
and they must also return this in the form of extra grain (around 50 seers), so the 
share they retain becomes about half the crop, not enough to live on for the year. 
Farm work has become less rewarding over the years: 
 
“There are too many people now looking for farms to work on. Landlords 
don’t help us like they used to in the past. If your family were sick you could 
rely on the landlord. Now landlords will not lend money for fear that you will 
leave. If you need a loan, you have to go to the shopkeeper, who charges 
very high prices. All of us have debts with the shopkeeper. If he didn’t give 
us flour, we would starve.”
139 
 
The landlord’s opinion:   
 
“Life is improving for the landless. In the past they had no choice, they had 
to farm. Now they can go to the cities and find jobs. In the last 20 years 
many  dehqan became soldiers and could get what they wanted through 
force. We suffered a lot because the commanders always called on us to 
provide bread and sheep for their soldiers. This never affected the landless. 
They could leave when there was trouble. They went to Pakistan and Iran 
and when they were there they sent their children to school. We could not 
leave our farms. We had to stay. Our children stayed here. It is our children, 
not their children, who are still illiterate.”
140 
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Across the river at Kachari Village, there are no large landowners but eight smaller 
related farmers, more distantly related to the Deh Pioetab landlord.  Two larger 
farms are each a quarter daftar in size (15 jeribs or 3 ha). One farm is eight jeribs, 
two are four jeribs, and three are less than three jeribs. Only two have tenants, 
both because they are absentee (one landlord is in Iran and one is in Warras, where 
he has inherited land his father bought, and is growing poppy). Four others employ 
a total of seven workers.  
 
All own “many” animals, mainly sheep and donkeys. The pasture above the 
northern side of the valley is expansive. Nonetheless, virtually no common land 
exists; what does exist is used for storing fodder and fuel. The pasture is private, 
divided “several generations ago.” As is the case elsewhere, the more land that 
was owned in the valley, the more land had to be allocated on the hills. Landless 
farmers received no share, even those who were at the time long-term residents. 
Then and now they have to rely upon landowners to access pasture for their own 
animals.  Keeping livestock is considered as important as farming, and the main 
concern of these farmers is to find veterinary medicine for their animals.  
 
This village is also experimenting with poppy production, with some very small 
plots, visibly afflicted, however, with cut-worm. Still, the farmers were hopeful: 
 
“Soon Panjab will be like Warras and Daikundi districts. We know growing 
poppy is bad but we need the money. Everyone benefits from poppy. The 
landless get a lot of money and can buy sheep. If Karzai does not want us to 
grow poppy, then he has to help us, bring more jobs to these areas — 
hundreds of jobs. If Oxfam and the other NGOs started a project in this 
valley, which gave us 100 jobs, we would stop growing poppy at once.”
141  
Panjab District:   The Ghor Ghori Valley 
The Upper and Lower Ghor Ghori Valleys include 38 hamlets and up to 400 
households. The Upper Valley (Poshti-e-Ghor Ghori) is famous for a magnificent 
“lawn,” or valley bottom pasture, some hundreds of hectares in size. This is not 
farmed due to its waterlogged nature in summer. This lawn and the surrounding 
hillside pastures have been an obvious attraction to pastoralists, and today, much 
of the area is owned by absentee Kuchis, along with many of the village farms. 
Twenty-two of the 38 settlements (58 percent) include farms and pasture that is 
entirely owned today by Kuchis. Another six (16 percent) are partially Kuchi-owned 
villages. All Kuchi owners are absentee landlords. Only ten hamlets in the valley 
are owned by Hazaras (26 percent). Oxfam in Panjab reports that three other 
valleys in Panjab District (of a total of 15 valleys) also have majority land 
ownership by absentee Kuchis.
142 Land is partially owned by Kuchis in two other 
valleys.
143 Interviews in the Ghor Ghori Valley were held in three sites: one at 
Bazaar Village near Qala-i-Ghulam Beg in Targab Ghor (Lower Valley) and two in 
the Upper Valley at Joi Hawdz and Rashak Villages. 
 
Relations between local Hazara and Kuchi owners are poor. The exact history of 
each valley varies, and there are conflicting views as to how and when Kuchis 
acquired the land. Officials and villagers agree that the problem stems originally 
                                                 
141 The group of interviewed farmers of Kachari. 
142 The Targab Barg, Akhzarat and Nai Qoul Valleys. 
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from the time of Abdur Rahman, his eviction of Hazaras and the granting of their 
lands to Pashtun Kuchis. There was disagreement among interviewees as to 
whether the efforts of both King Habibullah and later Amanullah to restore land to 
Hazaras included pasture. Many say that all the lands were returned, especially by 
Habibullah, whilst others believe that all pasture was wrongfully retained by the 
kings and sold or allocated to the Kuchis. The status of the Ghor Ghori lawn is 
complicated by the fact that whilst it is largely useful only as pasture, it is a low-
lying valley expanse. Some say that the Kuchis never gave up the valley lawn. The 
relevance of this debate is moot; most Kuchis now claim ownership of these valleys 
on the basis of documented grants of land from kings and especially on the basis of 
deeds of transfer or purchase when Hazaras surrendered their land after defaulting 
on a loan.  
 
The more important debate is about the manner in which these latter lands were 
acquired. Many agree that even when Hazara mirs  received land grants under 
Habibullah, some of this land was then sold on to Kuchis. A Kuchi castle in Ghor 
Ghori Valley dates from Habibullah’s time (1901-1919). Two landlords confirmed 
that their grandfathers had also sold land to Kuchis as early as the 1920s and 1930s. 
The majority of land sales occurred, however, during the 1960s to 1970s, and with 
a good deal less transparency. This was the period during which the wealthier 
Kuchis penetrated the greater body of smaller landowners and systematically 
accumulated more and more farmland. The district agriculture officer of the time 
explained the process: 
 
“Kuchis became very land-hungry during the king’s time (1933-1973) and 
would stop at nothing to get whatever land they could. When it came to the 
one or two big landowners, they paid for the land; land was cheap at the 
time. But more typically, Kuchis would acquire land by carrying a lot of 
unavailable goods (tea, ropes, tobacco and cloth) to the area and would give 
these goods to people on the promise that they would be paid in seers of 
wheat. They always checked whether the person had animals or land before 
they gave the goods on credit. When they came back the next year, they 
would ask for the seers of wheat, which were inevitably more valuable. Most 
people would not be able to pay the full amount, and the Kuchis would let 
them run up their debt.  The debt would grow far beyond the value of the 
piece of cloth they had bought in the first place. After several years they 
would take the sheep and then ask for the land. The land was never valued 
on its own, but was always valued at the same value as the debt. So, 
ultimately, the people would sell their land for a piece of cloth or even for 
tea. Some people would refuse to give up the land and the Kuchis would 
appeal to the government. The government would make the people give up 
the land and would draw up a document affording ownership to the Kuchis.” 
 
The numbers of Kuchis that came to the district is not known, but seems 
considerable. Farmers interviewed named eight clans
144 of between 30 to 100 
households as having come to the district. On average, each Kuchi family brought 
2-300 sheep, 5-10 cattle, 5-10 camels and 8-10 donkeys.  
 
Generally, Kuchis returned annually to the same upper pastures and their leaders 
were known by name to people in the valley. Poorer Kuchis tended to keep to the 
upper pastures. Richer Kuchis roamed the valleys, trading and making contracts 
with farmers to cultivate the farms they now owned, usually on a one-quarter 
                                                 
144 Clans named include: Essa Khail, Bahran Khail, Gorgaka, Hassan Khail, Khwazak, Niazi, Murad Khail and 
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crop-share basis. Crop damage cases abounded, as did claims that Kuchis had 
stolen local cattle. Hazara interviewees repeatedly expressed resentment of what 
they perceived as the bias of Daoud towards the Kuchis.  When tensions rose during 
the years of the Republic (1973-1978), Kuchis felt emboldened with the support of 
Daoud’s administration and claimed that they had been given all of the land that 
the Hazaras were claiming as their rain-fed lands and private pastures. All aspects 
of Kuchi-Hazara land relations were contested, including 1) the use of mountain-
top pastures; 2) the point at which pasture became rain-fed land and dispute over 
its ownership; 3) the way in which Kuchis had acquired irrigated and rain-fed lands; 
4) the way in which they handled debts and treated the Hazaras; and 5) endless 
cases of crop damage by Kuchi owners. Conflicts were many and delegations were 
frequently sent to the district.  
 
A handful of richer Hazaras also benefited. Kuchis would lease their accumulating 
lands to one larger farmer and he, in turn, would sublet plots to poorer people at 
one-fifth crop-share (panj kot). The main tenant would be responsible for 
collecting the crop-share due, serving more as bailiff than farmer. This 
arrangement exists in Ghor Ghori Valley today, with one or two wealthier farmers 
subletting farms belonging to Kuchis as well as the pasture, including the famous 
lawn.  
 
The 1978 revolution came as a relief to the Hazaras of Ghor Ghori in that the 
Kuchis were not to return for some years. Arrangements were soon made, however, 
for local Hazaras to collect the crop-shares due to the absentee landlords. Farmers 
say most debts were paid up until around the late 1980s. The departure of the 
Soviets and the factional fighting that followed meant that the Kuchis stayed away 
and Hazara tenants rebelled against paying crop-shares. Hazaras requested the 
new “government” in the district to restore their land to them. During the 1990s, a 
council of mullahs was created by the Akbari governor to hear each claim. In many 
cases, the claimants had their lands restored and received documents certifying 
this fact. The process was interrupted by the Taliban. 
 
The Taliban did not establish their authority in the area until October 1998, at 
which point Kuchis felt it safe to return.
145 A dominant Kuchi leader, Naim Koochi, 
was a senior commander with the Taliban and persuaded the leadership that he 
should be sent to Panjab to disarm the Hazaras. He arrived in May 1999 with a 
decree to this effect, and an unspecified number of soldiers (some claimed they 
numbered 3,000). Valley by valley Naim Koochi proceeded to systematically disarm 
people (often larger landlords), but he also allegedly collected their livestock, 
crops and documents and set about collecting sharecropping debts of the past 12 
years. Those who had complained to the earlier council were especially targeted. 
Their homes, farms and animals were looted. Some were seriously injured in the 
process. IOUs were forcibly extracted, itemising the debts that were still owed 
over and above the animals taken. More land was signed over to the creditors:  
 
 “In some cases, even those who had no relations with Kuchis and owed them 
nothing had their animals taken. I had animals on the common pasture which 
the Kuchi soldiers said was their pasture, so they took my animals as 
payment for using their grass.”
146 
                                                 
145 The blockade preventing goods from entering Panjab lasted from 1996 until October 1998. At that time, the 
Taliban entered the town and some 30 people were killed. Oxfam staff had evacuated the area in advance, and 
the Taliban took over their office. When they left, they destroyed or took with them the computers, vehicles and 
stores. On their return, Oxfam launched a massive food distribution throughout the district. Oxfam was to 
evacuate the area again ahead of the January 2001 massacre of Yakawlang. 
146 Landowner interviewed at the valley bazaar. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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People complained bitterly to the district governor, an Akbari supporter working 
with the Taliban. He reported the complaints to the Bamyan provincial governor 
and Governor Sarhadi personally visited Panjab to investigate. Naim Koochi was 
ordered by Taliban leader Mullah Omar to leave the area with his men within 24 
hours. He left on June 17, 1999, though orders had been sent to every valley 
warning that if debts to Kuchis were not immediately cleared, all would lose their 
animals and lands.  Sharecropping debts were still outstanding from 1989 and many 
farmers were uncertain of the status of their land. Those who had had their goods 
and animals taken, or who had signed over their land or IOUs to Kuchi soldiers 
under duress, sought to have their property restored. The governor established a 
second commission to hear each case. This commission was still meeting when the 
Taliban government fell in late 2001.  Since the transitional administration has 
been in place, the Hazaras have applied to have their cases again heard. No council 
has yet been established. One official observed that “if the new government is fair, 
it will support the people, for everyone knows that many Hazaras have lost their 
land in a wrong way.” Others demur: 
 
“We are poor and ignorant people and we let the Kuchis exploit us. Who is 




An NGO officer with more than a decade of experience in the area explained:  
 
“We must never forget that some of the land has been bought legally by the 
Kuchi and at good prices. Rich Hazaras did not let the Kuchis take their land 
for nothing. There are also Kuchis who have exploited the poor year after 
year. But the Kuchis do not exploit the Hazaras more than the big Hazara 
landlords have exploited the poor. Whether you are a Hazara or a Kuchi, it is 
easy to defeat poor people.”
148 
Interviews were first held with 12 local residents at the bazaar, which lies in the 
centre of the valley. These men come from one takiya khana, or mosque next to 
the bazaar, where they meet regularly for chat, prayers and events.
149 Only two of 
those interviewed own land, but all owned some sheep. The two landowners have 
around 35 jeribs (seven ha) of mainly rain-fed land each. One had sold some land 
to a Kuchi trader in the past. “If I had been given time I could have sold the land 
for a proper price but he came demanding immediate payment.”  
 
Land in the valley is currently valued at around US$60 per jerib of irrigated land, 
but sales, except to Kuchis through debt repayment, were not recalled. Most of the 
land in the area is still owned by Kuchis (from Logar). Among the ten landless 
farmers talked to, three had owned small plots at some time in the past. Each had 
lost this land to Kuchis through pawning it for goods: 
 
“They took our land in a gentle way. I bought cloth and other items, then 
after two years, the trader asked for his money. ‘Don’t worry,’ he said, ‘I 
                                                 
147 A Hazara landowner in the valley area around the central bazaar. 
148 Pers. comm., Shah Wali, Oxfam Panjab. 
149 Although the takiya khana serves as a mosque in most villages, it also serves as a place for social gatherings, 
weddings, meetings and winter schools. Even dancing and singing may occur and women may enter. The long 
winters of Panjab, when most do not move from the village, make the takiya khana especially important as a 
warm, dry social centre. Every household belongs to one or other takiya khana and this provides the community’s 
focal point (pers. comm., Mr. Waaedi, Oxfam). Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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will leave ten percent with you, just give me the rest.’ So we had no way 
out of it, because they were kind to us.” 
 
Eleven of the total 12 farmers interviewed still owe money to Kuchis. When Naim 
Koochi and other landlords came several years ago, six of the 11 were unable to 
fully discharge their debts, even after surrendering their animals to the soldiers:  
 
“We had to sign IOUs and witness for each other. The IOU says how much is 
owed. It does not say what the debt is for, so the court will make us pay as 
Shari’a orders that we pay our debts. The Kuchis will also pay the judges to 
make us pay even though the judges know that we were forced to sign the 
IOUs. The Kuchis will definitely return to collect their debts.” 
 
One has absolutely nothing to give, “not even a hen.” He had already pawned and 
lost his land to Kuchis and is also now indebted to one of the shopkeepers in the 
bazaar.
150 His IOU specified that he owes 2,000 seers of wheat to a Kuchi landlord: 
 
“What surprised us is that the Kuchis demanded we pay for the use of the 
pasture as well as the grain we owed them. They claimed all the pasture was 
their land. If they saw you had any animals, they made you pay. If you had 
cultivated rain-fed crops on the pasture, they demanded compensation. 
They set the compensation at 1,000 seers of wheat, even though that land 
was not theirs. We know where their pasture is; it is the land which our 
forefathers sold to them, but not the lands they are claiming today. None of 
us could pay 1,000 seers. That is why we had to sign the IOUs. They came 
with the armed Taliban soldiers who had petrol cans and said they would 
burn our houses if we did not sign. We were given no chance to discuss the 
problem. We knew that one man had died in another village defending his 
land. Now we have signed, to save our honour, we will have to pay.” 
Joi Hawdz 
This village in Upper Ghor Ghori comprises 11 households, one of which is absent. 
Although cultivation is difficult, and the land considered barren, the village is 
surrounded by excellent pasture and lies immediately adjacent to the famous Ghor 
Ghori lawn. These farmers agreed that the entire area was granted to Kuchis by 
Abdur Rahman, but was restored to Hazara ownership by King Habibullah. Most of 
the land was retaken by Kuchis during Daoud’s Republic in the 1970s.  Six of the 11 
households are landowners, and five are brothers. Each inherited around eight 
jeribs (1.6 ha) of irrigated land and ten seers of rain-fed land (five ha).
151 The fifth 
brother is in Kabul, and has hired a tenant to farm his land. The sixth landowner is 
unrelated and owns only two jeribs (0.4 ha) of irrigated land and five jeribs (one 
ha) of rain-fed land.  
 
Although the family of the five landowning brothers has resided in the valley for 
generations as tenant farmers, their father acquired land only in 1979, through 
purchase. He had saved the money through working as a livestock trader for Kuchis 
(collecting animals on their behalf) and bought the land from a Kuchi who wanted 
to surrender the land before it was taken from him. The unrelated owner was a 
friend and bought his land at the same time. 
                                                 
150 This shopkeeper agreed and noted that he has 20 large debts outstanding. He said he does not charge interest 
but does inflate the prices. 
151 Irrigated land is calculated at an average of five seers per jerib while rain-fed land is calculated at two seers 
per jerib. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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Among the five landless households, four are workers and one is a tenant. Each 
works for one of the brothers. They are all new to Joi Hawdz this year. One had 
worked for 18 previous landowners in the same valley. Another had been a tenant 
for a Kuchi, but lost his oxen when the Kuchis came to collect debts and without 
plough power has been reduced to a dehqan (farmer worker). Several own sheep.  
All five are given accommodation and the right to freely graze their sheep; they 
will receive one-fifth of the crop they produce. 
 
The fifth landless farmer is a tenant. He has promised 80 seers of wheat (US$85) to 
his landlord, who is the brother who lives in Kabul. He fears that because of 
insufficient rain, he will not be able to produce the 80 seers he owes and will have 
to sell his sheep and oxen to pay and at the same time will have no food for his 
family. Even in a good year, 80 seers would leave him with well under half of the 
crop. Prior to arriving here, he had been working for the Kuchis in an adjacent 
area. There was a time, he said, when he might have sold his animals to buy land, 
but it would never have worked, “They used to deliberately let their flocks into 
people’s fields and destroy the crops. This was their way of making you sell your 
land to them. That was the worst time. It was not like that under the king but got 
like that under Daoud.” 
 
The farmers recalled the arrival of Naim Koochi in 1999 with bitterness. Tenants 
and workers suffered most, they said. When the Kuchis counted up the crop-shares 
due after 12 years, it amounted to many millions of Afghanis. Even the poorest 
worker who had farmed the smallest land was told he owed US$250. Virtually all 
animals were handed over. Receipts were issued. None of these ten farmers have 
outstanding debts to the Kuchis. Nonetheless, their biggest fear is that the Kuchis 
will return. “They will persecute us like they always have.” 
The Disputed Lawn 
As noted above, the focal point of disputes with Kuchis concerns the ownership of 
the Poshti-e-Ghor Ghori Valley lawn, which serves more than half of the valley 
communities. Most interviewees acknowledge that Abdur Rahman gave the lawn to 
the Kuchis in 1893 but that it was returned by Habibullah. They regard the valley 
lawn as their common property, divided village by village, parts of which have, 
however, been appropriated by private families. Richer Hazara families, such as 
the Akbar Khan family from the Nargas Valley, took some of the lawn in the 1900s 
and then sold their share to the Kuchis during the king’s time (1960s). “We need a 
fair government to listen to our case. Even if the lawn did once belong to the 
Kuchis, landlords should not have sold it to them, as the lawn belongs to all 
people, not to one household.”
152  
 
In the interim, Kuchi claims to the land appear to hold. They have leased the lawn 
to four Hazaras who pay 100 seers of wheat to the Kuchi owner (around US$105) 
and, in turn, levy a fee of 500 Afs (US$10) per year for each animal grazing the 
lawn. These tenants are also responsible for collecting rents from tenants who 
farm Kuchi-owned lands. The profits to the four Hazaras are enormous.  
 
The eldest brother of the Joi Hawdz owners is one of the four lessees. Because he 
is in Kabul, he has instructed the second brother to do the work. When re-
interviewed, this landowner admitted that he is the rent collector for the Kuchis. 
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He also acknowledged that he has so far met with enormous resistance, 
particularly by those who are asked to pay rent for their fields on land which 
Hazaras dispute as belonging to the Kuchis. Others resent paying fees to use the 
valley pasture. Many refuse to pay the fees. He agreed with the above farmer that 
there is a need for a fair government to solve the problem, but added: 
 
“No central or district government is powerful enough to deal with the Kuchis. 
Only the Independent Human Rights Commission can deal with this. We have 
suffered a lot from Kuchis. We have been looted and we should all get a share 
of the land and resources they took from us. Those who suffered most should 
get the biggest share. The Kuchis never differentiated between barren and 
other land. They treated us as their servants. Even workers with sheep had to 
pay. They didn’t care whose land it was, just that it was pasture. Daoud made 
the problem worse by telling Kuchis that pasture was public land. He told the 
Kuchis they could use any pasture they liked, as long as they pay a stock fee to 
government. They insulted us and took our land and our goods. When they 
came in those years, we would leave our houses for weeks because otherwise 
we would have to cook for them and kill our own stock for them to eat.” 
Rashak 
Rashak Village lies on the western side of the Upper Ghor Ghori Valley, a mile or so 
from Joi Hawdz. It is inhabited by 18 families. Four of these families are the 
descendants of the owner, who was killed by Kuchis in 1973 for refusing to give up 
his land to them. The villagers told how one night the Kuchis pulled the man from 
his house, took him to their tents and killed him. The eldest daughter, two years 
old at the time, introduced herself thus: 
 
“This is our land. The Kuchis still claim it but we will never surrender it. I 
live here with my husband, my sister and her husband and two brothers. We 
are only living to revenge our father. We are waiting for the Kuchis who 
killed my father to return and we will kill them.” 
 
Rashak was entirely looted during the Naim Koochi visit in 1999. Stock, food and 
blankets were all taken from the houses. Since then, the brother from Joi Hawdz 
has come every few months asking the owners to leave the Kuchis’ land. He also 
collects rent from those farmers who accept that the Kuchis secured the land for 
themselves. One tenant observed that he does not mind to whom he pays the rent, 
to the daughter of the original owner or to the Kuchis who took the land, but so 
long as there is a dispute, he will not pay rent to anyone. As to the Hazara bailiff, 
he said:  
 
“He is a patient man. He takes cash only. If there is nothing to take, he does 
not mind. One day he will go to the government, and the government will give 
him armed guards to enforce the collection. That is how it used to be and it 
will be like that again.” 
 
Four other of the 14 landless families in the village are also tenants and are related 
to the landowning family. None have agreed to pay the Kuchis rent. The father of 
one of the tenants had owned his own land, and was related to the woman. He did 
not know what transaction took place in 1973 but he knows it was at that same 
time that his father stopped being an owner and became a tenant.  
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Nine other households are farm workers, receiving one-fifth share of the crop in 
return for their labour. One remarked that his forefathers had been farm workers 
and he expects his children will be farmers. “We are just simple workers,” he said. 
When asked whether he wished to own land, he responded that he could never 
imagine having the means to buy land. “My dream is to be a road worker, to get 
cash for work,” he said. 
The Kuchi Issue:  Looking at the Other Side 
It is useful at this point to see how well research among Kuchis using Ghor Ghori 
pasture compares with local Hazara views. As a member of a Danish anthropology 
research team in the 1970s, Gorm Pedersen chose to study the Zala Khan Khel clan, 
by then a well established trader nomad group in Pakyta. By chance, it was to this 
group of Kuchis that the Iron Amir appears to have granted the rights to Ghor Ghori 
as a reward for their support in crushing the Hazaras (1893).
153 The Zala Khan Khel 
leader in the 1880s was Qutb-Uddin and to whom the original firman  letter 
granting Ghor Ghori was given. This allocation was a full 400 km from the clan’s 
winter pastures in Paktya (Khost) and greatly extended their summer migration:  
 
“However, the advantages of the new area outweighed the disadvantage of 
the long migration. For it provided not merely better grazing grounds, it 
gave admission to a new trading area. Hazarajat was a virgin market which 
had been hitherto almost inaccessible to outsiders and therefore unexploited 
by outside merchants… exploitation was at first sporadic, but with the 
establishment of the first nomad summer-bazaar in Kerman around 1919 
trade began to boom.” 
154 
 
During his lifetime, Qutb-Uddin sustained the grazing land grant as common 
property, distributing its use annually to the Zala Khan Khel households. On his 
death, his brother, Maston Khan, made a permanent distribution of the firman 
grazing grounds…  
 
“… in such a way that consideration was taken to where the various 
households had their other land and to where they normally had their 
summer camp and grazing area.” 
155 
 
Although Pedersen does not give us the date of Qutb-Uddin’s death, this probably 
occurred around 1930. It is not known whether his brother issued documents of 
sub-division at this time, but local Hazaras speak of more than one firman being 
shown to them as “evidence” of Kuchi tenure. What Pedersen’s account does 
suggest is that whilst their grievance at the loss of the Ghor Ghori pasture to Kuchis 
in 1893 reasonably stands, opinions that the Ghor Ghori pasture was returned to 
them by Habibullah or Amanullah, along with irrigated lands, are not supported. 
 
Pedersen’s account does, however, amply support Hazara claims that they began 
to lose more than the Ghor Ghori pasture to the Kuchis through other means. He 
records how easy the Kuchis found it to exploit the Hazaras. The Zala Khan Khel 
had arrived from the outset (1890s) with full government support, were well 
organised and well armed, and regarded the Hazaras as second-class persons who 
deserved to be punished for opposing Pashtun dominance. Then and later, lands 
were often “taken by force and incorporated into the nomads’ summer grazing 
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156 Other areas were bought from settled Hazaras who had also been 
granted land in the area.  As traders, this particular group of Kuchis had ample 
leverage to bring local populations to their knees:
157 
 
“When after a number of summers the buyer was unable to pay the ever-
increasing sum and ended in bottomless debt, the nomad would first take 
over his livestock and later his land. This land would be leased out, in some 
cases to the former owner, and the nomad would thereafter receive a fixed 
proportion of the yearly yield. Some of the nomads became very large 
landowners …  In addition to the grazing grounds allotted to them they now 
also possessed farmlands, which gave a surplus both for consumption in their 




For many Zala Khan Khel, trade developed in Panjab and related areas of Hazarajat 
to such an extent that livestock-rearing actually became secondary. A further 
catalyst to this was the loss of part of their winter pastures in Paktya with the 
creation of Pakistan in 1947. The grazing rights in Ghor Ghori were of declining 
value, because of the lack of winter pastures.  
 
Nonetheless, the Kuchis did not stop visiting Panjab during Zahir Shah’s reign. 
Poorer Kuchi families, in particular, continued to arrive in the summer and to buy 
up sheep and goats to sell in Kabul for slaughter.
159 Some developed trading on a 
small scale and gained a steady income from the lands they had acquired and then 
leased back to local Hazaras. Wealthier Kuchis were fewer but more powerful. 
They increasingly arrived without stock, coming just to check their investments, 
including the houses they had built or acquired and the growing hectares of farms 
they owned. They came to inspect these assets and to collect rents.
160 Some Zala 
Khan Khel became very prosperous through this activity. Some began to invest in 
trucks, forming a transport association among themselves.
161 Others focused on 
land acquisition and increased their holdings. Some began to buy up land even 
further north, most notably at first in Dahani-i-Ghori in Baghlan.
162 
 
The 1970s saw trading with Hazaras decline, as a result of both the drought and 
loss of purchasing power and government support for the establishment of 
permanent bazaars in town centres. During the early 1980s, some Zala Khan Khel 
attempted to re-enter Hazarajat, seeking to recover debts from the Hazaras and to 
do a little trading. They were halted by armed Hazaras who demanded payment for 
passage and the use of pastures.
163 By 1986, Pedersen found virtually the entire 
Zala Khan Khel clan in exile in Pakistan, living at 12 different sites.
164 None were 
raising livestock. Former truck-owning Zala Khan Khel had brought so much wealth 
into Pakistan, they were able to invest in commerce and the local Peshawar 
property market.
165 Nonetheless, they were still living in black tents and moving 
between two sites in a form of seasonal migration. In 1986 their interest in re-
establishing their nomadism was still very high but they feared they would be taxed 
upon entry in Hazarajat and that the Hazaras would not acknowledge the old 
                                                 
156  Pedersen, op cit., 130. 
157  Ibid, 134. 
158  Ibid, 133. 
159  Ibid, 96. 
160  Ibid. 
161  Ibid, 96-97.  
162  A first purchase of 1,200 jeribs (240 ha) was made by 20 Kuchi households of this clan in 1956 (Ibid, 96). 
163  Ibid, 241. 
164  Ibid, 227. 
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firmans of the Iron Amir, upon which their wealth had been built.
166  As we have 
seen earlier, an attempt to recapture the benefits of their acquisitions in Panjab in 
1999 failed — but possibly not irrevocably so. 
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There is little doubt that people in Bamyan Province feel under enormous pressure 
in their agrarian livelihoods, and that problems relating to their control over land 
resources are central to this. First, the landscape itself is hostile to flourishing 
cultivation, and many communities are unable to produce more than 50 percent of 
their subsistence food needs. While non-arable land is expansive, much of it is too 
high, too cold and too dry and barren to be of much use other than for the 
collection of shrubs for winter fuel. That is, rich pasture is not as abundant as 
often supposed, and the handful of lowland pastures like Ghor Ghori, the exception 
rather than the rule.
167 Hillsides in most of the districts are very steep, and rain-
fed cultivation above the valleys is in some areas a waste of precious seed in many 
years and perilous for soil stability and quality. Even without external pressures, 
the eking out of a living from the land in many parts of Bamyan Province (if not 
around Bamyan City itself) can be a desperate business, but one that the majority 
are bound to undertake year after year. As we have seen, escape to the cities 
(forced or otherwise) has been steady for nigh on a century, but the rewards 
therein seem limited in terms of reinvestment of urban gains in the home farm. For 
a significant number of migrants from Hazarajat, membership in a rural underclass 
may merely be exchanged for membership in an urban underclass. 
 
It is also evident that socio-political events of the last century have conspired to 
exacerbate the difficulties already faced by people in Bamyan Province. The Iron 
Amir’s reign of 1880-1901 was indisputably a cruel and dramatic one, and 
established a pattern of state-driven and ethnically-coloured subordination and 
exploitation that was far from relieved with this death. Abuse of the communal and 
private land rights of Hazaras has been a continuing feature of life in Bamyan in 
the 20
th century and a platform for other abuses. Ghilzai Kuchis have often served 
as an instrument in this unhappy state of affairs, aided and abetted by seriously 
inequitable relations within the Hazara community itself. Whether from a 
communal or individual perspective, resolution of land ownership issues seems 
crucial to the broader recovery of the area.  
 
Below, tenure trends suggested by the findings of this short study are identified 
and briefly reviewed.  
1. The size of farms may be becoming more even. 
In the literature of the 20
th century and even from informants in this minor survey, 
we are told that very large estates disappeared with the dismantlement of the mir 
leadership under Abdur Rahman, and that median farm size has continued to 
decline, mainly through generational subdivision. It may be assumed that the 
largest farms, indicated in Table 9 as examples of the present, are smaller than 
those of a 100 or even 50 years ago. It may well be the case that the gap between 
the very large and small farms has closed somewhat.
168 Differences among districts 
and even villages are, however, so stark that a cumulative average is not 
meaningful. These differences by area are very clear in the collated village data in 
Table 9. 
                                                 
167 The expansive Yakawlang pastures of Dara-Souf, Kham Nile and Sarn’Qoul pastures are other exceptions. 
168 A small survey conducted in Bamyan by the Swedish Agricultural Survey found that owners averaged farms of 
two hectares (SCA 1993, op cit., Table 4). Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 




Table 9: Range and Mean of Farm Sizes in Study Sites 











1  Bamyan  Siya Khar Bolaq  0 – 60  12  2.4 
2    Alibeg  0 – 50  8  1.6 
3    Borghaso  0 – 30  8  1.6 
4    Dashti-e-
Borsianas 
0 – 20  5  1 
5  Shibar   Kalo  0 – 25  5  1 
6    Kafshandaz  0 – 2.5   1  0.2 
7    Ashoor  0 – 1  0.6  0.1 
8    Khoshkak*  0 – 1.2  0.7  0.1 
9  Panjab  Nargas  0 – 720   8**  1.6 
10    Doni Nayab  0 – 36  22  4.4 
11    Deh Pioetab  0 – 45  45 (1 owner)  9 
12    Kachari*  0 – 15  6.5  1.3 
13    Bazaar  0 – 35  35  7 
14    Joi Hawdz  0 – 33  28  5.6 
15    Rashak  No data on farm size 
* excludes rain-fed lands, sizes unable to be estimated. 
** this includes 11 owners with the large landlord family which has 720 jeribs.  
 
2. Landlessness is substantial and may be increasing. 
Whether a function of feudal or post-feudal land relations, agriculture in 
Hazarajat, as in the rest of the country, has always depended upon the labour of a 
large body of landless farmers and so much so that this group is regarded almost as 
an artisan group of workers; the term “farmer” implies an occupation and skill 
rather than owner. Unfortunately, chroniclers and even modern-day surveyors up 
until the communist 1970s have tended to ignore this large group of people. Where 
land ownership has been analysed it has tended to focus upon distribution among 
the landowners.   
 
Although the barriers preventing movement between landless and landed may have 
loosened, it is not known if they have grown or decreased as a percentage of the 
community. The oldest assessment with which today’s data may be compared is 
from 1967/1968, compiled by the Central Statistics Office based upon land 
ownership information that had begun to be systematically collected from 1964 
under the cadastral survey. This concluded that an astounding 73 percent of the 
rural population was landless.
169 Studies conducted by Russian, Indian and Swedish-
sponsored surveys around 1980 concluded respectively that the landless constituted 
25.9 percent, 24.1 percent and 18 percent of rural households.
170 Such figures 
accord better with those of the recent World Food Programme’s (WFP) 




                                                 
169 CSO 1978, op cit., Table 23. 
170 See Glukhoded’s ‘Economy of Independent Afghanistan’ 1981 and Mukherjee’s ‘What is Happening in 
Afghanistan’ 1981 in Gupta, B.S. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society: Revolution, Resistance, 
Intervention. St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1986. Also see SCA (Swedish Committee for Agriculture). The 
Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan. Sixth Report 1988 and 1989 Surveys. 1990. 
171 WFP. Afghanistan Countrywide Food Needs Assessment of Rural Settled Populations 2002-2003. WFP 
Vulnerability Analysis Mapping Unit and Partners. 2003. Land Relations in Bamyan Province 
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In respect of Bamyan Province, Semple’s 1998 survey of four villages — two in 
Panjab and two Warras districts — showed landless households as 21.3 percent and 
36 percent in Panjab and 100 percent and 13.75 percent in Warras, reflecting the 
diversity found even within each district. The WFP’s vulnerability analysis and 
mapping by district and using more communities showed levels of landlessness of 
between 12 and 34 percent (see Table 10).  
 
Table 10: WFP/VAM Results on Bamyan Province 
Percent  Bamyan 
 


























Source: From data in Annex 8, WFP/VAM 2003. 
 
Table 11 brings together the findings from this survey. These confirm the 
difficulties of drawing conclusions, given the diversity by even villages within the 
same valley, let alone across valleys and districts, although landlessness is again 
shown as clearly most severe in Panjab District despite that it is also there where 
the largest farms are found.  
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  Alibeg  126  49  39  10  8  42  33  25  20 
  Borghaso  100  20  20  c. 20  20  c.55  55  c.5  5 
  Dashti-e-B. 
  100  c.20  20  c.30  30  c.45  45  c.5  5 
SHIBAR 
 Kalo Valley*  c.1,200  c.500  42  c.100    c.480  40  c.120  10 
 Kafshandaz  42  10  24  14  33  18  43  0  0 
 Ashoor  22  12  54  6  27  4  18  0  0 
 Khoshkak 
  20  3  15  12  60  5  25  0  0 
PANJAB 

















 Doni Nayab  30  26  86.6  1  3.3  1  3.3  2  6.6 
 Deh Pioetab  13  12  92.3          1  7.7 
 Kachari  17  9  53      2  11.7  5  29.4 
 Bazaar  12  10  83  0  0  0  0  2  17 
 Joi Hawdz  11  5  45  0  0  1  9  4  36 
 Rashak 
18 






















*    Very broadly indicative only; no interviews by village. 
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Landlessness overall is shown as more than one-third of households. The sample is 
not smaller than that used by WFP, and the source — both village group and 
individual farmer interviews — is possibly stronger. In view of the fact that villagers 
say it is mainly the landless who are still absent from the village, this figure could 
rise.  
 
Moreover, the figure rises again if those who are definitively near landless are 
included; a conservative cut-off was used for identifying those who are near-
landless, distinguishing between those who claimed they had “little” or 
“insufficient” land to live by, who were classed as small farmers.
172 Landless and 
near-landless together constitute more than half of the sampled populations.  
 
The exact dimensions of landlessness need not preoccupy us; even if the landless 
represent a quarter of households, this may be considered a significant minority 
and indeed a “large” minority. As this study has elaborated, the landless are 
themselves stratified in significant ways. They tend to divide into workers (lacking 
tools, seeds, fertiliser, oxen or plough), sharecroppers and tenants (see Table 12). 
Sharecroppers are those who may bring one or more inputs to farming, and 
accordingly can increase their crop-share up from one-fifth or one-quarter to one-
third. Tenants are even better off; they provide all farming inputs and are often in 
a position to negotiate rent for using the land. However, even in these conditions, 
rent is set with the amount of wheat to be produced in mind, and both parties will 
endeavour to anticipate the harvest accurately and negotiate in their own favour. 
Rent in all cases was not paid in cash but at the end of the season, in seers of 
wheat.  
 
Those who own land may also sharecrop or even rent additional land. This is very 
frequently the case currently, given that many households are still absent from the 
village and some of these include landowners. A sharecropper or tenant is 
therefore not necessarily landless. 
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Workers  %  
No. of 
Share-
croppers  %  
No. of 
Tenants  % 
BAMYAN 
 Siya Khar         
Bolaq  17  5  29  9  53  3  17.6 
 Alibeg  49  ? 5  10  c. 40  82  0   
 Borghaso  20  c.10  50  c.10  50  0   
 Dashti-e Bors.  c.20  No data    “most” (15)    No data   
SHIBAR 




“many”   
 
“about half”   
 
“few”*   
 Kafshandaz  10  All currently absent because no land or opportunity to farm 
 Ashoor  4 resident  4  100  0    0   

















 Doni Nayab  26  7  27  0    19  73 
 Deh Pioetab  12  6  50      6  50 
 Kachari  9  7  78      2  22 
 Bazaar  10  5  50  5  50  0  0 
 Joi Hawdz  5  4  80  0  0  1  20 


















*  Most of those who rent in land are already landowners. Unknown for 26 landless families (11 percent) 
 
3.  The poor are actually destitute. 
Several findings about the landless that have arisen in the previous chapter need 
bringing together here. First, the fact of landlessness predictably correlates very 
strongly with local perceptions as to what constitutes poverty and with what 
presents itself to the outsider as poverty. Not surprisingly in an agrarian context, 
to be landless is, by definition in Bamyan Province, to be “poor.” Materially, most 
landless and especially the workers are destitute by any poverty standards. They 
have few to no material possessions beyond a cooking pot, clothes, one or two felt 
blankets and a hoe, and even some of these items are borrowed from relatives. 
Very rarely does the sale of their labour to landowners earn them enough wheat to 
feed themselves for a year. This means they have to beg or borrow or carry over 
share debts with the landlord into the next season. It is not uncommon for a farmer 
to have in effect received payment for his labour in advance of the harvest.
173 They 
have few other sources of income from which they may purchase tea, sugar, oil, 
paraffin, extra wheat or other basics. Most buy from the local shopkeeper in effect 
on hire purchase, paying for the goods over time, never quite discharging the debt.  
 
Debt is, however, not confined to the poor in Afghanistan; many studies indicate 
that sometimes two-thirds of households use credit at some time during the year, 
and moreover, that the use of credit is weighted towards social needs (food, 
marriage payments and medical treatment), rather than investments in agriculture 
or other productive activities.
174 However, because they live on the edge, even the 
                                                 
173 In some areas, this regime of advances is called the salaam system, but this was not encountered in Bamyan. 
174 This is well covered, for example, in ACBAR (Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief). Helmand Initiative 
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better-off landless, those with assets like animals and tools, may be tipped into 
destitution with little provocation. The most common provocation in recent years 
has been the drought, and, in Bamyan and Shibar (and probably Yakawlang, not 
covered here), the Taliban. 
4.  Homelessness is a serious problem among the landless. 
A surprisingly high proportion of landless people are also homeless. Almost by 
definition, worker farmers (dehqan) have no homes of their own. Even some 
landless sharecroppers and tenants are homeless. The luxury of living without 
shelter does not exist in Hindu Kush villages, where the winter is long and bitter, so 
homelessness is particularly serious.
175 Some live in the homes of wealthier 
relatives, but most depend on landlords for shelter. The conditions are poor; 
sometimes three landless families live in a single room. This need for shelter 
increases the vulnerability of the landless to exploitative hiring terms (the crop-
share, the type of tasks, etc.). In addition, with no fixed shelter, the landless 
migrant workers cannot become active community members and cannot easily 
sustain their children in school, or take advantage of other community benefits. 
5.  The landless are exploited. 
Both because of their pressing need for food and for shelter, especially in winter, 
the landless are vulnerable to exploitation. This comes in several forms: first, in 
the low crop-share; second, in the manner of duties and obligations they are 
allegedly required to perform, and related abusive practices they are subjected to; 
and third, in the ever-present threat of being evicted from the farm.  Little 
information was obtained on the second and third, though farmers frequently 
mentioned the threat of eviction as a problem, and often explained how hard it is 
to work for landlords. “They make you do anything and you have to obey.” One 
farmer said that sometimes their daughters had to be made available to the 
landlord. Not a single landlord was praised as kind, generous or fair, and the 
farmers do not expect them to be. In respect of crop shares, we have seen that 
this varies from one-third to one-fifth, with workers in Panjab being least well-off. 
However, the crop-share levels are well-established, and no one suggested that 
should be altered. This does not mean, however, that workers consider the share a 
fair return for their labour or enough to live on.  Rather, the system is so 
entrenched that they do not consider that it could be changed. Complaints as to 
the insufficiency of food under one-fourth and one-fifth arrangements were 
standard. Most have to buy in food (for which they enter debt with shopkeepers) 
after four or five months. In these circumstances, it is not surprising there is little 
loyalty to employers. 
6.  Livestock is the main capital asset. 
There was not much evidence that landless farmers actively seek land of their own 
— some spoke as if the handing of land in 1978/79 was a miracle. Despite greatly 
changing social relations over the last century, the distinction between landowners 
and farmers remains strong. Although some landless have succeeded in acquiring 
more land, they were in this survey the exception, and descent into further 
destitution appeared to be the more powerful trend. Land is very expensive, and 
not widely available, even should a landless person gain the finance needed to 
enter the land market. No public or common land for building remains in villages, 
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and even to build a house, the worker would need to buy land from a landlord. 
Houses are not often for sale in the villages. For the landless, accumulation thus 
focuses on the purchase of sheep and then oxen. The aspiration expressed is not to 
own land but to become a tenant and thereby be able to arrange a fairer crop 
share. Small stock ownership among the landless is quite widespread, although 
currently much reduced. Even seasonal workers may arrive with a few sheep, and 
landlords accept that they must provide not just a room for the family but a stall 
for the animals in winter.  
7. The scope for land distribution is limited. 
In a situation where very large estates and landless poverty exist side by side in the 
farming sector, it seems logical to seek redistribution of the former. The reasons 
are both social and agronomic/economic. An abundant literature exists in the 
development world, which testifies to the benefits to production; owner-operators 
have the incentive to invest in the land in ways which tenants and labourers do not 
possess. Landlords with large estates, often distant from the land itself and lacking 
in cash, also have noticeably less interest in land improvement investment than 
those who work directly on the land. One of the main arguments in favour of large 
estates — higher productivity per hectare — has been disproved in recent decades; 
hectare for hectare, small landholders appear to be more productive.
176  
 
Panjab District was the only one of the three districts surveyed that involved large 
landholders and land workers, and it was there that the constraints to 
improvement of agriculture were most noted. Erosion and declining fertility were 
visible and abundant, and the need for land development measures, even in valley 
bottoms, but also in the hillsides and rain-fed fields, was arguably urgent. Among 
interviewees, the level of interest in doing anything about this was limited. The 
landlords blamed the tenants and workers, the tenants and workers blamed the 
landlords.  The landlords are cash-short, and do not believe they have the funds to 
divert their labour or hire additional labour to take action. Tenants and especially 
workers have such a limited stake in the properties — most of them move on every 
one or two years — that unless paid to do so, they would not embark on land 
improvement measures independently. Both groups, however, agreed that soil 
conservation was important, and said they would work on such measures if paid to 
do so. Oxfam, the main operating agency in the district, is, in fact, paying for soil 
conservation through food-for-work contributions.  
 
Meanwhile, the appetite for land distribution was low or at least ambivalent. There 
was a general lack of conviction that landless people could ever become 
landowners, that this was simply not their right:  Landless becoming landowners 
would challenge the traditional order in rural society, and taking property away 
from traditional landlords was “wrong” and un-Islamic.  A number of farmers 
contradicted this view when they expressed support for the Taraki land reform, 
wishing it had come to their area (Panjab) or wishing it had lasted longer and 
expanded (Bamyan).  However, they regretted that these reforms precipitated two 
decades of anguish.  Some landless argued that landlords held too much power in 
Afghanistan and would never allow redistribution.  
 
The provision of non-private, government land for settlement was more appealing.  
However, providing land on its own is an insufficient condition to turn landless into 
smallholders; they need oxen, ploughs, tools, seeds and fertiliser as well.  If the 
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land granted is dry, they also require the means to hire substantial labour to bring 
irrigation to the area, and buy a share of the water. Among the several hundred 
households who were granted dry land in Folady Valley, only those with such means 
have ultimately been able to develop the land (even 30 years later).  Those unable 
to feed themselves continued to sell their labour and/or were among the first to 
depart for the cities in search of employment.  
8. Improving labour terms is necessary to creating fairer wages and job 
security. 
For most farmers interviewed, the more immediately useful action would relate 
not to land ownership but to the conditions of farm employment. Again, this was 
particularly so in Panjab, where most landless are very easily exploited homeless 
workers, moving farm to farm, year to year, valley to valley, looking for work and 
hoping for a “fair” landlord. They receive an inadequate crop-share to sustain 
themselves and face frequent eviction. Developing strategies that motivate 
landlords to increase the crop-share or pay a fairer wage and to give workers more 
security of tenure in the rooms they are provided, would make a real difference to 
their lives. One possible strategy could be tax incentives, exempting those 
landlords who ensure the tenure of their workers and allow them to receive 50 
percent of the crops they produce.  A code of conduct for owners and workers 
could evolve and become the text of signed contracts.  
9. Mortgaging practice needs reform. 
Mortgaging presents a major threat to small landowners. This is not to say that 
large owners do not take out mortgages, but they need mortgage only part of their 
farm in order to secure a loan. As described earlier, no cases of real land 
mortgaging were encountered; rather, land is passed over into the temporary 
ownership of the lender who may use the farm himself, hire workers or rehire the 
borrower as a sharecropper.
177  
 
The survey did not collect sufficiently consistent information on this subject to be 
able to indicate the proportion of farmers who have their land under mortgage. In 
some of the study villages, like Khoshkak in Eraq Valley, it was very high, at more 
than half the farmers; in other villages, like Borghaso in the Folady Valley, no one 
had their farm under mortgage at the time. The WFP/VAM study shows that whilst 
the majority of most sample communities borrow cash (see Table 10), only four 
percent of households sampled had their land under mortgage in 2002.  
 
Cases documented by this study suggest that the value of the loan is usually paid 
back in kind through the crop-share within two or three years. If the value of 
interest is added to this, then the debt is fully discharged by payment of the crop-
share for five years. This finding supports the thinking behind Taraki’s 1978 law, 
which ruled that all debts should be cancelled after five years of repayment by 
crop-shares.
178 The law was not, of course, implemented. In practice, borrowers 
may only retrieve their land by paying back the full amount of the loan in cash or 
in kind, in addition to the crop-share, which is regarded as serving the function of 
interest. In this survey around half of those who had mortgaged their land 
defaulted and lost their land. Foreclosure (the automatic taking over of the farm 
                                                 
177 The term mortgage is used, however, in the English translation of the Civil Code; see Chapter Three: Possessory 
Mortgage. It is also stated there it is a condition of mortgage that the mortgagee (i.e., lender) takes hold of the 
property mortgaged [Article 1773]. 
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by lenders) is not practised per se, because the lender already in effect possesses 
the land. Therefore, it is his choice whether to permit the original owner to sell 
the land to another person to repay the debt. Usually the land, irrespective of its 
value, is regarded as the repayment of the original loan. As observed in this study, 
the lender gains greatly at the expense of the borrower.  
10. Poppy production is a reality to be dealt with. 
Poppy has been planted and harvested in Saighan and Kahmard districts for at least 
three seasons, and is being tried out in Panjab in 2003. Predicting the effects of 
poppy cultivation on land relations is not easy. In theory, both landowners and 
workers should gain dramatically increased incomes
179 that could be invested in 
land. However, it is likely that lucrative poppy crops will cause land prices to rise 
and the better off will be able to out-bid the poor for this new land. Interestingly, 
no evidence of changes in the local land market appears in ACBAR’s study on an 
opium area in Helmand, even though vast sums were being made.
180  Nor does it 
appear in Goodhand’s more recent review of poppy production in one village in 
Badakhshan, where one-third of villagers were landless.
181 However both studies do 
suggest that koknar (poppy production) does promote further polarisation: the 
already landed and wealthy being able to reap most benefit from the new crop.  
Though in both areas, crop-sharing seemed to have remained the mechanism 
whereby workers were paid; both studies suggest that the proportion of the share 
may have been falling in favour of the landowner. At the same time, there is 
plenty of anecdotal evidence in Afghanistan that suggests that “skilled” poppy 
harvesters may earn up to US$15 cash per day, where they are hired by agents. In a 
district like Panjab, where there is already a mobile workforce, workers should be 
hired and “trained” to harvest the resin correctly; this could help them break the 
cycle of poverty. 
11. Women’s land ownership is not a live issue.   
Not surprisingly, women landowners are very few indeed, and the subject of 
female land ownership was of little to no interest to interviewees, male or female. 
Only ten cases of women owning land were recorded in the 15 villages among the 
400 or so landowners (2.5 percent). Not all were widows. In Rashak, two daughters 
inherited the land left by their father after he was killed by a Kuchi; the elder 
confirmed that she, not her husband, actually owns the land.  The Akbar family 
holding includes two sisters, who have married their first cousins who also have 
shares in the land. In Doni Nayab, one landowner had acquired land through his 
wife, and while she was alive, they were considered joint owners. All these cases 
were in Panjab. In Borghaso Village in Bamyan District, several farmers owned land 
that had been left to their sisters after the death of their fathers. In each case, the 
sister had surrendered the land to a brother; in one case:   
 
“I received land from my father and I also had received land from the 
government in 1979. My brother only got land from our father. So he begged 
                                                 
179 With a gross income of around US$1,590 per jerib of koknar (poppy), this will be at least 20 to 25 times the 
income from one jerib of wheat (averaging US$60 per jerib). 
180  ACBAR, op cit.  
181 Goodhand, J. Frontiers and Wars: A Study of the Opium Economy in Afghanistan. University of London: London. 
2003. Many changes were being wrought by koknar (poppy production) and this included further polarisation, with 
the rich being able to take most advantage of the new crop and control the terms with the poor. Even though 
there was a great deal more wealth in the village, the poor were receiving less alms (ushr). Voluntary communal 
labour (hashar) on the fields within extended families was declining. Social relations were also changing between 
young and old, with the former being less respectful given their dominance in both poppy production and 
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our sister to give him her share. She was willing, as this is our custom. Girls 
must get land to meet the requirements of Islam, but they are not expected to 
keep it. If they keep it, they cannot expect their brothers to care for them if 
they face problems. My brother took my sister presents. He bought her sheep 
and clothes. He praised her. At the same time he called us and the elders to 
witness in writing that she had passed the land over to him.” 
12. Kuchi-Hazara relations deeply concern Hazaras. 
The question of Kuchi-Hazara land relations deeply concerned virtually all 
interviewees, from the provincial governor to village households. While the number 
of nomads actually involved may be quite small, numbering in hundreds of families 
rather than many thousands, the effect of their presence in Bamyan Province has 
clearly not been small,
182 particularly in the pasture rich areas of Yakawlang, 
Panjab and Warras.  Participants in meetings on the Constitution in Bamyan in July 
2003 remarked that the matter of Kuchis was being raised quite frequently, even 
though discussions on land issues had deliberately been excluded. Informally, 
members of the constitutional drafting commission visiting Bamyan acknowledged 
that the issue was important enough to be constitutionally addressed.  
 
Even at the village level, it is acknowledged that the matter is complex, not least 
because the arrival of Kuchis was state-supported and formal grants of land were 
made to them from the beginning. Decades of subordination to the state, combined 
with a strong tradition of believing in and fearing the law, means that many 
farmers recognise state-issued land grants as “legal” and find it difficult to imagine 
that anything that is legal could also be unjust. And yet, drawing a distinction 
between what is legality and justice will, in one form or another, be necessary to 
resolve the Hazara-Kuchi land conflict. 
 
Acknowledging territoriality as an element of land rights 
The conflict has diverse elements that need untangling. One issue concerns the 
grants of land in Hazarajat to outsiders, in ways that have not been willed by 
Hazaras and not arrived at through market mechanisms. This relates very much to 
notions of territoriality, which, in this case, has an ethnic basis. Events in Southern 
Africa, East Timor and the Balkans most painfully illustrate that the notion of “our 
land” needs to be addressed. The more land rights are interfered with en masse, 
the stronger the territorial demand may become. Arguably, this is precisely what 
has happened with the Kuchi occupation of Hazara lands. In different 
circumstances, the very notion of Hazarajat may have slowly dissolved this last 
century. Instead, it has attained a new vigour, due largely to the effects of 
suppression, oppression and colonisation. Attempts to dismantle a sense of local 





There is also the question of what lands were granted to Kuchis and when. Local 
history and literature tends to acknowledge that the wholesale rights granted by 
Abdur Rahman in 1893 were revoked by his son Habibullah, at least in part, and 
limited to pasture in the 1920s by his grandson, Amanullah. An inspection of these 
                                                 
182 This is important in itself for the orthodoxy in that few Kuchis ventured as far into the Hindu Kush as Bamyan 
Province on an annual basis and the assumption is made that therefore Bamyan is not a serious part of the overall 
Hazarajat problem involving Kuchis. 
183 Allan, N. Rethinking Governance in Afghanistan. Journal of International Affairs. Spring 2003. 56(1) is worth 
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land grants in particular will be instructive. However, it is unlikely that the extent 
of pasture allocated to heads of different Kuchi clans was exactly defined, either 
by type or altitude. Nor is it likely that these firman clearly acknowledged that 
local people in the region should also have equal rights to use the mountain tops, 
or that a distinction was to be drawn between the pastures being granted to the 
Kuchis and the pastures that belonged to local people. It is quite possible that in 
the 1920s, largely still stripped of their assets, that local herds were small, 
especially compared to those of the Kuchis.  
 
Failing to recognize the multi-use of uplands 
Part of the problem lies in a failure to recognise the multi-use functions of even 
the highest pasture in the Hindu Kush: the fact that it may also be used for 
collection of khar and other woody bushes useful for fuel, and the fact that even at 
quite high altitudes the possibility exists for cultivation. Hazaras had long practised 
both rain-fed and “cold” farming, taking advantage of ponds and springs in some 
very high areas. Moreover, cultivation was erratic, both by season and area.
184 It is 
reasonable to conclude that some of the very high pastures that the Kuchis claim as 
theirs, as well as the hillsides closer to the valleys, had been used for periodic 
cultivation. It was normal for Hazaras in these districts to move up to the 
mountains with their animals, establishing huts (mana or chapari) both to use the 
pasture and to cultivate. Even in the 1950s, Ferdinand observed that: 
 
“…where there are good mountain pastures there is a move uphill every 
summer. This is found in Deh Zangi
185 and Deh Kundi, and is certainly 
connected with dry-field farming, apart from the pasture needs of the 
animals…. In the Ghorband, Shibar and Bamyan region we find the same 
system …”
186    
 
Failing to acknowledge common property 
A related element may be the failure to recognise that all of these lands were 
already owned, and could be appropriated by the state and allocated at its will.  A 
tendency to assume that all common property — lands held and used by groups, not 
individuals — is un-owned land underlies much of the appropriating strategies of 
governments over the 20
th century; Afghanistan is no exception.  
 
This attitude to commons became apparent during the 1960s and 1970s with the 
implementation of the USAID-funded and directed cadastral survey of the country. 
In this process, more or less any land that was not individually owned homes or 
farms, or visibly a community service area (such as a mosque), was claimed as 
public land. The Law of Pasture Lands 1970 put this into legal effect. First, pasture 
was defined as any land — even banks of rivers or marshlands — that “can be used 
as fodder for cattle” (Article 2).  Second, all pasture was made public property and 
“the people can use them…if they have official documents or used the pasture 
traditionally before the enforcement of this law” (Articles 3 and 15). Third, having 
co-opted all this land, “nobody is allowed to … convert a pasture into cultivable 
land” (Article 9). With the support of Daoud’s administration, Kuchis may have felt 
encouraged to help themselves to any land that could be used for cattle, moving 
down from the mountain tops. They could also stop local Hazaras cultivating land 
that had grass on it or was useful for pasture. For their part, the Hazaras could 
insist (if they had the socio-political power to do so) that they should be allowed to 
                                                 
184 Ferdinand, op cit., 33-34. 
185 Deh Zangi is Panjab today. 
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share the pastures if they were “public” land.  With hindsight, it is not surprising 
that Hazaras interviewed speak of Daoud’s time as “one of the worst.”    
 
The problem was that the pastures claimed by the state were not “rightfully” 
public land; they were the privately owned communal property of the Hazaras.  
The Hazara people today explain that only the most barren rocks on the tops of 
mountains and those covered year round with snow were no-man’s land or public 
property; any land that had utility for grazing, thorn bush collection or cold and 
rain-fed farming was “owned.”  Land to the first ridges was privately owned by the 
landowner living in the valley, who owned all hillsides that drained into his part of 
the valley. Land above and beyond this summit was local “public” land — that is, 
land owned by the people of the valley collectively. Another way to distinguish 
these lands, they say, is to note where the sun falls at sunrise; any land that is in 
shadow at dawn is private land. Only where the sun falls (i.e., land that was very 
high on the mountain tops) may be considered local public land.  
 
Little has been written on the land tenure system of the Hazaras, at least in this 
mountainous region of Hazarajat. However, both the descriptions of Ferdinand 
above and those of Canfield tend to support these views. Canfield, writing of 
Shibar District in 1973, observed how clan groups: 
 
“… traditionally claim territories in the mountains where thorn bushes, if 
available, may be gathered for fuel and their flocks grazed. It is also in these 




“In addition to the pasturage claimed by each qawn community there are 
extensive untillable stretches of ground among the lower mountain ravines 
and slopes which may be grazed, but not by flocks from any other valley.”
187 
 
Destruction of the commons 
At the same time, it appears that most of the commons were being privatised 
among the Hazaras themselves. Population expansion, subdivision and other forces 
encouraged the division of local pasture and rain-fed areas by household. 
Occupation by Kuchis was one such force. Government appropriation was another, 
particularly of land owned in common. The landless in the local communities were 
the losers; without stock, their rights to pasture declined, without the means to 
cultivate independently, their rights to use the commonage would also decline. 
The disappearance of local community pasture was spoken of in Borghaso, Kachari 
and Kafshandaz.  
 
Material destruction has also occurred, particularly in Panjab. There the expansion 
of lalmi and sarad cultivation has decreased the availability of important ground 
cover and woody vegetation, weed infestation and has caused soil erosion. Even in 
the 1950s Ferdinand recorded steady expansion of cultivation in community and 
private pasture lands, and pondered that this might encourage conflicts with 
Kuchis.
188 Though environmental considerations are certainly a factor that needs to 
enter the land use process, “land” issues should not be confused with issues of 
ownership; it seems apparent that Hazaras will have to limit expansion of rain-fed 
farming. They claim to have already done so, with retraction of cultivation in many 
vulnerable areas. This does not imply that ownership of these lands should be 
                                                 
187 Canfield, op cit., 63. Italics my emphasis. 
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revoked, but the way in which they use the land should be changed. This is the 
view of many farmers, who say that the future of farming in Bamyan must look 
more to livestock. 
 
Exploitation 
There are, we have seen, another whole set of issues that colour Kuchi-Hazara land 
relations in Bamyan.  These stem from the rent-seeking behaviours of the Kuchis 
with respect to land. In general, the Kuchis did not acquire land to farm 
themselves, but as an early enterprise to gain wheat and money. Not all the 
bitterness recorded in Chapter Two stems from Kuchi appropriation of important 
pastures, with or without government support. It does derive from the way small 
and poor farmers felt they were unfairly put in debt and forced to give up their 
lands.  
Ways Forward 
The main question facing the current administration is how to deal with these 
issues. The redrafting of the Pasture Law, currently underway, seeks in effect to 
restore almost exactly its terms in 1970; this would remove an important 
amendment established by the Taliban that distinguished community from public 
pastures. This was introduced in a new Law on Pasture and Maraa (Public Lands) 
under a general Decree 57 of 2000, which is technically still the operating law, 
although it has never been implemented. Article 2 distinguished between private 
pasture (individually or commonly owned) and public pasture and barren lands 
(mawaat). Article 3 specified that private pasture could only be used by adjacent 
communities, whereas anyone could gain access to public pasture through a 
licensing system. Reintroduction of this distinction deserves attention.  
 
In addition, it is likely that a practical, locally-based approach to dealing with the 
pasture issues may be necessary. This could comprise a series of steps whereby the 
pastures within a specific valley are reviewed, named, demarcated and their status 
determined on the ground with local community members. Kuchis who claim 
ownership rights in that area, could be invited to present their claims and be 
subject to a facilitated reconciliation and negotiation process. Compromises would 
need to be made on both sides; local residents would need to limit damaging rain-
fed cultivation, and visitors would need to limit their grazing to agreed spheres. 
Meanwhile, investigation of all debts would need to be re-opened and resolved 
individually. Kuchi leaders may need to agree to cease purchasing more arable land 
in the valleys and to make the land they own available for sale to tenants and 
workers — a process that would require loan assistance to the latter. Joint 
agreements could be formulated by the two parties to regulate pasture use 
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Abdul Zol Halek, Deputy Governor, Bamyan Province 
Mr. Atta-Ullah, Judge of Bamyan Court 
Engineer Tahir Khan, Head of Department, Ministry of Agriculture [MoA] 
Gurban Ali Huqjo, Director of Cooperatives Department, MoA 
Haji Kasim, Administrator, MoA 
Ghulam Sakhi, Director of Plant Propagation Department, MoA 
Dr. Arif, Director of Veterinary Department, MoA 
Haji Kazim, Head of General Administration, MoA 
Husain Ali, Amlak Department, MoA 
Husain Bakhsh, Planning Department, MoA 
Nasir Fernandes, UNHCR 
Mark Pond, Political Officer, UNAMA 
Rameh Abdurrahman, Agricultural Adviser, Aga Khan Development Network [AKDN] 
Karim Merchant, AKDN 
Mr. Zaman, Social Organiser, AKDN 
Said Hussain Hussani, Administrator, Constitutional Commission, Bamyan 
Rahima Salama, Public Relations/Women, Constitutional Commission Bamyan 
Sylvain Marilleau, Coordinator of Agricultural Programmes, Solidarites 
Pou da Geul, Shelter Programme, Solidarités 
Gul Nabi, Shelter Programme, Solidarités 
Qsazi Attaullah, Head of Bamyan’s Court 
 
Shibar District 
General Ghulam Abas, Governor of Shibar District 
Syed Ghuam Sakhi Askari, Propagation Director, MoA 
Nik Mohammad Hassar, Attorney General’s Office 
Khrruddin Randaki, Amlak Officer, MoA 
 
Yakawlang District 
Hamidullah Saghani, Solidarités 
Mohammad Azim, Solidarités 
Ahmad Omid, Governor of Yakawlang District 
Mohammad Bagir, Chief Judge of Shari’a Court 
Syed Ali, Judge, Yakawlang Shari’a Court 
Haji Mirza Sadiq, Court Recorder 
 
Panjab District 
Mr. Shah Wali, Oxfam Panjab 
Abdul Karim, Agriculturalist, Oxfam 
Wafaehi, Social Organizer 
 
                                                 
189 This list includes only persons interviewed in their public or organizational capacity. Nearly 200 villagers were 
interviewed, mainly in groups. They are too many to list and not all names were collected. 
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APPENDIX B:  Sources of Evidence for Land Ownership 
 
Box 1:  Written Evidence of Land Ownership 
 
Customary Documents: (orfi) generally with witnessing by relatives, neighbours and 
especially local leaders. Include bills of sale and purchase, pawn agreements, wills, 
subdivision documents, etc. 
 
Deeds: (Wasayeq Shari’a) legal documents with copies in Court Registries in the form of: 
Qabalae Qatae:   Land Ownership Deeds  
Qabalae Jayezi:   Warranty Deeds 
Wakalat Khat:     Power of Attorney 
Taraka Khat:    Distribution of Inherited Property Among Heirs  
Hasre Werasat:     Legal Heir 
Taqsim Khat:     Division of Property (during lifetime of owner) 
Tamlik Khat:     Letter of Conveyance 
Ejara Khat:     Lease Agreement 
Wasayat Khat:    Last Will and Testament 
Eslah Khat:     Mediation Finding 
 
Firman: Land grants by kings, in the form of decrees, legal letters, etc. 
 
The Cadastre: Available for owners as in 1960s only: available in cards, with attached 
survey map of the property (usually shared for around eight or more properties), indicating 
name of owner, size of property, date of survey and registration. Main copy in the Land 
Offices in the Province (mostly lost); second copy with Central Archive in Kabul (Cadastral 
Department under Afghan Geodesy and Cartography Department). Carried out on site but 
most owners are registered as “possible owners,” as many were absent or their documents 
of ownership could not be found or confirmed. 
 
The Books of Integrated Land Size and Progressive Taxation: Prepared for 75 percent of 
owners during the 1970s, based upon self-reporting of land owned through filling in forms 
distributed by the Ministry of Finance’s Property Department (Amlak, now under Ministry of 
Agriculture). This was carried out by a special team formed in each province to distribute 
and collect the forms, and compile the information in the books. Compilation was 
undertaken at the Provincial Office, where the main copy was retained, with one copy sent 
back to the District Property Office and one sent to Kabul for safekeeping.  
 
Tax Receipts: Direct or indirect property tax has been a main rural tax since the 1880s, 
with landowners paying most tax, and in turn extracting some share from their workers, 
tenants or sharecroppers. A formalised system was begun around 1930, and records are still 
complete in the Ministry of Finance archives for the period 1930-1958, after which time 
provincial offices kept the main record. These records list the family owning the land, the 
area of land and the tax due. The larger the land area, the higher the tax paid, at a fixed 
rate per jerib. Annual tax collection ceased in 1978 and was not begun again until 1999 by 
the Taliban, but seemingly with returns kept at the local level. The Taliban also collected 
other taxes. Throughout the period 1979-2001, local militia also variously “taxed” rural 
households. Receipts have always been demanded and issued on payment of tax, and 
farmers use these as evidence of the land they own. 
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Some  Most   Held by those who 





Some  Some   Some  Some 
Borghaso  Very few  Few  Some hold title 







Some  Many (from 
1930s) 











Kafshandaz  Some   Some  None  Many 
Ashoor  Many  Many  None  Some 





All  Land grant deeds 
from Abdul Rahman 
Land sale docs. 
1978 
 
Doni Nayab  One of four  Four of four  None   
Deh Pioetab  None  Some  None   
Kachari  Some  Some     
Bazaar  No data 
Joy Hawdz  All  None  None  None 
Rashak 
 
All  All  None  None 
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Table 2: Comparing the Utility of Written Ownership Records in Rural Areas 
Record  Coverage 
 


















Many records lost 














Court Documents  Low: 
Mainly for rich 
persons who can 
afford court and 
registration fees 
High: 
Kept in court 
archives 




   
Cadastre   c. 26-30% of 
owners as 
existed 30-40 yrs 
ago 
High: 
100% Back up 
copy in Kabul  
Cadastre Kabul   
 
High  Low: 
As per owners in 
1963-1974 only 
 
Books of Land 
Size & Taxation 
c. 75% of owners 
as existed 25-30 
yrs ago 
High: 
100% back up 
copy in Kabul. 






High    Low: 





100% (in theory) 
for 1977; est. 
75% 1999/2000 
High  Owner 
+ Back up in 
provincial offices 







property at time 
tax paid and 
amount indicates 
size of property 
High  High: 
Tax paid in most 
areas in 1999, 
2000 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
AIMS      Afghanistan Information Management Service 
AKDN      Aga Khan Development Network 
ATA     Afghanistan  Transitional Administration 
DDR      Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
FAO     Food  and  Agriculture  Organisation, United Nations 
Ha     Hectare 
IDP  Internally displaced person, as compared to a refugee who is 
a displaced person who left the country 
ISAF     International  Security Assistance Force 
NGO     Non-governmental  organisation 
PDPA      Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
PRT      Provincial reconstruction team 
UNAMA      UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
UNHCR     United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
USAID     United  States  Agency for International Development 
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